OpinionChina’s backing for North Korea sanctions is unlikely to turn the tide against Kim Jong-un’s regime
Although the latest UN resolution looks tough on paper, the White House may soon find that it falls short of expectations in practice
On Saturday, after weeks of deliberations following North Korea’s first-ever test of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2371. News reports almost universally described these sanctions as the widest-ranging and strongest-ever against North Korea.
On paper, the resolution looks quite robust. It bars North Korean exports of several key commodities – including lead, lead ore, iron, iron ore, coal, and seafood. According to Nikki Haley, America’s ambassador to the UN, the total damage to Kim Jong-un’s pocketbook would run in the range of US$1 billion, or roughly a third of North Korea’s overall trade revenue.
For an administration that has defined its North Korea policy under the flexible banner of “maximum pressure and engagement,” Resolution 2371 sure appeared to do the trick.
The trouble, however, begins with the details, as it often does with UN sanctions regimes. First, despite the alluring US$1 billion sum cited above, the actual damage to North Korea is likely to be more modest. The figure presumes total compliance by UN member states, including China, which accounts for more than 85 per cent of North Korea’s trade.
The Chinese eagerly pointed out that they would be the first to implement this resolution to the fullest extent possible, but history belies this point.