Lower risks, harder to respond: why Beijing may prefer a blockade to armed conflict on Taiwan
- PLA says military exercise is focused on naval and air combat readiness, seizing battlefield control, strike precision and patrols
- Drill was planned before William Lai’s inauguration and calibrated to ‘signal displeasure, but hopefully not escalate’, says analyst
The PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command announced on Thursday it would conduct a joint drill between its army, navy, air force and rocket forces, with a focus on naval and air combat readiness patrols, seizing battlefield control and precise strikes of crucial targets, as well as warship and aircraft patrols near the island.
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The command said the drill – taking place to the west, north and east of the main island of Taiwan and its outlying islands – aimed to “test the joint combat and real combat capabilities of the theatre forces”.
Analysts said while the possibility of war across the Taiwan Strait remained low, the drill represented China’s focus on blockading the island instead of entering a direct confrontation and considered it would cost Beijing relatively little and cause less damage on the island.
Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at the Taiwanese naval academy in Kaohsiung, said the location of the PLA drills – all in areas currently under Taipei’s control – suggested that the exercise was aimed at blockading the island instead of submitting it to a full-scale attack.
“The short duration of Joint Sword-2024A highlights that the United States and Japan [could] not have time to intervene,” Lu said.
“The northern exercise area threatens important political, economic and military targets in Taipei and New Taipei. The eastern and southeastern exercise areas counter the preservation of combat power in Hualien Jiashan and Taitung Jian’an. The southwest exercise area focuses on Zuoying.”
Raymond Kuo, director of the Rand Corporation’s Taiwan Initiative, said that while the likelihood of conflict remained low, the PLA’s exercise was “clearly” planned in advance of Lai’s inauguration and was calibrated to “signal displeasure, but hopefully not escalate”.
He said while the blockade operation also entailed significant risks and costs for Beijing that could “terminate” its cross-strait intermediary trade, it was still less of an escalation than a full-scale attack, and Taipei’s increasing defence capabilities, aided by Washington, would increase prospective damage by the PLA.
“A direct invasion of Taiwan is highly risky, even after accounting for the PLA’s modernisation efforts over the past two decades. Taiwan is increasing its defence capabilities, and an invasion raises the possibility of a US intervention,” Kuo said.
“By contrast, a blockade is a much more difficult operation for Taiwan and the US to respond to, making it appealing to Beijing.”
Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, echoed the view, saying an all-out war would be the “least palatable” of all options.
“It’ll be contingent on Beijing to prosecute a short and decisive campaign that completely subjects the island to its control, best if possible before the US can respond and get its act together,” Koh said. “A blockade strategy will allow Beijing the option of avoiding a meat-grinding, bloody campaign on land.”
However Koh said the blockade approach would be successful for Beijing if it led to Taipei “capitulating” as soon as possible.
“Blockade isn’t without risks; if the Chinese aren’t able to suppress and neutralise the Taiwanese air and naval capabilities, forces involved in the blockade will have to expect resistance and potential losses,” he said.
“Taiwan, possibly in concert with the US, may conduct an effective counter-blockade strategy if the PLA doesn’t neutralise these forces in theatre, which means essentially widening the conflict beyond just a mere blockade that would be nothing more than symbolic.”
The PLA has previously conducted military drills aimed at blockading the island in an attempt to pressure Taipei and suppress promotion of what Beijing considers a “separatist movement”.
In August 2022, the PLA Navy launched an unprecedented large, live-fire exercise surrounding the island after then US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei. A similar drill took place in April 2023 when then Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen met speaker Kevin McCarthy during her stopover in the US.
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According to Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Beijing is reacting to the inauguration of Lai “by trying to immediately coerce the new president through military exercises into accepting China’s 1992 consensus on unification”.
“But more importantly, and knowing that Lai won’t be coerced – China is normalising these types of blockade manoeuvres so that at some point in the future, an ‘exercise’ can become an actual military operation with little or no warning.”
Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China, to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the island by force, and is committed to arming it.
