Reconciliation of the two into a single bill comes next, ahead of sending it to US President Joe Biden to sign into law, typically near the end of the year.

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China’s PLA sends dozens of warplanes near Taiwan as island holds annual Han Kuang military drills

China’s PLA sends dozens of warplanes near Taiwan as island holds annual Han Kuang military drills

Taiwan

Both versions of the bill have many provisions dealing with Taipei’s defence, including assessments of a blockade of fuel to China and other military options in the event of a PLA attack on Taiwan.

And for the first time, the NDAA – at least in its House version – calls on the secretaries of State and Defence to maintain a non-combatant evacuation plan for Taiwan.

Beijing regards Taiwan as a rogue province that must be eventually be united with the mainland, by force if necessary.

Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said that the numerous Taiwan-related provisions in the NDAA indicate a congressional convergence on the likelihood of a conflict with Beijing.

“Such new measures appear to have given a more ominous signal of those anxieties,” he said.

In addition to requesting an overall assessment of Taiwan’s defence needs and US military readiness for war, the House version of the bill seeks a feasibility analysis of a US naval blockade of fossil fuels to China in the event of armed conflict.

The Senate version requires a risk analysis of a sustained Chinese military blockade of the island, as well as a report on the “range of geopolitical and economic consequences” of a conflict in 2030.

It would double the frequency of Pentagon briefings to Congress on Beijing’s military posture from annually to every six months.

Building on similar measures in last year’s NDAA, the Senate bill would also establish a “comprehensive” training, advising, and institutional capacity-building programme for Taiwan’s military – the better to improve Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.

For its part, the House bill wants the Pentagon to consider establishing a combined US-Taiwan military planning group.

It also calls on the defence secretary to invite Taiwan to the US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) military exercises within 30 days of the bill’s enactment – setting a deadline for the invitation for the first time.

RIMPAC, the world’s largest maritime exercise – involving vessels from more than two dozen navies – has been held every other year since 1992 without Taiwan, despite previous legislative calls to include the island.

And for the first time, both bills call for cybersecurity cooperation with Taiwan to “actively defend military networks, infrastructure and systems”.

In recent months, Taipei has accused Beijing of increasing its cyberattacks at the island, and The New York Times has reported that the Biden administration has directed a search for hidden malware that could interrupt US military operations in the event of a conflict with China.

But as with previous years, the bills largely avoid measures that explicitly challenge the US’s one-China policy, in which Washington “acknowledges” Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China.

The House bill includes a provision barring the Pentagon from funding any map that depicts “Taiwan, Kinmen [also known as Quemoy], Matsu, Penghu, Wuciou, Green Island or Orchid Island as part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China”.

Hu Bo, a maritime strategy specialist at Peking University, said that Congress’s efforts to bolster Taiwan reflected the Pentagon’s “continuous” effort to engage the island, including by increasing the presence of US troops there.

But, Hu added: “Recently, Washington seemingly wants to reduce the attention and sensitivity regarding Taiwan issues … to do more and say less”.

Analysts also question the practicality of some of the proposals.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, called an energy blockade by the US “very feasible” but was sceptical since any PLA attack would likely occur too quickly for such a move to work.

“If China finds itself in a protracted war with the US in which that might come into play, it’s already in trouble,” said Mastro, who is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute.

Restricting technology

The NDAA drafts also focus on efforts to check Beijing’s technological advancement.

The Senate bill requires US businesses to notify the Treasury Department before making transactions in China, Russia and other “countries of concern” involving technologies with military applications. Covered sectors include advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum information science and hypersonics.

Senator Bob Casey, a Pennsylvania Democrat who is a cosponsor of the measure, said that it “would shed visibility on US investments going to China in highly sensitive and critical sectors”.

Responding to the Senate proposal last week, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said: “Arbitrarily placing curbs for normal investment activities in the industrial community and private sectors violates the principle of market economy, disrupts the global industrial and supply chains and will only end up hurting the US investors.”

Tim Bergreen, a partner at law firm Hogan Lovells, said that the measure reflected the government’s ongoing attempt to curtail investments to China but was less “toothy” than what many may have expected.

“Most companies are going to be doing due diligence into their partners [anyways]”, he said.

“The burdensomeness of [measures like] this may come down to the willingness of the Chinese government to allow due diligence firms or companies themselves directly to gather the necessary information.”

Meanwhile, the House bill calls for the Pentagon’s annual China Military Power report to include an assessment of emerging technological developments by Beijing.

And both versions take aim at funding towards Beijing, with prohibitions against Pentagon financing research in China, including at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and the EcoHealth Alliance, a US-based non-profit that has partnered with the Wuhan institute.

Countering influence

As with previous years, restricting Chinese influence in the US remains a focal point.

The Senate bill bans entities from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea from purchasing American farmland and agricultural businesses – which the sponsoring legislators justified by using food security and espionage claims.

The same amendment calls for adding the Secretary of Agriculture to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) – the inter-agency committee that screens inbound foreign investment.

The House bill includes a measure that would require researchers financed by the Pentagon to disclose personal information like their nationality and educational background – a move that the White House strongly opposes, criticising it for adding administrative burdens, creating “an inadvertent national security risk” and likely deterring the Pentagon’s ability “to attract the best and brightest foreign scientists”.

Several measures from both chambers hope to block Chinese ideological influence, including ones that prohibit Pentagon support for films that have been censored by China.

Both versions target Confucius Institutes, which would effectively close all existing institutes in the US by 2026.

Indo-Pacific

Both the Senate and House bills also bolster existing regional security initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.

The Senate version supports programmes like a maritime domain awareness initiative with regional allies – including Australia, Japan and India – and the Indo-Pacific Campaigning Initiative, which would increase the frequency of US military exercises and partner engagements in the region.

Yet the Senate bill leaves out language that would fast track the transfer of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, part of an effort to persuade the Biden administration – which has already committed to providing such submarines to its Aukus ally – to invest more in domestic production before sending them abroad.