Expanding Nato works against US
The Nato summit opens today, with Georgia and Ukraine lobbying the alliance to continue its steady eastern march. But this process is undermining, not improving, US security. Countries that have been variously occupied, partitioned and dominated prefer not to trust in the goodwill of their large neighbours. Indeed, Russia's popular eruption against Estonia over the removal of a second world war memorial offers a stark reminder that Russia has yet to join Europe in heart and mind.
To the question 'what to do?', the answer is obvious: enlist the services of a benevolent, distant superpower. Europe might offer a good economic home, but the very ennui that renders so many formerly great powers harmless diminishes the security value of a military alliance with them.
America is different. The US possesses the world's most powerful military and is ever ready to go to war. That is why so many governments pine for its embrace.
Surely, the alliance aids Central and Eastern European efforts at continental integration. Joining the exclusive club is particularly satisfying for countries that spent years looking in, across the Iron Curtain.
But the most important factor is Article 5 of the Nato charter - which creates the possibility of turning a war with Russia, however unlikely, into Europe's, and, more importantly, America's, war.
It's a policy which makes sense in Tbilisi, Kiev and elsewhere in the region. But it doesn't make sense in Washington.
One reason for America's expensive outsized military is to back just such treaty commitments. And the price of actually acting on these security guarantees could be huge: Russia remains a serious power with nuclear weapons. Moreover, Moscow has clout where America needs it - on the UN Security Council, which affects US policy towards Iran, North Korea and more.
In short, any cold-blooded assessment of US interests will emphasise Washington's relationship with Moscow over co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe. Countries that fear again becoming an afterthought in great power competition need an alternative strategy: upgrade their militaries, create value for Washington and avoid confrontation with Moscow.
Relying on the US to rush off to war, if necessary, to preserve the independence of distant countries out of abstract goodwill is risky. Instead, nations need to demonstrate that they are net security assets.
It also means aiding the US in meeting military responsibilities outside Europe. Poland's and Ukraine's modest commitments to Iraq evinced genuine effort. Warsaw's planned withdrawal suggests the new government expects the defence relationship to run only one way. Participation in the planned US missile defence system is another area of practical co-operation. Finally, vulnerable countries should avoid provoking powerful neighbours.
Having to be concerned about Moscow's opinion might not seem fair, but life is unfair. It is not America's duty to eliminate all unfairness from the world. The US has few security reasons to defend Nato's newest members, let alone potential inductees like Georgia and Ukraine. Washington's new friends should not assume the US will forever put sentiment before interest. Freedom rarely comes that cheap.
Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft fellow at the American Conservative Defence Alliance