No matter how you look at it, that was a turning point for Hong Kong, with far-reaching implications. And at the time, the city was nearly halfway through the 50-year contract [with the UK, known as the Sino-British Joint Declaration]. And this will continue to rumble on in the next few years, given the US sanctions and the counter sanctions by Beijing.

02:13

Beijing’s passage of national security law for Hong Kong draws international criticism

Beijing’s passage of national security law for Hong Kong draws international criticism

Q: Does this mean the end of Hong Kong as we knew it, as a financial centre for Asia, but also as a place where you could find a relatively free flow of news and information?

A: The pessimistic view is that Hong Kong’s role and standing will most likely fade further, and that Hong Kong will just become another Chinese city. I don’t agree. First of all, it’s not in Beijing’s interest to turn Hong Kong into another Chinese city. While it’s true that Hong Kong’s role and relevance have declined as the Chinese mainland rises and opens up, Hong Kong is still the best window or bridge through which the outside world engages with the Chinese mainland.

Also, Hong Kong’s resilience should not be underestimated. It has bounced back from very bad situations, like the riots in the 1960s instigated by the pro-Beijing elements, against the background of the Cultural Revolution in the mainland. And despite concerns over the national security law, Hong Kong’s rule of law and its capitalistic way of life and its clean, efficient governance and its high quality professional services matter.

It is a free trade port for goods and for people, and its unique location gives it advantages that will continue to attract foreign investment. Businesses will find it very hard to leave.

Q: Do you really believe Hong Kong can maintain a free press, in the aftermath of what’s happened with the national security law and Jimmy Lai’s Apple Daily?

A: Press freedom and free speech in Hong Kong has always been a touchy subject, in the run-up to the handover and afterwards. My career with the SCMP can provide some perspective.

I started to work at the SCMP in 1996, and worked my way up to become the editor-in-chief in 2012. And until I stepped aside, at the beginning of 2016, before Alibaba bought the SCMP, there were always suspicions that the paper had changed. Before ’97, the SCMP was called the mouthpiece of the colonial government. After 1997, the paper was said to have become less critical of Beijing.

But in my opinion, the SCMP has not changed. The perception has changed. We are still the same news platform providing independent, insightful, authoritative news analysis about China and Hong Kong. Our website has been blocked by the Chinese mainland for years. And like other overseas correspondents in China, our China-based reporters have been harassed.

Now, people will look at the national security law closely because of the implementation of the law and the potential impact on the freedom of press and speech in Hong Kong. The Chinese governments and Hong Kong authorities have been saying that the law is designed for crimes that threaten national security, and that reporting activity can take place, as long as the news reporting is focused on accurate, fact-based journalism. I hope that will be the case.

I would argue, as many people in Hong Kong have, that the free flow of information and news is vital for Hong Kong, which is a leading financial and business hub.

Q: Why do you think Beijing acted so forcefully, in the way it did, and essentially shelved the idea of “one country, two systems”?

What that means is that Beijing was telling Hong Kong: “You live your capitalist life and we will live our socialist life, and neither side should meddle with the other side’s system.” It signalled a hands-off approach on Hong Kong. And both sides were really hoping to make this system work.

From Beijing’s perspective, Hong Kong had become the first Chinese territory under Beijing’s control, where Washington could compete with Beijing openly for influence. And Beijing was not on the winning side.

There were many people in Hong Kong and overseas who argued that the people who called for the independence of Hong Kong, who called for us to liberate Hong Kong, were very small and narrow-minded. They didn’t represent the thinking of the majority of people in Hong Kong. But that’s not how Beijing saw it.

To them, it was a great humiliation that in a territory under the control of China, they were openly calling for the independence of Hong Kong. And it came after Trump launched the trade war in 2018.

Q: Many attribute the changes in Hong Kong to the leadership style of Xi Jinping, and his efforts to consolidate power and create a kind of paramount leader again. Do you see it that way?

Q: Is this effort to place so much power in the hands of one leader, and move away from a collective leadership approach, a good thing? Doesn’t this create fewer checks and balances?

A: China’s political system is such that once at the top, there are fewer checks and balances. That has caused worries at home and abroad. I share those concerns. What the current leaders, including Xi Jinping, have been saying is that they won’t repeat the excesses of the Mao era. As you say, given China’s opaque politics and lack of transparency, they are operating out of a black box. So it is something to worry about.

But then again, the message from the Chinese media is that this administration will not make the mistakes made by Mao, with the disastrous Cultural Revolution that sort of put China on the brink of economic collapse.

Q: What about Xi’s relationship with Biden, and the escalating hostilities between the US and China. You mentioned that Beijing sees Washington as interfering in Hong Kong, and perhaps even instigating or backing an independence movement. What’s the state of relations right now?

But we all know that did not happen. Relations are getting worse. In many ways, Biden’s policies towards China are just as tough as Trump’s, if not tougher. The confrontational nature of the relationship has dominated global headlines. The problems started after Trump launched the trade war against China in 2018 but the underlying reasons had been simmering for years.

Japan was once the second largest economy in the world and was fast catching up with the US and spending money to buy trophy properties and investing in the US. Then what happened is that the US took a series of measures to put Japan in the economic doldrums for decades.

Also, the US previously believed that after years of economic freedom that this would lead to some sort of political freedom in China. And that has not happened, particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping. Beijing has tightened controls at all levels of society. And Xi had the constitution changed. And so Washington no longer sees Beijing through rose-tinted glasses.

Now it sees Beijing as a serious competitor or rival. And for Beijing, there was concern about the mistakes that Trump made and particularly those by [former] secretary of state Mike Pompeo, who tried to drive a wedge between the Communist Party and ordinary people in China, inadvertently helping Xi’s leadership. So they came up with rules to make it very difficult for Communist Party members or their family members to go to the US to study or visit.

If they implement that policy right now, we have nearly 90 million party members. If you count family members, it might be 300 million people. And those people represent the middle class and above. So the Trump administration alienated 300 million people! They forced those people to rally behind the current leadership.

Because of Trump’s chaotic presidency and all the stupid mistakes, and the election chaos, the attack on the Capitol, which is a symbol of US democracy, not to mention the messy withdrawal from Afghanistan, all of this has led Beijing to believe that the US is in decline.

Q: There are many signs that the US may be in decline, certainly its international standing has taken a large hit. But China also has a global image problem, according to a recent Pew study. And few see how it can grace the global stage in the aftermath of Covid, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and more. Doesn’t China also need to rethink its approach to integrating with the global economy?

It doesn’t help that earlier this year, senior Chinese officials openly talked about how the East is rising and the West is declining. That’s premature, and unhelpful. Excessive confidence can lead to misguided policies.

Q: Can you talk about how Beijing has approached the controversy over its detention camps in Xinjiang, and allegations of human rights abuses? I believe that you have written in your column that on this question and others, Beijing ought to restrain itself from so-called Wolf Warrior diplomacy and be more transparent on Xinjiang.

A: China can definitely do more to increase transparency in the communication of its policies. On Xinjiang, I’m one of the few Chinese who have been publicly saying this, and I definitely believe that China should be more transparent on the issue of Xinjiang and the so-called vocational training centres.

I can see the reason why they did it is disconcerting – so many people locked up against their will. I have doubts about the scale and breadth of allegations of arbitrary detentions or torture, or the forced sterilisation in those camps as reported in the overseas media. I cannot rule out that there are abuses, given the fact that so many people were confined to those so-called vocational training centres for months. But the allegations have been consistent, and have been there for four years.

The Chinese government has strongly denied the mistreatments, and said those training centres have closed and the Uygurs have returned to their normal lives. But there are fresh allegations being made.

So my point is that if China has nothing to hide on this issue, definitely open up to foreign officials and reporters or to UN organisations. The reason they are hesitating is that we have come to a point that the Chinese government, or certain officials in China, see every criticism of China coming from abroad as having an ulterior motive. So right now, they reject any criticism. They should be more disciplined in responding to critical views about China’s rise and its impact on the rest of the world.

Coming back to the point on Xinjiang, they are concerned that if they allow more foreign journalists, the visitors who go to Xinjiang are bound to find someone who will be critical of the policies. That’s not how a major power should behave.

01:11

Canada leads call by more than 40 countries for China to give UN access to Xinjiang

Canada leads call by more than 40 countries for China to give UN access to Xinjiang

Q: Let’s turn to the expulsion of American journalists from China, and also Washington’s decision to label some Chinese journalists as “foreign agents” and to expel some state sponsored journalists. What is going on and what can be done to ensure that journalists, whether in the US or China, can report on international affairs?

A: Yes, as a journalist myself, I find it truly sad to see this sort of situation. And if you recall that the current restrictions, and the fact that many Americans have been expelled from China is because, from a Chinese perspective, this whole thing started when the Trump administration engaged in sort of tit-for-tat expulsions between China and the US.

The point I would make is that such actions are damaging to the free flow of information between China and the US, and they are not good for either country. Let’s be honest on this one, the increasingly restrictive media environment in China is not productive for anyone. More needs to be done for journalists so that they can keep doing the important work.

I’m still cautiously optimistic that Biden and Xi Jinping are going to meet, either through a video link or in person, to put a floor under this free fall in the bilateral ties. And then I think to get the American journalists back into China is one of the very first things that they should do.

The Asian tsar for the Biden administration, Kurt Campbell, made this suggestion several months ago, which I totally agree with. I also talked about this in one of my columns.

Given the complex relationship, the best and most effective way to get both countries back on track is to start small. And that includes reversing the tit-for-tat expulsions of journalists and easing visa restrictions. That could be a very clear way of showing goodwill. But for this to happen, it will have to come from both sides at the same time.

Q: You began your career in journalism in China’s state-run media. How does Beijing view journalism and journalists? Is there some insight you can offer?

A: The Communist Party sees the media as just a propaganda tool. In every story, you have to put on a positive spin. Say there was flooding in Henan, killing people and inflicting damage on property. You’re supposed to put a positive spin on that story, saying the Communist Party formed a task force; they were the first to help people, and then you report the facts. That atmosphere means it’s difficult for Chinese people to connect with overseas reports.

On the other hand, Chinese leaders realise they need to improve their communications and better explain their decisions to the outside world. It’s sort of ironic that soon after Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, he repeatedly said the Chinese media should tell China’s story well, to the world. As a result, China spends billions every year on global media campaigns.

The most important reason is that China has done such a terrible job telling its stories to the world because of the inherent nature of China’s propaganda machine. This is partly because its primary target audience is Chinese leaders and key officials at various levels of government.

Q: Finally, what can be done to improve relations between the US and China? It’s a question we seem to be asking every day. How do you see the situation?

A: Right now, we all focus on the negatives of the bilateral relationship. That means we have not paid much attention to the positives. For instance, trade and investment has long been considered the ballast, the anchor of bilateral ties. That is something the two leaders can build on.

I met a good friend who works for a major American company, and she told me that the company was very quiet but very happy. They organise trips to the provinces, and the reception level is always high-level. And major companies, including big oil companies, are setting up new plants; JPMorgan was given its first full brokerage licence to operate here. In June, the government approved of Fidelity [Investments] to have a licence for mutual funds. Those deals are good and may help stabilise the relationship.

Xi and Biden should really put aside their reservations. They both have a very nationalistic audience to answer to at home. But they should meet and resume a dialogue as soon as possible. They should go back to basics by focusing on common interests, such as trade and investments, and reversing the tit-for-tat expulsion of journalists and visa restrictions. I’m optimistic about the China-US relationship. There’s too much at stake.

David Barboza is the co-founder and a staff writer at The Wire. Previously, he was a long-time business reporter and foreign correspondent at The New York Times.