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Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, the Philippines and the US are working together to upgrade some key military bases. Photo: Armed Forces of the Philippines via AFP

US to help Philippines upgrade key defence bases amid rising South China Sea tensions

  • The upgrade of an airport and naval base are part of a US$100 million plan to expand a defence cooperation agreement between the two allies
  • Amid ‘continued Chinese aggression’ Manila is pursuing a strategy of increasing its military position to help deter Beijing
An increased US military presence at air and naval bases in the Philippines could help deter China from launching a possible armed conflict, analysts have said, as Washington and Manila prepare to upgrade some bases near Taiwan.
The Philippines is reportedly seeking help from the US to build a pier and repair an airstrip at Camilo Osias Naval Base in the northern Cagayan province, which the US has access to under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed between Washington and Manila.

There is also a plan to add a fuel storage facility and command centre in Lal-lo Airport, also in Cagayan province.

US Indo-Pacific Command head Admiral John Aquilino and Philippine armed forces chief Romeo Brawner Jnr inspected the two sites earlier this month and discussed further expanding the number of bases US forces could access under the agreement.

“We are not just looking at how we can operate together more efficiently, but also we are looking at the future operations that we are going to conduct,” Brawner said. “All of these factors should come in as we decide on which projects we’re really going to pursue.”

02:05

US and Philippines launch ‘biggest ever’ joint marine exercises near disputed waters

US and Philippines launch ‘biggest ever’ joint marine exercises near disputed waters

The EDCA is a defence agreement signed between the US and the Philippines in 2014 that allows the US military to rotate troops into the Southeast Asian nation for extended stays and allows Washington to build and operate facilities for both US and Philippine forces.

In February, the Philippines expanded the agreement to allow US troops access to four more military bases in addition to the initial five sites. US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin also said in April that the US allocated more than US$100 million to develop and modernise these sites in the Philippines.
The four additional sites include Camilo Osias Naval Base and Lal-lo Airport, which are both close to the potential flashpoint with China, located in the north towards Taiwan which is across the Bashi Channel. The sites are also near the South China Sea, disputed between Beijing, Manila and other Southeast Asian countries.
The move follows Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr’s pivot toward the US since the start of his presidency last year, bolstering the long-standing alliance between the two countries.

“The Philippines is being pressured militarily by China and its past efforts to reach compromise positions with China have left it burned each time. Thus it is tilting toward the US and US allies to safeguard its own interests,” said John Bradford, executive director of Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies.

“[Manila] has decided that in the face of continued Chinese aggression, hardening itself militarily is the best way to advance that deterrence.”

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Beijing has opposed the expanded military deal between Washington and Manila. Huang Xilian, Chinese ambassador to the Philippines, said in April that Manila was “stoking the fire” over Taiwan’s independence.

In response, Marcos said during his visit to Washington in May the EDCA sites are not intended to be used for “any offensive action” against any other country, and such actions are outside the parameters of what Manila had discussed with the US.

Analysts said Camilo Osias and Lal-lo could play critical roles in the case of an armed conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, thanks to their strategic location.

“The locations of Camilo Osias Naval Base and Lal-lo Airport would enable them to provide important military functions in a Taiwan conflict,” Bradford said. “Forces operating from those bases would have immediate access to defending Taiwan’s southern flank and prevent China from breaking out into the Philippine Sea through the Bashi Channel.”

Aaron Jed Rabena, a research fellow at Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress in Manila: “The Bashi Channel is a very strategic waterway for a state actor that intends to exercise greater sea control and sea power through the passage of its naval – surface and subsurface – assets.

“Therefore, a state actor who dominates this area could put other state actors at its mercy.

The Camilo Osias Naval Base and Lal-lo Airport locations are strategically important in any potential South China Sea or Taiwan conflict. Photo: EPA-EFE

“This means that US military assets could operate closer to China and will make it easier for the US to preposition assets in the event of a contingency in nearby areas.”

Raymond Kuo, director of the Taiwan Policy Initiative at US-based think tank Rand Corporation, said Beijing will attempt to gain naval control over the Bashi Channel to limit external support coming from the Philippines in the case of a conflict over Taiwan.

“Chinese naval control of the Bashi Channel allows it to limit support coming from the south, as well as swing through relatively open water to set a picket on Taiwan’s eastern side,” Kuo said. “They would then be in a position to interdict US support from Guam and possibly complicate US and allied support coming from the north.

“Upgrading Camilo Osias and Lal-lo provides regional forces with hard points from which they can complicate these Chinese operations in turn.”

The Chinese navy has recently ramped up a large-scale naval exercise in the western Pacific Ocean through the Bashi Channel.

In April, PLA’s aircraft carrier Shandong passed through the waterway on its first voyage to the western Pacific, where it conducted anti-submarine, joint-fire strikes and regional air control exercises.

And this month, Shandong again passed through the Bashi Channel and joined a naval exercise in the western Pacific, which, according to the Taiwanese defence ministry, could be one of the largest drills the PLA has ever conducted in the region, involving more than 80 warplanes and around 30 vessels.

03:06

Beijing faces backlash from neighbours over expanded territorial claims in new official map

Beijing faces backlash from neighbours over expanded territorial claims in new official map

Tensions between Beijing and Manila have also intensified in the South China Sea. Last month, the Philippine Coast Guard said Chinese vessels had fired “illegal” and “dangerous” water cannons towards ships carrying supplies for Philippine military personnel stationed at Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed Spratly Islands.

Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said while there is no unanimity in Manila over the country’s role should an armed conflict break out in the Taiwan Strait, the EDCA sites near the Bashi Channel are expected to help the Philippines secure its interests over the South China Sea.

“The South China Sea and Taiwan cannot be so easily delinked from each other … In the event of a Taiwan conflict, the South China Sea becomes an inevitable part of the theatre of combat operations,” Koh said. “So that’ll be a complex challenge confronting Manila.”

Bradley Martin, a senior policy researcher at Rand Corporation, said China will view the expansion of a US presence in the EDCA bases with concern.

“[China] will likely view the additional presence as an attempt to encircle and contain what it views as its legitimate claims in the region. China may react by increasing military operations and presence in the South China Sea in the vicinity of the [Philippines],” said Martin, who is also a retired navy officer.

“[China] also has a variety of diplomatic, political and economic tools available to communicate to the [Philippines] that there’s a risk and a penalty for drawing closer to the US.”

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