Wu Junfei, deputy director of Hong Kong’s Tianda Institute think tank, said Beijing believed its existing approach would yield long-term political and social stability in Hong Kong, despite short-term pains, including possible foreign sanctions.

The US has already imposed sanctions on mainland Chinese and Hong Kong officials – including Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor – whom it accuses of undermining the city’s freedoms and autonomy from Beijing.

“In Beijing’s calculation, this is the most cost-effective method, both politically and economically, over the long term, as many of the problems in Hong Kong cannot be allowed to drag on and on,” he said. “It is time to accept the pain and to fix them once and for all.”

Wang Chen, vice-chairman of the NPC and one of the officials under US sanctions over Hong Kong, said on Friday that reforms were necessary to “guard against and to neutralise risks” to China’s sovereignty and national security in the wake of anti-government protests in Hong Kong and the opposition camp’s “35-plus strategy” to win a majority in the Legco.

A government source said that Xia Baolong, Beijing’s top official on Hong Kong affairs, told an internal meeting last week that the situation involved not only Hong Kong but also foreign powers and issues of national security, so resolute action was needed to address “loopholes” in the city’s political system.

This included previous failed attempts to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law, the city’s mini-constitution, which requires the Hong Kong government to enact a national security law to prohibit acts including treason, secession, sedition and subversion. Beijing imposed its own national security law on the city in June last year.

“Xia said [the enactment of] Article 23 of the Basic Law has been delayed for 17 years and political reform has been delayed for seven years,” said the source, who requested anonymity. “That shall not be tolerated any more.”

But a Hong Kong affairs expert at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangdong province, which neighbours Hong Kong, said he was concerned that “the whole prescription” from Beijing for Hong Kong was “overkill”.

“Many from the opposition camp in Hong Kong said they do not see a future,” the person said on condition of anonymity because he is not authorised to speak to the media.

“Although they asked for it to a certain degree, and expected the push back from Beijing when they chose violence and confrontation, I still think Beijing needs to demonstrate it is sincere when it says there will be room for loyal opposition and be clear on where it will draw the line,” he said.

“Throwing all the babies out with the bathwater is not a good idea.”

But Beijing is unlikely to be swayed by international pressure, as it takes a more aggressive approach to its dealings with the West.

Xi Jinping tells Inner Mongolia’s NPC deputies to put Mandarin first in schools

Diana Fu, an associate professor of political science at the University of Toronto, said Beijing was engaged in an “offensive, not defensive struggle with the West over the superiority of authoritarian political values”.

“If Beijing backs down in Hong Kong as a reaction to international pressure, it would be akin to admitting defeat,” she said. “And Xi Jinping will not let that happen on his watch.”

Unlike the surprise imposition of the national security law last year, the moves against Hong Kong’s electoral system showed Beijing was making little effort to disguise its actions, Fu said.

“The space for dissent is getting narrower by the minute,” she said. “By charging the opposition camp with subversion, Beijing is putting teeth to the national security law. It is sending an unequivocal message: pro-democracy activists are not patriots and have no future in Hong Kong’s political system.”

Beijing has insisted that the electoral changes will help “expand balanced and orderly political participation from Hong Kong’s society and broader representation”, and the city’s former finance secretary Henry Tang Ying-yen said there would still be some room for moderate opposition voices.

Andreas Fulda, an associate professor at the University of Nottingham’s school of politics and international relations, said Xi was also concerned about securing Beijing’s rule over Taiwan – the democratic, self-ruled island it claims as part of its territory – that has been warily watching events in Hong Kong.

Analysts say another key element is Beijing’s plan to ensure by 2049 a “great national rejuvenation” – a term popularised under Xi, who eliminated constitutional term limits and can stay in power beyond the end of his second term in 2023. This includes Beijing’s control over territories like Hong Kong, which was perceived as being lost during the “century of humiliation” that began in the 1840s when China struggled to fend off colonial encroachment.

Li Xing, a professor of international relations at Aalborg University in Denmark, said Hong Kong had symbolic meaning in the historical narrative, as the first Chinese territory to be annexed by a colonial power, namely the British government in 1841.

“Hong Kong is part of China’s grand plan of national rejuvenation, of getting back to its glory days,” he said.

The timing of the actions against Hong Kong had also come in the midst of a global pandemic, when countries like the US and Britain had less leeway to retaliate against the Chinese economy, he said.

Steve Tsang, director of the China Institute at SOAS University of London, said Beijing’s strong actions on Hong Kong, without concern for international repercussions, were not surprising. He pointed to Xi’s remarks in 2017 for Hongkongers to develop a patriotic spirit, and said the protests in 2019 had just triggered an “earlier and more forceful implementation” of the tougher policy.

“Xi also told Chinese officials and diplomats that they should not be intimidated by the West and should not be afraid to unsheathe their swords when being confronted,” he said. “Xi is not for turning over Hong Kong.”