Can Bush bring democracy to Iraq?

Last week, US President George W. Bush laid out his vision for the Middle East. To most readers, the text read like any other: It was a stump speech designed to drum up support for 'regime change' in Iraq. But it is a remarkable document, showing both the distance that Mr Bush has travelled since winning the presidency, and the scope of the changes his administration envisions for the volatile region. It anticipates nothing less than the transformation and modernisation of the Middle East. And therein lies extraordinary danger.

He vowed that the US and its allies 'stand ready to help the citizens of a liberated Iraq'. He pledged that the US would 'remain in Iraq as long as necessary . . . America has made and kept this kind of commitment before . . . After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments.'

Mr Bush's thinking is even more surprising given his scepticism during the 2000 presidential campaign about the very idea of nation-building. Mr Bush took office vowing to focus on America's narrowly defined 'vital interests', which was another way of saying he would discard the 'change the world' rhetoric and policies of the Clinton administration. But not only has Mr Bush embraced the activism of his predecessor, he has also pushed the evangelism far beyond anything that Bill Clinton had envisioned.

In last week's speech, Mr Bush laid out a 21st century 'domino theory' in which the elimination of a ruthless tyrant and his replacement with a genuinely democratic government would lead to the establishment of other like-minded democracies throughout the region.

However, regional experts are dismissive. Writing in The New Republic about Iraq's future, journalist James Fallows cites a consultant who calls the vision 'so divorced from historical context, just so far out of court, that it is laughable'.

That is harsh judgment, but success depends on a long series of conditions.

First, the US and its allies have to win the war against Iraq - assuming it is fought - and do it quickly. Only if Saddam Hussein's regime is completely removed will the US have the free hand it wants to remake Iraq, and have the leverage with other governments in the region.

The second big if is the readiness of the US to stay committed to the region. Unfortunately, its record is less convincing than its ability to win on the battlefield. The Afghanistan experience does not inspire much confidence. Because the US has resisted the development of a large multinational force that would help pacify the countryside, the warlords are reasserting control.

The traditional framework of US burden-sharing - it blows things up and lets allies rebuild them - has to be revamped. An active American role in reconstruction is essential to the realisation of the Bush vision.

Finally, there is the very real possibility that genuine democracy in the Middle East might not be sympathetic to US interests. The Arab street is more likely to burn American flags than wave them.

The magnitude of the challenge should not be a reason to give up on the dream. The emergence of robust and stable democracies in the Middle East would be a spectacular accomplishment and the best way to improve the lives of tens of millions of people. But Mr Bush has to be forthright and honest about the risks and the costs. Failure to do so means that he will face mounting opposition at home and abroad - and will have only himself to blame.

Brad Glosserman is director of research at Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based think-tank