Is Prabowo’s Trump moment a sign that China is losing its favourite partner?

At a Gaza peace summit in Egypt in October, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto leaned towards his US counterpart Donald Trump and asked, “Can I meet Eric?” Prabowo was referring to the American president’s son. Trump responded warmly in the exchange that was picked up on a hot microphone. “I’ll have Eric call. He’s such a good boy.” Eric and his brother Donald Trump Jnr both serve as executive vice-presidents of the Trump Organisation, which has already built its first golf club in Indonesia and is working on a resort in Bali. The clip quickly spread online, prompting speculation in Jakarta and Washington about Prabowo’s unusually personal approach to engaging the “America first” leader. The moment also contrasted with how Prabowo was initially perceived after his 2024 election as Indonesia’s most Beijing-friendly leader in years. Some analysts at that time even warned that Jakarta was “sleepwalking” into closer strategic alignment with China, given Beijing’s deep and long-standing economic presence in the country. Yet that early expectation is now being tested, despite Prabowo’s three visits to China since taking office. In February, a White House statement heralding a “golden age” in US-Indonesia relations referred to Indonesia as an American “ally” for the first time in an official bilateral document. The designation was notable for a country that sits astride the maritime chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca and has long prided itself on non-alignment. Against this backdrop, Prabowo’s foreign policy is increasingly being read not as a clear pivot but as a stress test of Indonesia’s long-standing “free and active” doctrine. What was once a comfortable strategy of balance is being pulled in competing directions by sharper US-China rivalry, expanding economic entanglements and more personalised diplomacy at the highest level. Others frame the developments more conventionally – as middle-power hedging, an effort to avoid overdependence on China while extracting benefits from both major powers. But they caution that any sustained tilt towards one side could eventually place Indonesia in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between them. Klaus Heinrich Raditio of Driyarkara School of Philosophy and Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia of Universitas Indonesia argued that “strong partnerships with both the United States and China are not mutually exclusive”, with Jakarta’s long-standing foreign policy tradition anchored in strategic autonomy and balanced diplomacy. At a time of intensifying great power rivalry, cooperation with both countries would be “vital” for Indonesia, they wrote in an opinion piece published in April by East Asia Forum. “But absent deeper foundations for cooperation with China, the opportunity for a truly comprehensive and strategic partnership with one great power will remain limited,” they wrote. India’s Sunday Guardian reported in April on a leaked Washington defence document that outlined a proposed arrangement for US military aircraft to have blanket access to Indonesian airspace. According to the report, the arrangement would allow US aircraft to “transit directly upon notification until subsequent notification of deactivation by the United States”. It would also permit access for contingency operations, crisis response and joint exercises, it said. Last month, Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin told a parliamentary hearing that he signed a letter of intent in April with his US counterpart Pete Hegseth on granting such access but no commitment had been made. Separately, Indonesia has offered to convert the underused Kertajati Airport in West Java into Southeast Asia’s first maintenance hub for American Lockheed C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft. Questions have been raised about how much operational control Jakarta would retain if the proposal for the US-funded facility was formalised. “Any gains the US can make with Indonesia on overflight would be a boost for Washington because such security agreements are typically not easy to come by in Southeast Asia,” said Prashanth Parameswaran, a fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security in Washington. Parameswaran, founder of the weekly Asean Wonk newsletter, argued that even expanded US access would still fall short of treaty-based alliances such as those with Manila and Tokyo, which included “more specific provisions on how both sides would come to each other’s defence”. However, he noted that “an Indonesia that moves decisively closer to the United States and further away from China would be a blow to Beijing’s ambitions in Southeast Asia because of Jakarta’s sheer weight”. “The risk for Indonesia is that forced US-China choices may result in its foreign policy being less free, despite it being more active under Prabowo,” he added. Aristyo Darmawan of the Australian National University said Indonesia should not agree to blanket US airspace access, warning that it “risks compromising the country’s sovereignty and national security”. In a paper published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in April, he added that the proposal was “even more concerning” because it could allow US use of Indonesian airspace for crisis response operations. “Presumably meaning [in] response to a conflict breaking out in the region,” Darmawan said, without naming Taiwan. “This poses a serious danger to Indonesia’s national security.” Darmawan argued that since Indonesia had no formal alliance with the US, “the country is free to uphold an independent foreign policy, so the concession would make little sense”. “In adherence to its independent foreign policy, Indonesia should maintain neutrality over its airspace and authorise access on a case-by-case basis in the event of a regional conflict,” he said. Broto Wardoyo of Universitas Indonesia cautioned that a close security partnership should not be confused with an alliance. “Indonesia is not a US ally and there is no indication that Jakarta intends to become one,” he said. He described the proposed military overflight access as “not unusual” and something that Indonesia had granted before, usually on a case-by-case basis. “What has been reported so far appears to be a US request rather than a finalised agreement. Therefore, I do not see sufficient evidence to interpret it as a major shift in Indonesia’s strategic posture,” Wardoyo said. The same went for the planned maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) centre at Kertajati, he added, noting that Indonesia’s military had its own facilities and that companies such as GMF AeroAsia and PT Dirgantara Indonesia already serviced Hercules planes. “Therefore, an MRO facility can be understood not only from a defence perspective, but also as an effort to maximise the use of an underutilised strategic asset,” Wardoyo said. But it is not just the prospect of military concessions that has put Jakarta in the spotlight and unsettled Beijing. Promised economic concessions are also being watched closely by China. The developments come just months after Jakarta agreed to a reciprocal trade deal with Washington, reducing the duty on Indonesian products from 32 per cent to 19 per cent – one day before the US Supreme Court ruled Trump’s tariffs illegal. The deal is also widely seen as unfair in Indonesia, with commentators pointing out that it gives Washington a say over Indonesia’s digital trade arrangements and commits Jakarta to adopting US trade restrictions on third countries. It further mandates mining quotas to curb excess output from foreign-owned critical mineral processors. Chinese firms account for 44 per cent of Indonesia’s e-commerce market and have heavily invested in mining and processing projects in the country, home to one of the world’s largest nickel reserves. In May, Indonesia established a state-owned enterprise to oversee exports of coal, palm oil, nickel and iron alloys. Chinese investors, who account for roughly 75 per cent of Indonesia’s nickel processing capacity, have pushed back strongly. The China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia sent a formal protest letter to Prabowo, citing rising costs, regulatory uncertainty and alleged over-enforcement. However, others point to Prabowo’s visit to China in November 2024, which secured around US$10 billion in investment commitments and resulted in a joint statement on advancing the comprehensive strategic partnership and established the China-Indonesia community with a shared future. The statement drew concern because of the inclusion of language suggesting an understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping territorial claims, despite Indonesia’s position as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea. According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a leading political scientist in Jakarta, Indonesia’s “simultaneous outreach” to both China and the US aligns with its long-standing “free and active” foreign policy, which prioritises non-alignment and strategic autonomy. In today’s multipolar world, non-alignment had evolved into a “multi-alignment strategy”, she added, noting that both powers were Indonesia’s comprehensive strategic partners. Anwar, co-founder of the Foreign Policy Committee of Indonesia, argued that growing domestic criticism of reliance on China reflected concerns that the relationship had become “highly asymmetrical”. While Indonesia sought to attract US investment in critical minerals, she stressed, “Indonesia will not want to be too dependent on the US either”. “China will remain a very important partner for Indonesia and having China and the US compete could serve Indonesian interests better, such as more equitable terms, better governance and compliance to better social and environmental standards,” she said. “Beijing must note that Indonesia has a choice so it will not be dictated to.” However, Anwar cautioned that amid intensifying US-China rivalry, “it will undoubtedly be harder to avoid choosing sides”. Unlike the Cold War, today’s competition was more material than ideological, spanning multiple domains, she noted. “Indonesia and other countries will likely choose sides functionally, depending on the issues and needs,” she said, noting that while China remained Indonesia’s most important trade partner, security cooperation was negligible. The question is no longer whether Jakarta can engage both Washington and Beijing, but how long it can do so before engagement starts to resemble a choice.

Is Prabowo’s Trump moment a sign that China is losing its favourite partner?

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}The Indonesian leader’s unusual approach to the ‘America first’ president is testing Jakarta’s non-alignment policy, observers said

The Indonesian leader’s unusual approach to the ‘America first’ president is testing Jakarta’s non-alignment policy, observers said