Source:
https://scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3007593/see-what-drives-north-korea-and-kim-jong-un-set-biases-aside
Comment/ Letters

To see what drives North Korea and Kim Jong-un, set biases aside

  • North Korea may see denuclearisation of the peninsula in a very different way to the United States
  • It needs to be considered whether Pyongyang defaults on international financial commitments because of crippling US-led sanctions
North Korean students read newspaper coverage of their leader Kim Jong-un visiting Vietnam for a summit with US President Donald Trump, in Pyongyang in February. Photo: AFP

I agree with much of Mr Roy’s analysis. But I object to his built-in bias. Some examples follow.

First, Mr Roy asserts that “denuclearisation” of the Korean peninsula is “North Korean code for ending the US-South Korea alliance and withdrawing US troops from Korea”. Of course that is how most American analysts see it. But North Korea may see it as a fair exchange – a mutual removal of immediate threats – its “ denuclearisation ” for removal of the American military threat from the peninsula.

In fact, this is not a fair exchange, because the US would still have forward deployed forces near enough to continue to pose a threat while North Korea would have no deterrent once it “denuclearised”.

Second, Mr Roy says that “North Korea is notorious for defaulting on its international financial commitments”. But he neglects to mention that the crippling US-led sanctions – including on its international financial transactions – might have something to do with it.

Third, I agree that “China’s changed relationship with North Korea has helped Kim [Jong-un] ascend to a position of strength in his relations with the United States.” But Mr Roy should mention that this is due in good part to the political acumen and ingenuity of North Korea’s leadership in taking advantage of US mistakes.

China is backing North Korea because it is in its interest to do so; but also because the US has mishandled the situation and is – in China’s eyes – being “unreasonable”.

Fourth, Mr Roy doesn’t mention the alternative explanation for North Korea’s attempt to sideline Mike Pompeo – that he and John Bolton tried to impose the Libyan model, which from North Korea’s perspective would require that it surrender its nuclear deterrent first before the West engineers regime change.

Fifth, it seems obvious that Kim’s strategy now is to either get much of what he wants or wait out Donald Trump’s term for a more “reasonable” administration.

Analysing this conundrum from a biased perspective may lead to incorrect conclusions.

Mark J. Valencia, adjunct senior scholar, National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China