China’s longest US ambassador vacancy provides latest sign of bleak relations
- Speculation that Beijing is ‘having a full-scale review’ and may be ‘questioning whether it’s worth it to invest in the diplomatic relationship’
- The next envoy is expected to be Xie Feng, but the post in Washington has been vacant since December, the longest period since formal ties were restored in 1979
Beijing has been without an ambassador in Washington for more than three months, the longest period since US-China relations normalised in 1979, a situation that reflects the dismal state of the nations’ ties and potentially signals a serious rethink of how it engages with the US.
The last time the post remained empty for a lengthy period was in June 1995 when Beijing recalled its ambassador, Li Daoyu, for two months after Washington allowed the Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui, to visit the US in advance of a tense election.
“I think they’re having a full-scale review in Beijing of what is going on, questioning whether it’s worth it to invest in the diplomatic relationship,” said Charles Freeman, a visiting scholar at Brown University who was US president Richard Nixon’s interpreter during his landmark 1972 trip to Beijing.
China’s next ambassador is widely expected to be Xie Feng, although Beijing has not announced his appointment. Evidence that he is the choice was seen when he played a prominent role in meeting US executives on March 24 in Beijing.
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Xie, currently vice-minister of foreign affairs in Beijing overseeing the US portfolio, is a seasoned and respected diplomat with extensive US contacts and experience. In the meantime, the embassy is being run by Xu Xueyuan, the chargé d’affaires.
Diplomatic experts say there is no problem with Xie’s agrément – the procedure by which host countries accept a foreign nation’s diplomatic candidate.
Nor does Beijing have internal vetting difficulties, unlike the contentious US confirmation process seen of late, as ambassadors wait months for approval in polarised Washington.
“Beijing has no Senate, no congressional hearings. It’s just decided,” said Zhiqun Zhu, a professor at Bucknell University. “I believe there is some grandstanding here, a way for Beijing to show its displeasure with us.
“You want the host country to know you’re not happy and you’ll hopefully treat our new ambassador nicely.”
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Many Chinese do not believe that happened with China’s most recent ambassador. Qin Gang’s access to senior White House officials was reportedly limited, a reflection the dismal bilateral relationship – White House officials deny this – forcing him to spend much of his time cutting ribbons and meeting US regional leaders.
The chill has been reciprocal, with the US ambassador to Beijing, Nicholas Burns, facing similar closed doors in his bid to gain access to top Chinese officials. “They don’t talk to us,” Burns said in an October interview with Foreign Affairs.
“We want to get to a place where we can air our differences in a very detailed way, and get beyond our talking points and have real conversations about how to lower the temperature here.”
When Beijing promoted Qin to foreign minister and state councillor in December after just 17 months, surprising many in Washington, some felt remorse at the missed opportunity.
But it’s unlikely that subjective feelings are playing any direct part in the ambassadorial delay, analysts said, given that policy in China is set at far higher levels.
“In the order of things, I don’t think he can or would want to have his personal feelings be any part of the decision-making process,” said Victor Shih, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, and an expert on Chinese elite politics, referring to Qin.
More fundamentally, analysts believe Beijing is concerned that their experienced, high-ranking envoy could face similar treatment in the US capital, undermining the respect China believes it is due.
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China also recognises that for many US officials, simply meeting with a Chinese ambassador these days is politically problematic.
That has left it struggling to assess whether Xie can navigate this environment on the ground or whether a fundamental foreign policy shift must be engineered from Beijing, analysts said.
“Xie Feng is going to be based in DC and he will be entering a minefield. The generous explanation is hesitation on their part, another is some trepidation,” said Rorry Daniels, managing director of Asia Society Policy Institute.
“I find it likely, while the Chinese leadership is now processing US policy, it’s not ready to formalise the relationship between Xie Feng and all the people he’ll meet.”
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That dovetails with a broader review in Beijing – potentially involving a policy debate at top levels – over how to handle US policies seen to be increasingly adversarial, analysts said, with the three-month delay an outward manifestation of uncertainty and tactical and strategic reappraisal.
“China wants to get a sense, are you really serious about figuring out some way of turning down the heat or not,” said Dimitar Gueorguiev, an associate professor at Syracuse University who studies Chinese politics.
“And they have reason to be suspicious on where we’re going with the electoral cycle in the US and how risky it is.”
Even as many in Washington see the need to defend democratic Taiwan against authoritarian threats, mainland China sees its fundamental sovereignty dangerously undercut.
This includes, in its mind, a steady US erosion of the one-China policy with mounting weapons sales, growing contact with Taiwanese officials including President Tsai Ing-wen last week, and repeated statements by President Joe Biden that the US will defend the self-governing island, undercutting the long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity.
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This is compounded in Beijing’s mind by a blizzard of anti-Chinese legislation, a web of “encircling” military alliances and partnerships, and a US habit of conducting much of its diplomacy in front of cameras, anathema for a regime fixated on control and closed-door negotiations.
In February, Secretary of State Antony Blinken faced off publicly with foreign affairs chief Wang Yi in Geneva, and last year engaged in a near shouting match with Yang Jiechi, his predecessor, in Alaska.
“If you know anything about Chinese culture, it’s about face,” said Freeman. “You can see an action-reaction feedback loop with this relationship forever. … We’re driving each other nuts.”
Few countries, including the United States, recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington’s policy is to support Taiwan’s military defence capability as well as its expanded international presence, objectives Beijing opposes.
Adding to China’s frustration, some analysts said, is a feeling that its efforts to reduce tensions – however tactical and driven by its limping economy and social tensions back home – have been ignored or rebuffed.
During the G20 meeting in Indonesia in November, President Xi Jinping agreed with Biden on a plan to help ease the tensions.
It called for a series of ministerial visits – starting with Blinken’s trip to Beijing in February – capped by a trip by Xi to San Francisco for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit this November.
But Blinken cancelled his trip after a Chinese surveillance balloon crossed the US in February and, from Beijing’s perspective, Xi’s outstretched hand last November has not been reciprocated, leaving China wary of trying again without some movement from Washington.
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“How do they deal with this environment where they feel like the ball is in the US’ court, but instead of hitting it back across the net, the US smashes it,” said Daniels.
“When the Chinese feel they have no constructive relationships in Washington, they tend to be paralysed.”
Adding to the delay may also be more mundane timing issues, analysts said. Many senior Chinese Communist Party and government officials promoted in recent months under the new administration are only getting started in their jobs. And as Xi has consolidated power, more decisions must go through his office.
“It could be just another appointment up in the air,” said Shih. “A problem with a highly centralised leadership, which is the case with Xi Jinping, my guess is that he has to sign off on all ministerial-level positions.”
And with Xi’s high-profile trip to Moscow last month, decision-making may be bogging down, a feature of a centralised authoritarian system reluctant to delegate, he added.
Many in Washington assumed Xie would be named ambassador soon after Qin left the capital late last year. When that didn’t happen, they thought the announcement would come during the national party congress in mid-March.
Now, some are betting on this month, after Beijing recalibrates and absorbs the latest developments, including Tsai’s ongoing “stopovers” in the US and any nascent signals from Washington.
On March 23, the State Department “China House” head Rick Waters visited China. And Bloomberg reported on March 24, citing sources, that National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan called Wang, possibly over the Tsai visit.
“We’re all wondering why it’s taking so long,” said Zhu.
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Analysts say there is ample evidence that the absence in Washington is not part of a broader inward turn, as China has engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity coming out of the pandemic.
Xi travelled to Moscow and offered a 12-point peace plan to end the Ukraine war, however poorly received, and travelled to Uzbekistan for a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
Beyond displaying pique, a vacant ambassador posting has practical costs. The top envoy serves as the eyes and ears of policymakers back home. And given diplomacy’s obsession with reciprocity and protocol, a charge d’affaires is not always an acceptable stand-in during a crisis.
Said Zhu: “It’s a dilemma. You don’t have an ambassador here when relations are bad. But without an ambassador, they can’t improve.”
