Why PLA fighter jet sorties near Taiwan dropped to a 3-year low in the first half of 2026

There is a change in the skies and waters around Taiwan. In the first half of this year, the number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fighter jets detected near the island more than halved year on year to 1,334. It was a three-year low and marked the lowest operational tempo since 2023, according to a tally by the South China Morning Post based on data from Taiwan’s defence ministry. At the same time, the number of days no PLA jets were detected by Taiwan hit a new high, and the PLA did not stage any large-scale drills around the island – a first since 2022. It is a long way from August 2022, when then US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei and Beijing responded with live-fire drills around Taiwan. Those drills set new norms, with mainland China sending fighter jets and later, vessels, near the island on an almost daily basis. The number of air sorties rose to more than 5,400 in 2025, increasing pressure on the island and prompting some strategists to argue that the PLA would take over Taiwan in 2027, the deadline for the mainland military’s “centennial goals”. Yet this year, with the deadline for the vaguely defined goals just a year away, Beijing’s military signalling near Taiwan appears to have shifted. Why fewer PLA sorties? Observers say that improvements in Beijing’s relations with the US, pending US arms sales to Taiwan and non-official engagements between Beijing and Taipei, could be among the key external factors behind the change. Internal considerations by Beijing could also be at play, they argue, including a push to control military costs and a shifting focus for PLA exercises. By the numbers In the years following Pelosi’s visit, the PLA sent more planes and more vessels, which went closer to the island. They also experimented with more sophisticated collaboration between various units. The aerial pressure culminated in 2025, when the PLA sent the most annual aircraft sorties near the island (5,461) and had the highest count of sorties crossing the median line (3,782) of the Taiwan Strait – the notional midpoint between the two sides. But for the first six months of this year the number of PLA aircraft sorties around Taiwan dropped to less than half those counted in each 2025 half-year period: January-June (2,762) and July-December (2,699). Of these, the number of aircraft crossing the unofficial median line – considered by Taiwan to be more dangerous – this year (810) was well down on the half-year periods in 2025 (1,984 and 1,798). From January to June 30 this year, no PLA aircraft were detected on 38 days, much higher than the six days in the first half of last year and the eight in the second half. And five out of the first six months this year saw the lowest monthly totals since 2023. The total aircraft recorded for March (162) was the lowest monthly figure since January 2023. What role did Xi-Trump summit play? Experts have largely attributed the dip in mainland military activity around Taiwan to the summit held in Beijing between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump, where both sides touted agreements on strategic stability. Despite continued tension between the world’s two biggest economies, the two sides are trying to stabilise ties, with subtle de-escalation signs coming from Beijing, Washington and Taipei. “Following [Trump’s] meeting with Xi, there’s some sort of a leaders’ consensus on trying to turn down tensions, especially over Taiwan,” said Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies with the Singapore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). Media reports said Trump might delay or roll back arms sales to Taiwan, according to Koh. “Then there’s no reason for Beijing not to reciprocate with obvious moves. And this is a very obvious move,” he said. Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University of China, also said Beijing had an eye on US arms sales. “It seems that military operations around Taiwan have reduced dramatically and for numerous months, which could be explained by [the mainland] withholding any major reasons for [the] US and its related allies to increase military support to Taipei,” he said. The first half of this year also coincided with outreach by Beijing to Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT). In April, Xi met KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wun for the first such talks in nearly a decade. Beijing followed this by releasing a package of 10 measures to promote cross-strait exchanges in the economy. Lyle Goldstein, director of the Asia programme at the Washington-based think tank Defence Priorities, said Beijing now saw that “Cheng’s discourse is having some effect in Taiwan politics, kind of opening the window to a wider debate of cross-strait relations”. “I think they find this favourable and that could explain partially why tensions are lowering,” he said. Reassessing the 2027 Davidson window The US intelligence community is reversing its previous assessment of the so-called Davidson window, the idea that the mainland would attack Taiwan in 2027. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence said in a report in March that “Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027”, reversing course on predictions that have shaped US battleforce strategy for the past six years. Following the Xi-Trump summit, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to explain why military means were not the preferred way for Beijing to take Taiwan. “What they would want is some vote or a referendum in Taiwan that agrees to fold in. I think that’s what they would prefer,” he said in an NBC interview in May. A similar assessment was offered by Lloyd Austin, defence chief in the Joe Biden administration. “I don’t think that President Xi wants to take Taiwan by force” and “there is probably less risk of escalation going forward here in the near term”, Austin said last month. Goldstein argued that these were signs of change in Washington’s China policy debate. “I do think the space for debating China policy is opening again. It’s been closed for a long time. It did seem that Washington was set on a very hard-nosed approach to China, but I do think eyes are open to a different possibility here,” he said. The role of PLA drills A shift in training focus for the PLA and calls to cut costs could also be behind the change, observers said. Fu Qianshao, a retired PLA Air Force colonel, said the change in the PLA’s tempo was partly because it had already completed management and control around Taiwan, and that the training focus of the PLA had expanded towards the western Pacific Ocean. “Adjustment has been made based on the current cross-strait situation, and more training now is in the far seas, not necessarily around the Taiwan Strait,” Fu said. “This expanded scope [of the western Pacific] also covers the cross-strait area. It’s just that the diameter has been expanded. This, I think, is a key characteristic for the first half-year.” Koh said the lower frequency could also be the result of practical reasons, such as the time required to maintain high-end equipment and deliver balanced training to military personnel. Analysts also point to the impact of Beijing’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign on the military leadership, as well as its call to cut costs in the armed forces, as possible factors. The campaign has led to the downfall of many of the most senior figures across the top PLA leadership and various forces and theatre commands, leaving only two members from the original seven-member Central Military Commission. The process to fill the vacancies is continuing. After Beijing’s most recent ceremony to promote two full generals in July, the PLA has just six full generals in active duty, while normally it would have at least 20. “Reshuffling of the armed forces’ chains of command necessarily requires a long time, along with the shrinkage of financial capability that would not cease in [the] short, or even much longer, term,” Renmin University’s Shi said. Cost-cutting in the military is a theme that has reappeared many times in recent years. The 15th five-year plan endorsed by the national legislature in March calls for “building the armed forces through diligence and thrift”, and taking the path of “high efficiency, low cost and sustainability”. The fragile de-escalation Nevertheless, since taking office in May 2024, Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te has been seen by Beijing as highly provocative for his pro-independence stance. He has sought to pass an unprecedented US$40 billion special defence budget to fund the US arms purchases. Although only around US$25 billion was approved, Lai is seeking to pursue the remainder through separate proposals. Zhang Wensheng, deputy dean of the Graduate Institute for Taiwan Studies at Xiamen University, said that while the cross-strait military struggle would remain, “under the US pressure, I don’t think [Lai] will dare be too aggressive”. Maritime activity around Taiwan However, there are already signs of fresh tensions around the island. Starting in June, the number of official mainland Chinese ships, which includes the coastguard and survey ships, jumped. The number of these law enforcement vessels rose to 252 in the first half of this year, up by 89 per cent from July-December last year (133), and a 66 per cent jump compared with the six months before that (152). The number of mainland law enforcement ships nearing Taiwan reached 111 in June – the most in a month since July 2024, when such ships started to be involved in daily PLA operations around the island. That appeared in response to the Japan-Philippines maritime delineation talks which started in late May. The talks could concern exclusive economic zones claimed by Beijing and Taipei, and Beijing has condemned them as breaching China’s maritime rights. “[The Chinese coastguard] used to be seen as secondary only to the PLA, but now [the China Coast Guard] is taking on a more active role in the round-Taiwan-island patrols,” said Koh at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore. “I guess there is a desire to create a less militaristic impression. And so, using white hulls instead of grey hulls might actually be something that will feed that sort of strategic narrative,” he said, referring to the hull colours of CCG and naval warships. Despite the ongoing tensions, observers say this trend of easing Chinese military activity could continue into the second half of the year. But they warn that US midterm elections and the Taiwan local legislative elections, both in November, could affect the delicate de-escalation. “Since the Xi-Trump meeting, we can see that mainland and the US are managing Taiwan together. And how does the US manage Taiwan? It is through arms sales,” said Lu Li-shih, a retired Taiwanese navy lieutenant commander.

Why PLA fighter jet sorties near Taiwan dropped to a 3-year low in the first half of 2026

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Beijing is shifting cross-strait military strategy, halving aerial missions and increasing coastguard patrols in the waters near the island

Beijing is shifting cross-strait military strategy, halving aerial missions and increasing coastguard patrols in the waters near the island