South China Sea: how Beijing might respond as Southeast Asia bands together on rival claims
- Vietnam-Indonesia EEZ deal comes at a time when Beijing faces increased pushback in the South China Sea, both from rival claimants and the US
- As rivals race to settle sea boundaries ahead of a code of conduct, China must boost ‘deterrence’ of acts that provoke its interests, analyst says
The agreement between the two Southeast Asian neighbours followed 12 years of negotiations and finalised the demarcation of their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) around Natuna Islands, in the southern section of the resource-rich waterway.
Southeast Asia seeking ‘balance’ between US and China in region
“I don’t think China is going to accept the agreement,” said Wu Shichun, chairman of the China-Southeast Asia Research Centre on the South China Sea, headquartered in the Chinese province of Hainan.
The overlapping EEZs are within the nine-dash line, which Beijing has used to outline its territorial claims in most of the strategic waterway, Wu noted.
Details of the deal remain unclear. In response to the Post, the Chinese foreign ministry said that “negotiations on maritime delimitation in the South China Sea by the countries concerned must not undermine the legitimate interests of China”, without specifically naming Vietnam or Indonesia.
The agreement comes at a time when Beijing, after years of strengthening controls in the strategic waterway, is encountering increased pushback in the South China Sea – rendered a regional hotspot by the conflicting interests of China, the US and other regional claimants.
Indonesia is not a claimant state but its EEZs overlap with those of Malaysia and Vietnam, and often clashes with China over fishing rights in the surrounding waters of the Natuna Sea.
China ‘sending a signal’ to Indonesia with large coastguard ships near island
“I think the code of conduct will be a legally binding one, which means … countries would have to pay a cost for violations,” Wu said. “So now is the perfect window [for claimants] to consolidate and expand their vested interests through unilateral action,” he added.
“Without common rules, whoever can benefit most from breaking them would be more willing to do so,” Wu said. “And the situation would become more complicated.”
In a near-miss just weeks later, a Chinese Navy J-11 fighter jet flew within metres of a US Air Force reconnaissance plane, with either side blaming the other for the dangerous face-off.
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Chinese fighter jet almost collides with US military plane over South China Sea
Two weeks ago, the People’s Liberation Army deployed the Shandong aircraft carrier strike group in the South China Sea for intensive live-fire drills, as part of a series of military exercises after the USS Nimitz Carrier Strike Group carried out routine South China Sea operations.
“The conflicts between China and the US, including in the South China Sea and the Taiwan issues, are deep-seated and can’t be resolved by meetings between the leaders,” Wu said.
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The Indonesian Navy said it had deployed a warship, maritime patrol plane and drone to monitor the Chinese vessel in response.
Wu said Indonesia was seeking to “expand its vested interests” in the disputed waters, and other claimants might follow its lead.
“After Indonesia, Vietnam could also start its [oil and gas] exploration in disputed waters, and so could the Philippines, as its joint development with China is unlikely now,” Wu said, “there will be chain effects.”
Collin Koh, a research fellow with the maritime security programme at Singapore’s Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, said it was “inevitable” that Vietnam and Indonesia would eventually reach a settlement.
None of the rival claimants in Southeast Asia recognise Beijing’s nine-dash line claims, and a 2017 bilateral agreement could see Vietnam receive natural gas supplies from the Tuna Block as early as this year.
“From both Indonesia and Vietnam’s points of view, therefore, while there could be concern about how Beijing would react, in the broader scheme of things – especially where it concerns also tangible economic stakes, such as energy resources in the offshore blocks located in those waters – coming to an eventual settlement of the dispute would have been inevitable,” Koh said.
“I also won’t dismiss the probability of such intra-Asean settlement of disputes having the effect of even having some of these Asean parties coordinating more closely with each other on their respective national positions on the South China Sea issue, including the [code of conduct] process.”
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Fishermen in South China Sea are at the centre of territorial crossfires
Growing regional pushback is likely to make China strengthen “maritime deterrence”, including its navy and coastguard, which are “not strong enough” to fend off challenges from the US and other rival claimants, Wu noted.
“It doesn’t mean that China is to bully these neighbouring countries, nor is China to challenge the US in its so-called freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea,” Wu said.
“But China needs to enhance its ability to defend its legitimate claims, so countries may think twice when they try to provoke China’s interest.”
However, Koh doubted whether Beijing’s muscle-flexing would be effective in dissuading Vietnam and Indonesia, arguing energy interests are non-negotiable for Southeast Asian countries.
“The Chinese maritime presence in the areas where such energy work is conducted may serve as a visible symbol of Beijing’s displeasure, but until China would want to cross the Rubicon by resorting to more drastic actions that may invite serious blowback, there’s a very limited set of options available [to it].”
