India must break the triangle of madness

'Those whom the gods destroy they first make mad.' There is a madness about the triangular relationship between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. They have all resented and often hated each other, made alliances against each other, worked together when it was opportune, supported or, at least, turned too much of a blind eye to terrorists in each other's countries and became profoundly angry if terrorism was unleashed against them.

These cleavages have their roots back to the days of the 'Great Game' of the 19th century, the British-Russian struggle for supremacy in Afghanistan and central Asia.

But, ever since the Red Army invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and was finally defeated by the Taleban - aided by American, Saudi Arabian and Indian arms and training - the intensity of the 'game' has been ratcheted up and extended to now frightening proportions. It has been worsened by America's decision to go to war with its former close ally, the Taleban. It is no longer just a Great Game, but a Great Madness.

It has long been known that the Pakistan-based terrorists who struggle to liberate Kashmir from India's grip have close connections with the Taleban. There is also little doubt that those Pakistan-based terrorists whose primary interest is a free Kashmir see one way to wound India is to hurt its growing political and diplomatic interests in Afghanistan.

Pakistani tactics profoundly changed for the better under president Pervez Musharraf and they have arguably changed even more under the new government of Asif Ali Zardari, who lost his wife, Benazir Bhutto, in the bombing carried out by these same Pakistan-based terrorists. His statement renouncing Pakistan's first-use doctrine for its nuclear weapons was a landmark step forward.

Now with the Mumbai terrorist action it seems that India and Pakistan are being pushed back to square one. This is largely India's fault. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government has been too slow to respond to overtures of peace from Pakistan.

The insouciant body language that shrugged off Mr Zardari's statement on nuclear policy was totally reprehensible given its significance. But even worse was Dr Singh's refusal to grab Mr Musharraf's offer at a time when he controlled both the government and military of Pakistan. Every diplomat I talked to in Islamabad and New Delhi last year thought that India would never get a better one.

With Mr Musharraf gone, the best chance of a deal has gone, too. Even though Mr Zardari seems willing to try, it is unclear whether Pakistan's military can be led to the starting line as easily as it could have been by Mr Musharraf.

Besides, after Mumbai the atmosphere is so badly poisoned in India that Dr Singh is presumably even more convinced he can't take any grand steps towards Pakistan.

But this is what separates a statesman from a politician. Dr Singh must risk all and reach out and grab Pakistan's peace offers. Only then might the triangle of madness be broken.

Jonathan Power is a London-based journalist