Explainer | Decoding PLA moves around Taiwan: 3 categories, 3 levels of signalling?

Manoeuvres around Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army have become a routine affair, but their tempo and intensity have steadily increased in recent years. What were occasional sorties before 2020 have evolved into a well-coordinated campaign designed not only for combat training but also for strategic signalling. But not all PLA operations around Taiwan are the same. They fall into three main categories: near-daily aerial patrols, combat-readiness patrols, and large-scale joint forces exercises – each varying in scale, intensity and purpose. So what kind of signals do each of these send? Near-daily patrols PLA Air Force sorties around Taiwan have been carried out on an almost daily basis since 2021, with a sharp increase in numbers observed since 2024, after Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te assumed office. According to PLATracker, an open-source database based on Taiwanese defence ministry reports, fewer than 20 PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in 2019. The figure has gone up by 150 times since then, with 3,075 sorties in 2024, compared to 390 in 2020, 972 in 2021, 1,738 in 2022 and 1,703 in 2023. A total of 1,730 sorties have been detected so far this year, according to the tracker. The sharp rise in 2020 coincided with then Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen starting her second term. Tsai, from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), first took office in 2016 and refused to accept the one-China principle, at which point cross-strait relations began to deteriorate. Tensions further escalated after Lai, who is also from the DPP, assumed office in May last year. The near-daily patrols are also edging closer to Taiwan, with a growing number of the flights reportedly crossing the median line – the unofficial boundary down the middle of the Taiwan Strait. Last June, a month after Lai’s inauguration, 73 per cent of PLA flights crossed the median line, compared to 20 to 40 per cent over the preceding 10 months. Combat-readiness patrols Combat-readiness joint services exercises are considered a more serious type of military manoeuvring. First launched in September 2020 by the PLA air and naval forces, such patrols have become regular practice since August 2022, when Beijing reacted angrily to then US House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. These patrols are not just training exercises but are conducted in a near-combat state. The official PLA Daily defined their purpose in a 2022 article, saying the patrols aimed “to test and improve multi-service joint combat capability and maintain a high state of alert at all times”. “Joint exercises are no longer simply training activities but have become a preparatory process for advancing readiness and enhancing capability,” the article noted. Initially, combat-readiness patrols were targeted responses to specific Taiwan-related developments, particularly US-Taiwan engagement. On September 18, 2020, the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command announced air and naval combat-readiness patrols and joint exercises in the Taiwan Strait, aimed at testing integrated joint combat abilities. The command, which oversees the Taiwan Strait, described the operation as a necessary response to the situation in the area. This came a day after then US undersecretary of state Keith Krach visited Taiwan – the highest-ranking State Department official to do so since 1979. A year later, the Eastern Theatre Command conducted a joint combat-readiness patrol around the Taiwan Strait on the same day that a US congressional delegation visited Taipei. The US move was strongly condemned by Beijing and the timing of the PLA drill was seen as a direct response to it. Then in August 2022, after holding live-fire drills following Pelosi’s visit, the PLA announced that it would hold “regular” combat-readiness patrols near Taiwan. Beijing, which sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary, has repeatedly warned that Taiwan affairs are China’s internal affairs and criticises what it calls US interference in the region. The United States is Taiwan’s main international backer and arms supplier but, like most countries, it does not recognise the self-governed island as an independent state. However, Washington is opposed to any attempt to take Taiwan by force and is committed to arming it for defence. Beijing conducted multiple patrols around Taiwan from late January to mid-February this year, coinciding with the Lunar New Year period from New Year’s Eve to the Lantern Festival. On February 12, Chinese state broadcaster CCTV reported that a PLA naval unit carried out a “confrontation drill” as part of the patrols, with warships moving swiftly into combat readiness upon receiving orders. While the PLA does not always officially make such missions public, Taiwan reports on such exercises based on its own definition of “combat-readiness patrols”. More than a dozen such operations have been reported by Taipei so far this year. The latest, on June 10, involved 43 PLA aircraft and 6 PLA Navy vessels, which were detected carrying out manoeuvres until 6am the following day, according to the Taiwanese defence ministry. The ministry said in February that it defined a PLA combat-readiness patrol as involving coordinated air and naval training. “Our definition is based on the nature and pattern of PLA activity,” the ministry said, without out giving details. Large-scale exercises Since August 2022, the PLA has conducted at least six large-scale joint exercises around Taiwan, each featuring different manoeuvres and showcasing new operational abilities. The drills triggered by Pelosi’s visit involved six designated zones encircling Taiwan and covering key maritime and air routes. One of the zones was located just 20km (12.4 miles) from Kaohsiung – Taiwan’s biggest port and a key economic hub. According to Taiwan’s defence ministry, 11 Dongfeng-series ballistic missiles were fired during that drill. Four of these reportedly flew over Taiwan’s main island for the first time, marking a significant escalation in Beijing’s military signalling. The PLA’s “Strait Thunder 2025A” large-scale joint exercise in early April this year included the Shandong aircraft carrier group, which approached Taiwan from its less-fortified east. It was the third time that the PLA had deployed an aircraft carrier in such drills. It was also the second appearance for the Shandong, which took part in the April 2023 “Joint Sword” exercise launched shortly after Tsai met then House speaker Kevin McCarthy while in transit through the US. The PLA has conducted two Joint Sword exercises since Lai took office just over a year ago – one shortly after his inauguration and another in October, which included a record 153 sorties in a single day. What purpose does each kind of exercise serve? Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at Taiwan’s naval academy, likened the spectrum of PLA activity to a scale – where joint combat-readiness patrols lay in the middle, more serious than routine patrols but less intensive than full-scale joint drills. The patrols should reflect multi-domain dominance and encompass joint operations across land, sea, air, space and the electromagnetic spectrum, he said. “Combat-readiness patrols emphasise regular patrols and surveillance. Pushed further, they evolve into Joint Sword-type drills, with more sorties deployed and more intensified [activities],” Lu said. Combat-readiness patrols underscored a mindset of emergency response, he added. “War might be unexpected. Orders come suddenly, and you must execute.” Former PLA instructor and mainland military analyst Song Zhongping expressed similar views. He said joint combat-readiness patrols were routine multi-branch manoeuvres, while exercises like Joint Sword or Strait Thunder represented rehearsals for specific combat scenarios. “One is regular patrolling. The other is targeted drills to achieve defined military objectives.”

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Aerial near-daily patrols, combat-readiness patrols and large-scale joint forces drills vary in scale, intensity and purpose, analysts say

Near-daily patrols

Aerial near-daily patrols, combat-readiness patrols and large-scale joint forces drills vary in scale, intensity and purpose, analysts say