Long-awaited Chilcot report damns British government’s ‘wholly inadequate’ planning for Iraq war
Inquiry finds peaceful options were not exhausted and evidence of weapons of mass destruction presented with ‘certainty that was not justified’
The head of Britain’s Iraq War inquiry released a damning report on Wednesday on a conflict he says was mounted on flawed intelligence, was executed with “wholly inadequate” planning, and ended “a long way from success.”
Retired civil servant John Chilcot, who oversaw the seven-year inquiry, said “the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.”
The 2.6-million-word report is an exhaustive verdict on a divisive conflict that – by the time British combat forces left in 2009 – had killed 179 British troops, almost 4,500 American personnel and more than 100,000 Iraqis.
The UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted
Chilcot said then-Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government presented an assessment of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons with “certainty that was not justified”. He also found military planning for the war and its aftermath were not up to the task.
“The people of Iraq have suffered greatly” because of a military intervention “which went badly wrong,” he said. But he refrained from saying whether the 2003 invasion was legal, and did not find that Blair and his government knowingly misled Parliament or the British public.
Chilcot heard from 150 witnesses and analysed 150,000 documents. His conclusions are a blow to Blair, who told President George W. Bush eight months before the March 2003 invasion – without consulting government colleagues – “I will be with you whatever”.
The report says Blair went to war to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Britain’s main ally, only to find the UK excluded from most important decision-making about the military campaign and its aftermath.
“Mr Blair, who recognised the significance of the post-conflict phase, did not press President Bush for definite assurances about US plans,” the report concluded.
Iraq descended into sectarian strife after the occupiers dismantled Saddam ‘s government and military apparatus, unleashing chaos that helped give rise to Islamic State (IS).
The report found failings by military chiefs who did not provide adequate equipment to forces in the field, and whose main post-invasion strategy “was to reduce the level of [UK] deployed forces.”
The UK failed to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme required in Iraq
The report concludes that Britain’s combat mission, which ended in 2009, did not achieve the objectives laid out in 2003 and saw British forces make a “humiliating” deal with militias in southern Iraq to avoid attacks.
“The UK failed to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme required in Iraq,” the report said.
The war has overshadowed the legacy of Blair, whose government has been accused of exaggerating intelligence about Saddam’s alleged weapons of mass destruction in order to build support for the invasion.
Chilcot criticised spy chiefs who failed to ensure their partial intelligence about Saddam’s weapons was not hardened into certainty by government spin. He said they also failed to consider “that Iraq might no longer have chemical biological or nuclear weapons” – which turned out to be the case.
The report said the widespread perception that the government had exaggerated intelligence evidence “has produced a damaging legacy, including undermining trust and confidence in government statements”.
Following the release of the report, Blair insisted he had acted in Britain’s “best interests”.
“The report should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies or deceit,” he said in a statement issued by his office. “Whether people agree or disagree with my decision to take military action against Saddam Hussein, I took it in good faith and in what I believed to be the best interests of the country.
“The intelligence assessments made at the time of going to war turned out to be wrong. The aftermath turned out to be more hostile, protracted and bloody than ever we imagined. For all of this, I express more sorrow, regret and apology than you will ever know.”
The report also faults Blair for making key decisions with only a few key aides rather than through collective Cabinet consultation.
Prime Minister David Cameron responded to the report in a statement to parliament.
“We cannot turn the clock back but we can ensure that lessons are learned,” Cameron said.
“It is crucial to good decision-making that a prime minister establishes a climate in which it’s safe for officials and other experts to challenge existing policy and question the views of ministers and the prime minister without fear or favour.”
Chilcot’s report has been repeatedly delayed, in part by wrangling over the inclusion of classified material, including conversations between Blair and Bush. Some of Blair’s pre-war letters to the president are published in Chilcot’s report, but not Bush’s replies.
Anti-war activists and relatives of some dead British troops hoped the report would find the conflict illegal, opening the way for Blair to be prosecuted for war crimes.
The International Criminal Court is looking into alleged war crimes by British troops in Iraq, but says has said that Britain’s decision to go to war falls outside its jurisdiction.
