Source:
https://scmp.com/article/411371/mr-bush-dont-ignore-your-promises-afghanistan

Mr Bush, don't ignore your promises to Afghanistan

Since the end of the cold war, it seems that the United States has deployed a curious division of labour when it comes to international conflict. In simplest, crudest terms, the US blows things up and the rest of the world, primarily Europe and Japan, rebuilds them. It is a dangerous strategy. Destroyed governments can quickly become failed states, and the political vacuum is often filled by the most ruthless and opportunistic forces. Winning on the battlefield is only half the struggle - maybe even less. Winning the peace is far more important. US strategic planners have long harboured doubts about using the most powerful military in human history to engage in peacekeeping and nation-building, worrying that such 'operations other than war' would sap its spirit and energy. The horrific image of a US soldier being dragged behind a jeep in Somalia also contributes to America's reluctance to put forces into any situation where the US might cannot be brought to bear. Instead, the US has preferred to do the fighting - from the air whenever possible - and leave the tidying up to its allies.

Afghanistan is the poster child for the flaws in this approach. The US armed the Islamic resistance to overthrow the Soviet-backed regime in the 1980s, then turned its back when the job was complete. Afghanistan lurched through several governments until the Taleban took power. They took up company with thugs like Osama bin Laden and offered him refuge and a base to wage jihad against the US and the West. That arrangement ended on September 11.

The US-led war against bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the Taleban confounded the critics. It was over almost as soon as it began. The US then turned its attention to other fronts, including the long-anticipated assault on Iraq's President Saddam Hussein. As that war grinds on, Afghanistan has become a fading memory; soon it will become a reminder of the need for continuing commitments. A year after the end of hostilities, a UN spokesman described Afghanistan as 'in a precarious state'. The UN has suspended aid work in parts of the country because of fighting between rival factions and uncertain security conditions.

In recent days, there has been an upsurge in violence in Afghanistan. Some attribute the attacks to the assault on Iraq, which has motivated Iraqi sympathisers and the surviving remnants of the Taleban; it could be that the old order is finally regrouping and is preparing a spring offensive against the coalition forces. Former Taleban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar made a new call for supporters to fight 'Jews and Christians, all foreign crusaders' in Afghanistan. Coalition forces have already experienced 28 combat deaths and the latest declaration of a jihad is likely to increase the death toll.

The US has responded with mop-up operations that find weapons caches and take prisoners, but are no substitute for real nation-building. That is a serious and time-consuming slog, and America has shown precious little patience for the assignment. Instead, US forces are serving as a security force for the prime minister, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which puts them right in the middle of the tribal disputes that dominate Afghan politics. Despite US promises to help get Afghanistan back on its feet, at this point the evidence points to another long slide into warlordism and anarchy.

The US has opposed the deployment of the International Security Forces in Afghanistan, which keep the peace in Kabul, to cities other than the capital, although that policy is said to be changing. It is going to take about US$20 billion (HK$156 billion) to rebuild Afghanistan over the next five years (and that is probably a low estimate). The US promised to help, but the Bush administration's budget request for next year left out reconstruction aid for Afghanistan. Congress inserted about US$300 million, the same amount as the US budgeted last year. (In contrast, the US war effort in Afghanistan cost about US$4.5 billion). Afghanistan already receives less aid per capita than did Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor, and rebuilding Iraq is going to create an additional drain on US coffers. Afghanistan's drop below the horizon is perhaps understandable: the US special envoy for Afghanistan has also been assigned the job of negotiating with Iraq's fractious opposition forces and that is a full time job and a half. Mind you, being understandable in a bureaucratic sense is still inexplicable, given the problems that neglect created in the first place. What is most alarming is that this is not ancient history - the Taleban are making their presence known on a daily basis.

The Afghan experience makes worrisome US President George W. Bush's promise to stay in Iraq as long as it takes to restore the country to order and plant the seeds of democracy. Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Washington in late February to remind the US government of the pledges his country had received.

The accounting after the Afghan war - US$4.5 billion for fighting, US$20 billion for rebuilding - offers another cautionary note. The US is going to spend at least US$80 billion fighting in Iraq - and that assumes a short war. Reconstruction is going to cost several times that amount; Iraqi oil revenues will help, but it will be some time before the wells are pumping again.

Clearly, rebuilding Iraq must be an international effort. The US could not shoulder the entire burden alone, even if it had the stamina.

The only organisation that can organise and run a programme of this size is the United Nations. Getting it to assume responsibility will require some doing, since action by the world body could be seen as authorising the US-led attack. My guess is that greed and realpolitik will prevail: governments that opposed the invasion will swallow their objections to get their hands on the prize - the contracts to rebuild Iraq and develop its oil reserves. Such shortsighted thinking might validate the US decision to launch the war, but it is unlikely to win the peace.

Brad Glosserman is director of research at Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based think-tank [email protected]