China’s own actions have spurred hawkish US turn in policy
- Denny Roy writes that American strategy in the Indo-Pacific is a result of the heightened sense of alarm Washington feels about recent Chinese behaviour
The US defence community has adopted what it calls a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP), raising questions about the intent behind the new terminology. How much US policy will change is not yet clear, but an undeniable and important signal from the FOIP is a heightened sense of alarm about China.
The term “Indo-Pacific” reflects the US Navy’s argument that in practice, there is no logic to separating the Pacific and Indian Oceans. US operations require seamless movement between the two seas. The US Pacific Command changed its name to US Indo-Pacific Command in 2018.
FOIP repeats US policy guidelines toward the Asia-Pacific region that precede the Trump administration, but with a sharpening of focus and effort in some areas. It is fundamentally a restatement of, and a commitment to, protecting the regional order sponsored by the US. The order is a set of liberal rules, norms and institutions, including free trade, respect for international laws and agreements, and non-bullying. Like any great power, the United States interprets these principles in light of its own interests, often to the chagrin of some other governments, including Beijing.
Senior US officials explicating FOIP make several consistent points, each suggesting a problem that Washington sees as closely connected to recent Chinese behaviour.
First, FOIP calls for keeping international waters and airspace unobstructed. This is clearly a reaction to China’s “nine-dash line” claim and construction of military facilities in the South China Sea along with Chinese indifference to the internationally recognised Law of the Sea.
The South China Sea leads the list of US worries about “grey zone” activity: moves that strengthen an adversary’s position but are not belligerent enough to justify an overt military response. One clear practical implication is a continuation of US Navy ships sailing near Chinese military outposts in the South China Sea to challenge Chinese claims, meaning a persistent danger of an unplanned military crisis.
Second, FOIP extols the lowering of barriers to international trade and investment. This reflects increased criticism in the US of perceived unfairness in the US-China economic relationship, China’s non-compliance with its World Trade Organisation commitments and the alleged debt-trap aspect of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”. Many Americans recognise there is tension between this stated commitment to free trade and the Trump administration’s antipathy toward multilateral trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Third, FOIP endorses political liberalisation internationally. This is an indirect criticism of China’s authoritarian political system as well as a rejection of Beijing’s opposing principle of “non-intervention in other countries’ internal affairs”.
Fourth, FOIP includes building the military capacity of governments friendly to the United States. Chinese observers will interpret this as brazen “containment”. China is undoubtedly the chief driver of this perceived US need for stronger partners, but it is more accurately understood as a continuation of the old “hedging” policy – not intended to keep China weak, but rather to build an insurance policy against possible Chinese aggression.
Finally, FOIP proscribes bullying behaviour. Americans see a rise in cases of China employing economic leverage to compel a trade partner to submit to Beijing’s will on a political or strategic issue or deploying Chinese military units to intimidate a government with which Beijing has a political dispute.
FOIP is yet another signpost marking a long-term downturn in US-China relations. Washington is not reacting simply to the increase of China’s relative military and economic capabilities. It has been clear for two decades that Chinese capabilities were on track to close the gap with those of the United States. Rather, it is the combination of China’s growing capabilities and the foreign policy of the Xi Jinping government that accounts for the hardening of US policy toward China. We would not be seeing this hawkish turn if Xi had not jettisoned Deng Xiaoping’s advice to remain calm, keep a low profile in international affairs and avoid picking unnecessary fights.
China was already flourishing without building new military bases in the South China Sea, conducting a massive government-sponsored industrial espionage program, making foreign direct investors in China feel exploited, ham-fistedly coercing US allies and playing into Southeast Asia’s fears of Chinese domination. Now, however, it faces greater resistance in pursuing its international goals.
Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Centre
