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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un gave US President Donald Trump until the end of the year to make a “bold decision”. Photo: AFP
Opinion
Edward Howell
Edward Howell

When North Korea and the US restart nuclear weapons talks, the ‘bold decision’ might be to compromise

  • Edward Howell writes that if Pyongyang and Washington want to get past their failure in Hanoi and make this month’s negotiations a success, they must realise the winner does not have to take all

North Korea continues to launch missiles and in doing so it is sending a reminder – nuclear development is not going to let up. In fact, Pyongyang will fine-tune its capabilities.

With every flight, not least in short-range tests, comes another opportunity to refine missile delivery and try out some new technology. With every launch comes another threat to the international community, not least to South Korea.

The announcement last week by first vice-foreign minister Choe Son-hui of North Korea’s renewed interest in dialogue with the United States reinforced leader Kim Jong-un’s policy speech at the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly in April. He said then that it was “essential for the US to quit its current calculation method” and gave US President Donald Trump until the end of the year to make a “bold decision”.

Months later, North Korea is staying true to its word. The end-of-year deadline and the call to the US are still in place and, crucially, Choe warned that “DPRK-US dealings may come to an end” should the US “finger again the worn-out scenario”.

While history has shown that North Korea has frequently reneged on some of its commitments, it has followed through on others. We only have to go back to 1990, when it threatened to pull out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) should the then-Soviet Union – and its successor state of Russia – establish formal relations with South Korea, to see that.

In March 1993, within two years of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Russia and South Korea, North Korea had threatened to withdraw from the NPT.

Fast-forward to this year and we should not be surprised if North Korea’s frustration with the US boils over and negotiations stall again – and for far longer than the post-Hanoi phase – if any “bold decision” is not “bold” enough for Pyongyang.

But what “bold decision” does Pyongyang want and why the call for dialogue at a time when negotiations with the US have stalled and missile tests are resuming?

Establishing Pyongyang’s intentions with any certainty is impossible. Yet, the removal of John Bolton as US national security adviser will give Pyongyang greater impetus to ask for a more conciliatory approach from Washington.

With the adviser behind the notorious “Libya model” out of office, North Korea is likely to put easing of sanctions on the negotiating table. It was after all the matter of sanctions that led to a no deal in Hanoi, when North Korea called for the removal of five specific UN Security Council sanctions imposed in 2016 and 2017.

North Korea’s first vice-foreign minister Choe Son-hui. Photo: Bloomberg

We must also not forget China’s role. While Beijing has remained silent on Pyongyang’s recent missile launches it has spoken out ahead of lower-level North Korea-US talks scheduled for this month. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called on the US to “take practical measures” and “make due efforts to ease the situation and prolong the dialogue”, urging the UN Security Council to “open a discussion” on lifting of sanctions.

China tells North Korea it wants ‘closer communication and cooperation’

An uncompromising stance from Washington and Pyongyang will not bear fruit, as events in Hanoi showed. For negotiations to work, both sides will have to make some kind of concession.

One of Pyongyang’s ultimate aims is recognition as a nuclear state, albeit a de facto one, by the international community. North Korea has become a nuclear state in all but name and does not want to give this up any time soon.

For dialogue to bear fruit, North Korea must recognise that putting parts of the Yongbyon nuclear research facility – especially unused or malfunctioning elements – on the table, for instance, will not be enough for the US or the international community.

At the same time, Washington must remember that Pyongyang will not concede on all of its nuclear facilities – declared and undeclared – in a single move. Rather than the big deal desired by Trump, working towards a series of smaller deals with North Korea would be far more practical.

The first step must be a bold step, or else there will be a return to post-Hanoi stagnant dialogue.

Edward Howell is an ESRC scholar in international relations at the University of Oxford, specialising in East Asia and the Korean peninsula 

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