Treat North Korea like Libya
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, Washington's poster boy for good behaviour - who would have ever thought it? Incredibly, the wily strongman is now the US administration's model for dealing with weapons of mass destruction. Washington is calling on Pyongyang to join Colonel Gaddafi and give up its nuclear weapons ambitions; that will be the steady refrain during the six-party talks that resumed this week in Beijing.
It is a nice thought, but do not hold your breath. Libya's about-face was preceded by more than a decade of diplomatic engagement, most of it secret. Right now, Washington has it backwards. The US seems to condition engagement on North Korea's desire to come clean. That presumes a mutual trust by the two that does not exist. Pyongyang will not own up to its nuclear programmes until it trusts the US to be an honest negotiating partner.
Many in the US want to believe that the campaign against Saddam Hussein prompted Colonel Gaddafi's desire to come clean. The war on Iraq certainly got Tripoli's attention, but Libya had already experienced American anger at first hand: then-president Ronald Reagan launched military strikes against Libya in April 1986. They did not have the desired effect. They were followed by the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 that claimed 270 lives.
Years of secret negotiations followed that act of terrorism: first, to bring the perpetrators to justice and then to secure compensation. That process was integral to building confidence. It is also tempting to credit the reports of Colonel Gaddafi's illness (said to be fatal), a desire to rehabilitate his country, regain membership in the international community and secure his son's rise to power. Especially important was having another country - in this case, Britain - play the role of middleman, to facilitate the process. Reportedly, providing intelligence on al-Qaeda helped establish Libya's credentials.
While the analogy to North Korea is overdrawn, there is one important link between the two countries: Pakistan's assistance for their nuclear weapons programmes. The seizure last year of nuclear-related technologies headed to Libya gave Tripoli a final reason to come clean. The information that has since been provided to US and International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors helped expose the black market in nuclear technology that was being run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb.
Dr Khan's confessions have shed more light on links between Pakistan, Iran, Libya and North Korea. In so doing, they have also crystallised US concerns in the six-party talks. There have been continuing questions about what the North Koreans told US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in October 2002 when he accused them of cheating on the Agreed Framework by developing a clandestine highly enriched uranium programme. Pyongyang's line has changed, from confirming the charge to hedging, to outright denial. But North Korean statements do not matter: the US had intelligence that North Korea was cheating and that is all that counts.
Thus, the starting point for the US in the six-party talks is Pyongyang's admission (in some form or fashion) that it has a highly enriched uranium programme and is going to freeze it. Continuing denials of its existence will only be taken as proof that the North Koreans are double-dealing; they want the 'goodies' that flow from a deal and the nuclear capability that the programme will produce.
Here, the lessons of the Libyan experience matter most. The idea that Colonel Gaddafi was sobered by the Iraq invasion will only encourage the hardliners in Washington. But if the real Libyan lesson is that engagement comes first, then this is the wrong course to pursue. Libya's international isolation gave it an incentive to change its behaviour. Pyongyang is not in the same position. From my vantage point, it is Washington that risks further isolation within the six-party framework. No one wants conflict on the Korean peninsula, and all want the US to engage North Korea more to prevent that.
North Korea is proving more adroit than the US at public relations: Its leadership seems willing to talk and has put proposals on the table. In contrast, Washington appears stuck, demanding concessions from Pyongyang before it will begin to negotiate. If the US sticks to that position without showing what others - in particular, the Chinese and the South Koreans - perceive as flexibility, it, not North Korea, will be considered the obstacle to peace. Kim Jong-il is proving much more shrewd than Colonel Gaddafi, He wants considerably more than commendations for good behaviour; he may yet get it.
Brad Glosserman is director of research at Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based think-tank