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Celebrants wave the Nato flag at Senate Square in Helsinki on April 4, 2023, after Finland became the 31st country to join the transatlantic security alliance. Photo: AFP
Opinion
Andrew Hammond
Andrew Hammond

Nato’s fears over Trump re-election and Ukraine war could have a silver lining

  • The state of the defence of Ukraine and the prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House have sparked new fears and planning among Nato members
  • If others join Poland in increasing military spending and prioritising defence, there could still be an opportunity for intra-alliance harmony with the US

Nato marks the 75th anniversary of the signing of its founding treaty this week, yet the mood is far from celebratory. Key leaders within the transatlantic military alliance are increasingly concerned that the bloc is facing its biggest challenges ever.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a former European Council president, warned last week that Europe is in a dangerous, new “pre-war era”, a situation not seen since 1945. He said Ukraine must not be defeated by Russia or “no one in Europe will be able to feel safe”. He emphasised that war is “no longer a concept from the past” and that “any scenario is now possible”.
This is one reason Nato is reportedly drawing up plans to secure a five-year military aid package of up to US$100 billion. The “Mission for Ukraine” proposal is being shepherded by Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg for final approval over the summer. The plan would allow Nato to manage the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine for the first time since the conflict began.

The reason for the urgency is that Tusk and others have warned that the coming months of the conflict will be crucial, sparking the need in the next few weeks for the West to help Ukraine rearm. He said “we are living in the most critical moment since the end of the Second World War”.

Key Nato nations fear that, absent a significant shift, the tide is turning in the Ukraine war in Russia’s favour. Moreover, any outcome that could be perceived as a major victory for Moscow will significantly add to the threat environment facing other nations in Europe.
A rescuer works outside a residential building damaged as a result of Russian strikes in Kharkiv on March 27. Photo: AFP
It is in this sombre context that Nato is planning for the next half-decade, with a change of leadership anticipated in the second half of this year. The good news is that the context for the debate about the organisation’s future has been transformed in the post-pandemic period.
As recently as 2019, there was widespread concern about Nato’s purpose as French President Emmanuel Macron said it had become “brain-dead”. Macron’s outburst was driven by what he saw as a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape and the diminished commitment to Nato of the United States under Donald Trump’s presidency.
Fast forward to today and Macron has said that Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has woken up Nato with the “worst of electroshocks”. It is an unexpected turnaround of fortunes which could also be fuelled by Western concerns about China.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has underlined the continuing relevance of Nato. For all its shortcomings, the alliance remains one of the world’s most successful military organisations and has helped underpin the longest period of sustained peace in the West’s modern history.

Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (front left) speaks to then-US President Donald Trump at a Nato leaders’ meeting in Watford, England, on December 4, 2019. Photo: AP
While this is positive, Nato could face a major internal challenge from November if Trump wins a second term. Former Trump administration officials, including former national security adviser John Bolton, have confirmed that the former president came close to withdrawing the US from Nato.

Behind the scenes, there is much planning going on about the feasibility of a future Nato without US participation. It is possible Nato could try to keep the military organisation functional for a few years in the hope that the successor to Trump’s second presidency could bring Washington back into the fold.

In the meantime, some Western leaders such as Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte hold that the best way forward for Europe to prepare for any change of incumbent in the White House is to increase defence spending. They say it is important to see all nations in Europe now commit to the threshold of 2 per cent of gross domestic product on defence spending.

In 2024, two thirds of Nato members are expected to reach this benchmark, up from just three in 2014. Some, including Poland, have gone much further and now spend some 4 per cent.

If other nations move in the direction that Poland is heading, there could well be upside for intra-alliance harmony with the US. Here it is a combination of not just Russian aggression but also instability in the Middle East and Africa and the legacy of Trump’s uncertain commitment to Europe that is turning around the picture.

In the longer term, it is plausible that this elevated defence spending will be locked in by Nato concerns about wider shifts in the global security environment, including threats from China. Beijing’s increasing international assertiveness is seen as a growing concern in the West, and this will become especially significant if China continues to consolidate its strategic partnership with Russia.

Andrew Hammond is an Associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics

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