The darkness before the political dawn

THE latest Japanese political developments prove Banboku Ono was absolutely right. Mr Ono, a noted conservative politician who helped found the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955, maintained that ''politics is total darkness, one inch ahead''.

In the middle of the afternoon of June 27, there was no indication of the upheaval to come. A period of perpetual darkness seemed likely. Many assumed that the Diet session, far from quickly resolving the current impasse, would be extended while intrigues continued in the smoke-filled backrooms.

The impasse had come about in the wake of the resignation of the reformist coalition led by Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata on June 23. At that moment, all the main strands in the situation were in play.

The LDP and the Japan Socialists had met amidst ostentatious cordiality on June 25. Beyond the smiles for the TV cameras from LDP leader Yohei Kono and Socialist leader Tomiichi Murayama, little substance was apparent.

So while it was assumed that a coalition between the two parties, aimed at restoring the ''1955 set-up'', was still possible, it was not thought to be immediately likely.

Both the LDP and the Socialists were formed in 1955 from previously separate factions. Until the upheavals of 1993, the LDP had enjoyed 38 uninterrupted years in office while the Socialists enjoyed 38 uninterrupted years in opposition. Meanwhile Japanese bureaucrats enjoyed 38 more years of rarely interrupted power-wielding while Japanese businesses enjoyed 38 years of rarely interrupted growth.

On June 26 the Socialists, obviously enjoying their control of crucial swing votes in the Diet, went back to negotiating with the reformist coalition led by Mr Hata and his close colleague Ichiro Ozawa, the would-be Mr Fixit of the Japanese political scene. It seemed a logical move.

As they zig-zagged across the political scene, the Socialists had joined the six other reformist parties which had formed the first non-LDP government, led by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, after last summer's general election. The Socialists had ditched the coalition when Mr Hosokawa resigned, and when the other parties had showed signs of forming a single reformist grouping. Their departure from the coalition two months ago left Mr Hata in the precarious position of trying to sustain a minority government.

The Hosokawa cabinet had managed to finally pass political reform bills at the beginning of 1994, after left-wing Socialists had done their best to wreck the effort by voting against them. Mr Murayama had then been unable to maintain Socialist party unity in favour of reform.

But even today the crucial reform is still not yet ready to be implemented. This changes the electoral system built around multi-member constituencies to one in which single-seat constituencies are mixed with proportional representation. The new constituency borders have not yet been drawn. So on June 26 and 27 Mr Ozawa and his reformist colleagues sought the Socialists' parliamentary votes in order to sustain a government, while the new constituencies were drawn up and approved by the Diet. The only alternative for Mr Ozawa was to secretly secure a sufficient number of defectors from the LDP, or even the Socialists, to provide a secure Diet majority. While reformist-Socialist negotiations proceeded, the quiet search for defectors was also pursued.

Suddenly events were moving frantically into the total darkness. Indicating that the Socialist-LDP negotiations had moved further than the TV cameras had been allowed to see, the LDP ended hopes for a Diet extension. Mr Kono proposed that Mr Murayama should become the first Socialist Prime Minister of Japan since Tetsu Katayama held the job for 10 months in 1947-1948. Next, indicating that Mr Ozawa may have been more successful in seeking defectors than anyone had imagined, former LDP Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu denounced the Kono move to support the Socialists. Mr Kaifu put himself forward as Prime Ministerial candidate. The reformist coalition quickly backed him. What followed was a typical Japanese scene. At first, the political world rumbled and shook, just as in a real earthquake. The 1955 set-up threatened to collapse into the shifting earth. However, in the end, it was still standing albeit somewhat askew. But many foundations to the political system had been weakened.

First, the LDP and the Socialists have sought to defend their hegemony in the 1995 set-up by coming together in the Cabinet led by Prime Minister Murayama and Deputy Prime Minister Kono. Given the 38 years of dedicated opposition to one another, this is a cynical ploy which many politicians, as well as Japanese public opinion, are finding very difficult, if not impossible, to accept. Second, both of these parties were seriously weakened by their manoeuvres.

Together, the LDP and the Socialists should have had 280 votes in the House of Representatives prime ministerial vote. Yet in neither the first nor the run-off vote were the two able to put together a majority of the 511 members by themselves. The help of the 21 members of Shinto Sakigake (New Pioneer Party), formerly part of Hosokawa's coalition, was crucial. Instead of its normal strength of 206, the LDP vote shrank to 173.

The Socialist strength of 74 went down to 63. Nineteen LDP members voted for Mr Kaifu and probably eight Socialists did, too. Eleven LDP members cast invalid votes. Third, while Mr Ozawa failed to get enough defectors to secure a majority for the reformist coalition, his failure is equally worrying for the LDP. Mr Kaifu's weakness as an LDP politician has always been that he belonged to the small faction led by Toshio Komoto.

But Mr Ozawa also caught some more big fish when former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and former Deputy Prime Minister Michio Watanabe voted for Mr Kaifu. Had the whole of the once-powerful Nakasone-Watanabe faction of the LDP followed their leaders, Mr Kaifu would now be Prime Minister. Their failure to do so means that the factional loyalties which once sustained the LDP are now very weak - a reality more likely to help Mr Ozawa's unending search for defectors rather than Mr Kono's search for stability.

Fourth, the reformist coalition has been demoralised by Mr Kaifu's defeat, and by the clear evidence that Mr Ozawa is not a political magician after all. It could weaken as a consequence, even break up. Yet, since they no longer need to conciliate the Socialists, the reformists could also resume their unity moves towards becoming one single party.

Fifth, the political earth additionally shook because so much Japanese public opinion was shocked and antagonistic to the formation of the Murayama-Kono Cabinet. Peering into the total darkness which now lies ahead, the Murayama Cabinet could well be the last hurrah for the LDP and the Socialists. The two parties may take the gamble of trying to shore themselves up through one last election under the old electoral system. Such a move might arouse additional cynicism and could therefore backfire. A more aroused electorate is bound to stimulate more defections from the past to the future.

Many assumed that the Diet session would be extended while intrigues continued in the smoke-filled backrooms