Changing of the guard? China’s military may get a new leadership line-up
- Four of seven members on the Central Military Commission are at or have passed the retirement age and could step down at the upcoming party congress
- Analysts say Xi Jinping, who heads the CMC, has done the groundwork and is likely to be looking for combat experience and loyalty when making his picks
The last reshuffle was five years ago, and analysts say this time around Xi is better placed and more experienced, and he is likely to be looking for both combat experience and political loyalty when making his selections.
What are China’s theatre commands and service branches?
The CMC has seven members, including Xi. Vice-chairmen Xu and General Zhang Youxia are the oldest, and will be 72 when the congress is held. General Wei Fenghe, the defence minister, will be 68, while General Li Zuocheng, chief of the Joint Staff Department, will be 68 or 69, depending on the date of the congress, which is yet to be announced.
Only General Miao Hua, who heads the Political Work Department, and General Zhang Shengmin, who oversees military discipline, will be young enough to stay on.
The new line-up will be confirmed by the party’s Central Committee in its first plenary session after the congress.
New picks usually come from the pool of PLA generals who are members or alternate members of the Central Committee, preferably having been chief of a theatre command or service branch, as well as having combat experience. But lieutenant generals could also be in the running since Xi has previously promoted two to the CMC during his 10 years in power – Wei in 2012 and Zhang Shengmin in 2017.
However Li Nan, a visiting senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute, said this was unlikely to happen again. “Last time, it was a time of critical institutional change,” he said, referring to the military reforms.
Li said Xi had done the groundwork for this year’s changes to the CMC line-up. “Five years ago, for instance, Xi Jinping was not prepared. He had no network in the PLA at the time.”
That was partly because he had purged his first chief of joint staff, Fang Fenghui, and political work chief Zhang Yang after working with them in his first five-year term, according to Li.
This time Xi might also look to elevate officers he has worked with before. Xi has forged links with the PLA’s top brass throughout his political career. They have added to the military relationships from his late father Xi Zhongxun, who fought in the Chinese Civil War as deputy political commissar for one of five PLA field armies against the Kuomintang forces.
Multiple officers who served in the 31st Group Army – now reorganised into the 73rd Group Army – have been promoted to the CMC. The field army is stationed in the southeastern province of Fujian, where Xi spent 17 formative years of his political career from 1985 to 2002.
As the only two CMC members under the retirement age, Miao and Zhang Shengmin are the front runners for further promotion. Miao, seen as a Xi loyalist, headed the 31st Group Army’s political department in 1999, when Xi was Fujian governor and first political commissar of its reserve anti-aircraft artillery division.
Like Miao, Zhang Shengmin rose through the ranks of the PLA’s political system. He spent years in its General Political Department before taking on political commissar roles at the Second Artillery Corps until he was reassigned to the CMC in 2015 and became a member in 2017.
But Li from NUS said it was unlikely both would be made vice-chairmen since it would go against tradition not to have someone from the ground force in at least one of the roles.
He said the job could instead go to General Liu Zhenli, the ground force commander, alongside Miao. Zhang Shengmin might miss out on the position because he has been in a specialised role as head of the discipline and inspection department, Li added.
Liu as a vice-chairman would continue the tradition of having a ground force officer in the role, and he would be 58 – so he could serve two five-year terms before retiring.
He joined the PLA in 1983, spending decades in the former Beijing Military Region. Liu went on to become chief of staff of the People’s Armed Police, the paramilitary force, in July 2015 – a post he held for just six months before he was made chief of staff of the ground force. He became a member of the Central Committee in 2017 and was promoted to commander of the ground force and a general last year.
Liu is one of the few top PLA commanders with frontline experience, gained during the border conflicts between China and Vietnam in the 1980s, when he was recognised with a first-class merit award for repelling 36 attacks. Current CMC vice-chairman Zhang Youxia is also among that group.
Liang Guoliang, a military commentator based in Hong Kong, also said Liu was a front runner for a vice-chairman role, along with General Lin Xiangyang.
Lin heads the Eastern Theatre Command and was in the 31st Group Army when Xi was working in Fujian. He has also led the Central Theatre Command.
“Liu and Lin are both among Xi’s most trusted rising military stars,” Liang said. “Lin is in charge of the Eastern Theatre Command, which is the main force to take on Taiwan.”
He noted that the Eastern Theatre Command had put its combat-readiness to the test in the exercises near Taiwan after Pelosi’s visit. “All of this will add to Lin’s track record, not to mention that he came from Xi’s power base in Fujian.”
And it could give him the edge over Liu, according to Li from NUS. “The only weakness of Liu Zhenli is that he’s not from the Eastern Theatre … usually, those who are … have a better chance [at promotion] because they might know Xi Jinping well.”
As well as a potential vice-chairman, Lin was also seen as a candidate to replace Li Zuocheng as chief of the Joint Staff Department, Li said.
The CMC’s current vice-chairmen, Xu and Zhang Youxia, are the only two military members of the Politburo, the party’s 25-strong decision-making body. Xu, as the first-ranking vice-chairman, has a focus on armament and the PLA’s strategic support division, which provides intelligence to combat forces. Zhang’s focus is more on the military’s political work, its research units, anti-graft efforts and logistics support.
Li from NUS said the question of who might take over from Wei as defence minister was also uncertain, and it could be an officer who was not well known – though Admiral Dong Jun, the navy commander, was a potential candidate.
Beijing has also cancelled talks between Chinese and US theatre commanders in response, as well as work conferences between the defence ministries and meetings to promote military safety at sea.
Overseeing peacekeeping missions and national security education will also be among the defence minister’s duties.