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Opinion
Hao Nan

China’s missile test reveals fragile state of world nuclear governance

The reactions to Beijing’s ‘routine’ exercise put into focus a nuclear order that is rapidly fluctuating from Tehran to Tokyo

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Illustration: Craig Stephens
Hao Nan is a Susan Strange Associate Fellow with the Helsinki Geoeconomics Society, and a Nuclear Futures Fellow with Ploughshares Fund & Horizon 2045.
On July 6, a Chinese strategic nuclear submarine fired a missile carrying a training dummy warhead into a designated area of the Pacific. Beijing described the launch as routine, said relevant countries had been notified and insisted that it targeted no state.

The regional reaction was immediate, with Australia, Japan, the United States and Pacific nations raising concerns around insufficient notification and the politics of nuclear-free zones. Those reactions matter because they show how far nuclear politics has moved beyond the arsenals of large powers.

The test was read through several lenses: evidence of Beijing’s maturing second-strike capability, a challenge to US allies and partners, a problem for Pacific nuclear-free norms, and a signal to states already reassessing nuclear weapons policy. The test revealed a nuclear order in motion.

That order is increasingly shaped by three tracks. The first is Sino-Russian strategic alignment. The second is a US-led system of extended deterrence. The third is a diverse middle layer of secondary nuclear powers, nuclear-threshold states and “umbrella-anxious” allies. The first two tracks are hardening. The third remains fluid.

The Sino-Russian track has become clearer in recent years. Even though their nuclear doctrines differ, Beijing and Moscow have built a common vocabulary around “strategic stability” since 2016. Joint statements frame instability around US missile defence, long-range conventional strike capabilities, Aukus, space militarisation and the pursuit of “absolute security”.

For China and Russia, arms control cannot be reduced to counting deployed warheads while leaving US alliances, precision-strike networks, missile defences and foreign bases outside the discussion.

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