China and the Netherlands seek ‘pragmatic’ reset as Nexperia row rolls on

The phone call between the Dutch and Chinese foreign ministers was a first on a series of fronts. For the new Dutch Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen, the call on March 13 was his first with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi since taking on the job a few weeks earlier. It was also the first between the two holders of the offices since China and the Netherlands became embroiled in a row over the control of Chinese-owned, Netherlands-based chipmaker Nexperia. Nexperia is a major component in the electric vehicle supply chain and wholly owned by Wingtech Technology, a company that the United States has blacklisted in its growing technological rivalry with China. In September, Dutch authorities seized control of Nexperia’s management and ousted its Chinese CEO, Zhang Xuezheng – who is also Wingtech’s founder – to prevent what it said was the transfer of technology from Nexperia to China. The move upended supply chains around the world and led to a series of swift countermeasures by Beijing. The row has yet to be resolved but in the call with Berendsen in mid-March, Wang said China appreciated the “positive signals”. “China and the Netherlands are important partners for each other,” the Chinese foreign ministry quoted him as saying. “China appreciates the positive signals from the new Dutch government regarding its emphasis on relations with China.” Wang said he encouraged the Dutch government to maintain an “independent and autonomous” approach and support normal commercial exchanges between companies from the two countries. During the call, Wang described the Netherlands as an important partner whose cooperation benefited both countries and underpinned the stability of global supply chains. The conversation marked an early diplomatic engagement following the formation of the Netherlands’ new cabinet last month, but analysts said the timing pointed to challenges facing The Hague. “A new foreign minister calling Wang Yi is the sound of manufacturers knocking on the minister’s door,” said Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa, a geopolitical strategist specialising in EU-Asia relations. The Netherlands is seeking to manage ties with one of Europe’s key trading partners while balancing its own economic interests amid US pressure and domestic industry concerns. Dutch industry, particularly in hi-tech and semiconductor sectors, which includes chip-equipment giant ASML, has warned that political friction could disrupt supply chains and slow investment in critical areas. Ding Chun, director of the Centre for European Studies at Shanghai’s Fudan University, said there was a bigger shift under way in Europe. “Since late last year, European companies have increasingly shifted towards a pragmatic approach, driven partly by [US President Donald] Trump’s [tariff] policies and partly by concerns over profits and global strategies”. “It is a forced return to rationality,” he said. Ding Yifan, a senior fellow with Renmin University’s Institute of Global Governance and Development, agreed that pragmatism was coming to the fore. “The new Dutch government seeking dialogue with China reflects a real need,” Ding Yifan said. “The Netherlands has been affected by global economic stagnation and needs more export markets, and China is the largest consumer market for semiconductor equipment. The country simply cannot ignore the importance of the Chinese market.” And vice versa. According to Chinese customs data, the Netherlands was China’s second-largest trading partner within the European Union in 2025, with bilateral trade reaching US$114.30 billion, up 3.9 per cent from the previous year. The Netherlands also plays a pivotal logistical role in China-Europe trade. The Port of Rotterdam, Europe’s largest port, handles substantial volumes of Chinese cargo. Its CEO, Boudewijn Siemons, told Bloomberg last month that “around a quarter of all containers arrive from China, and more than another quarter contain components made in China”. Wang Yiwei, director of Renmin University’s Institute of International Affairs, said some European businesses were beginning to reassess the cost of distancing themselves from China. “Many companies in Europe are discovering that the biggest risk may not actually be China,” he said. “If Europe stops cooperating with China, its competitiveness will decline further,” he added, pointing to China’s role as a manufacturing hub, major market and rapidly evolving technology centre. US pressure to curb exports had only accelerated China’s drive for technological self-reliance – a shift he argued was nudging The Hague towards a more pragmatic stance. However, Chinese investment in Europe’s tech sector remains under the microscope, with the Nexperia case underscoring a trend among governments on the continent to view commercial investments through a security lens. “The investigations into Nexperia exemplify what policymakers call ‘securitisation’ – whereby commercial investments are treated as national security risks,” said James Downes, director of the Europe-Asia programme at the US-based Centre for Explanatory Research and Scientific Prediction. Downes noted the Dutch government sought to pragmatically engage China while following a de-risking approach. This strategy balanced security concerns with the specific needs of key sectors, signalling that the Netherlands wanted to protect its supply chains without fully decoupling from China, he argued. Contin Trillo-Figueroa added that while the foreign ministers’ call signalled engagement, it did not guarantee substantive policy changes. “The signal [from the Dutch government’s investigations into Nexperia] to Chinese firms is unambiguous: regulatory approval in Europe can be conditional and reversible.” Dutch authorities could host dialogues and issue communiques, but actual investment approvals were still shaped by broader geopolitical pressures, he said. Meanwhile, Dutch manoeuvrability remains constrained by broader European and transatlantic dynamics, analysts note. “In foreign policy, the Netherlands has traditionally followed the broader European line,” Ding Yifan said, adding that EU-China relations would largely be shaped by major economies such as France and Germany. “Both continue to see China as a competitor and systemic rival, a position unlikely to change quickly as Chinese industrial products increasingly compete with European goods in global markets,” he added. Yet, Downes noted, The Hague’s stance could “tip EU dynamics towards pragmatism”, particularly as Paris and Berlin recalibrated their positions in the wake of 2025, including on issues such as tariff policy. However, Ding cautioned against overestimating Dutch independence in policy decisions. “The attitude of the new foreign minister is positive, but whether the Dutch government can withstand pressure from the United States is another matter,” he said.

China and the Netherlands seek ‘pragmatic’ reset as Nexperia row rolls on

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Wang Yi hails ‘positive signals’ from new Dutch minister as US pressure and EU de-risking leave The Hague juggling security and trade interests

Wang Yi hails ‘positive signals’ from new Dutch minister as US pressure and EU de-risking leave The Hague juggling security and trade interests