As the Biden administration prepares to take the reins in Washington, the stakes have never been higher for the US relationship with China and the rest of Asia. In the latest in a post-US election series , Mark Magnier analyses the historic opportunity that Beijing had to improve its global standing as President Donald Trump insulted allies, launched trade wars and undermined international agreements. In January 2017, three days before Donald Trump’s inauguration as president of the United States, Chinese President Xi Jinping entered the heart of international capitalism and threw down the gauntlet. In a first-ever World Economic Forum appearance by a Chinese leader, Xi defended economic globalisation and pledged to fill the leadership vacuum quickly developing with the “America first” agenda Trump had campaigned on and would soon carry out. Now, as Trump staggers toward the exit after four years of insulting allies, launching trade wars and undermining international agreements, analysts and former officials question why China squandered such a historic opportunity to improve its global standing. Asian, European, Latin American and North American experts cite a variety of reasons for Beijing’s having dropped the ball. But many come down to a mindset that the West is failing and the world needs to acknowledge China’s superior system – an assessment they note that could prove premature and counterproductive. “They’ve had this giant opportunity over the past four years with the American president so unpopular abroad,” said Zack Cooper, an American Enterprise Institute fellow and former White House adviser. “It’s a combination of China’s increasing confidence and decreasing ability to hide that confidence.” “They don’t feel the need to placate others. I think that’s a self-defeating approach that’s doing a lot of harm to Beijing.” China’s moment, botched Had China played its hand better – building global trust as Trump trampled global norms – Beijing could have reaped significant benefits, experts said, potentially cementing dominance in cellphones, network equipment and cloud systems, weakening US-Asian military alliances and keeping Europe largely focused on Europe. Instead, countries are increasingly willing to join forces in sanctioning China and countering its interests. Germany, France, England, Australia and Japan are supporting freedom of navigation efforts in the South China Sea. The Trump administration has built support for excluding Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei Technologies from 5G networks globally. US President-elect Joe Biden is mapping alliances to pry open Chinese markets and pressure Beijing into follow global norms. “In early 2017, if China had simply maintained a steady hand in foreign and domestic policy, it could very well have become a true global leader in the US’s Trump-imposed absence,” said Taisu Zhang, a law and history professor at Yale University. “The Europeans were clamouring for Chinese leadership. Xi’s speech hit all the right notes. “Instead, we got three years of a race to the bottom between the two, with both countries picking unnecessary fights.” Xi’s speech nearly four years ago in Davos, Switzerland amid the alpine parties was roundly applauded. But scepticism soon spread as corporate executives noted the disconnect between well-crafted rhetoric and China’s record of state-controlled markets and intellectual property theft. Since then, Beijing has done little to ease foreign concerns. Global surveys find a sharp drop in China’s reputation in Japan, South Korea, the United States, parts of Southeast Asia and most Western European nations. Among other surveys, an October Pew Research survey of 14 industrialised countries found that 73 per cent of their populations regard Beijing unfavourably, a double-digit increase over 2019 and China‘s worst score ever. Those with little or no confidence in Xi jumped to a high of 78 per cent. No single action has eroded China’s so-called soft power – its ability to persuade rather than twist arms – although Beijing’s early Covid-19 mismanagement and crackdowns in Hong Kong and Xinjiang stand out, foreign policy analysts said. Collectively, however, they point to an increasingly confrontational regime quick to lash out at those who cross it, from individual sports teams to multibillion-dollar economies. Different regions, different issues Some concerns about China are regionally specific, analysts said. For Asia, it’s about expanded military, fishing and oil presence in East Asian waters; Himalayan troop skirmishes; and a bare-knuckled diplomatic showdown with Australia after Canberra questioned Beijing’s early handling of the coronavirus. For the US, it’s been state-backed hacking operations and Beijing’s outsize reaction to a National Basketball Association general manager’s tweet, among others, filtered through Trump’s “with us or against us” framing of US-China relations. Rankling Europe are China’s bid to acquire crown-jewel technology firms; distribution of shoddy “mask diplomacy” equipment; and Beijing’s cozying up to eastern and southern nations, undercutting EU cohesion. In Latin America, irritants include an Argentine deep-space tracking station run by China’s military and allegations that Beijing is “buying Brazil”. And in Africa, concerns include the alleged mistreatment of Africans in China’s Guangdong province; exploitative resource contracts; and “debt diplomacy”. Some perceptions aren’t necessarily well-grounded but become widespread, arguably a cost of China’s expanding profile. Rumours that China was taking over Port of Mombasa in Kenya spread rapidly despite denials by both governments, for example. Mask diplomacy in Europe was well-intentioned if poorly executed, said Yu Jie, a fellow at Chatham House in London. “In the mindset of some Chinese diplomats, they would much like to seek endorsements from developed countries,” she added. “China needs to develop sophisticated diplomatic skills.” Others, including concerns over China’s perceived disregard for global rules, may have no immediate local impact but spur fears among nations that their turn could be next. These include: China’s bid to impose free-speech restrictions globally after its Hong Kong crackdown; Xi’s reneged 2015 pledge not to militarise the South China Sea; and questionable detentions of Australian, Swedish and Canadian citizens. “China’s image has been in a secular decline across the planet,” said David Shambaugh, George Washington University’s China policy programme director at a recent South China Morning Post conference. “That’s because of China itself.” Historically, rising powers tend to overestimate their leverage, experts said, while some Chinese moves that are often condemned – stealing trade secrets; flexing military muscle; pursuing divide-and-conquer strategies – were part of earlier playbooks used by Britain, the US and Japan. But China’s position is complicated by the magnitude of its rise, its opaque state-led system, explicit and brazen global ambition and limited efforts to explain its behaviour. ‘The arrogance has gotten worse’ Experts trying to peer into Zhongnanhai, Beijing’s leadership compound, and discern motivations behind China’s increasingly shrill tone and muscular actions cite several factors. As it is in other nations, foreign policy is a stepchild of domestic politics, and chest-thumping plays well, whether among unemployed Chinese watching Trump’s punitive tariffs deflate their middle-class aspirations or nationalists eager to reverse China’s history of foreign exploitation. “Chinese leaders are more worried about their domestic reputation,” said Toshihiro Nakayama, an international studies professor at Keio University in Tokyo. “Being perceived as weak is their greatest fear.” ‘Good riddance,’ China says as Germany leaves UN Security Council While China isn’t monolithic, Xi’s strongman style has set the tone, including among strident “wolf warrior” diplomats, others said. On Tuesday, after Germany’s departing ambassador to the UN Christoph Heusgen urged China to free two detained Canadian citizens in time for Christmas, China’s deputy UN ambassador Geng Shuang responded: “Good riddance.” “Their diplomacy has gotten so much better over the last 30 years, but they still don’t seem to understand how they come across – often very dictatorial,” said a former CIA and State Department official not authorised to comment, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The arrogance has gotten worse as China has gotten wealthier and more powerful.” In China’s Communist Party-led system – where information is tightly controlled, and headlines such as “Wuhan once again awes foreign media” are common – leaders and the public may not fully realise the extent of overseas mistrust. A March survey by Haifeng Huang, an associate professor at the University of California, Merced, found that 87 per cent of the Chinese public overestimated China’s global image and popularity. “It’s possible Xi himself is not getting all the reports,” said Victor Shih, chair of China studies at the University of California, San Diego. “Chinese diplomats are responsible for sending back reports and they’re not going to send reports that they’re doing something wrong, same in this country. They tend to focus on the positive aspects of wolf warrior diplomacy.” Chinese doctrine also anchors Beijing’s more aggressive diplomatic stance, analysts said. Its “new outlook of global governance” policy at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 prioritised major-power relations, effectively downgrading ties with smaller nations, while Beijing’s “dual circulation” strategy espouses less foreign reliance, a response to US economic decoupling pressure. “Xi Jinping signalled very clearly to all Chinese officials and Chinese diplomats that it was time for China to stand in the centre stage of world affairs,” Shih added. “Chinese diplomats and officials interpreted that as a call not to concede to any foreign criticism and to hit back with policy responses – even where policy responses are not very advisable.” Replying to questions, the Chinese embassy in Washington cited comments by the foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying this month assailing foreigners for criticising Beijing’s wolf warrior diplomacy, interfering in China’s internal affairs with “so-called human rights” and threatening the dignity of its 1.4 billion people. “Do they think that China has no choice but the silence of the lambs?” Hua asked. “China does not provoke trouble – but will never flinch when trouble comes its way.” An uneven slide China’s reputation has not suffered equally during Trump’s tenure. Polling suggests that Beijing’s approval ratings have declined most among industrialised countries more concerned with civil liberties, less so with African and Latin American nations focused on development. “The United States is a geopolitical competitor with China, therefore their concerns are how you keep being No 1,” said Jorge Heine, a Boston University professor and Chile’s former ambassador to China. “But if you want to develop and need infrastructure, trade, foreign investment, and China is the No 1 capital exporter in the world, it’s a bit of a no-brainer.” “Compared to other continents, China’s influence in Africa is still largely positive,” added senior University of Oxford researcher Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou. “And people want to diversify [investment] partners, play one off against another.” Trump’s squandering of US soft power, with his undiplomatic diplomacy and disastrous pandemic handling, has rivalled China’s. The US dropped to 10th place in the Anholt-Ipsos Nation Brand Index of 50 countries this year from sixth place in 2017, while China fell to 35 from 24 four years ago, both record lows, said Simon Anholt, the index’s founder. But foreign policy experts say the US is better positioned to hit reset even as China seems to be doubling down under a potential leader for life. “Lots of China analysts seem to believe that Donald Trump is responsible for China’s declining reputation when in fact Beijing is responsible. They think once he’s gone, China’s reputation will improve,” Cooper, of the American Enterprise Institute, said. “Come January, Xi will still be unpopular, China will still be unpopular – but Biden will be popular. China will correct some of its mistakes, but Biden has a chance to really grab this opportunity.”