Signing of joint declaration masked deep rift between Britain and China over Hong Kong's future

Words of appreciation flowed freely between leaders of Britain and China during late British prime minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to Beijing in December 1984. After all, the centrepiece of the occasion merited it: the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong's future.

During her three-day visit that December, the "Iron Lady" also received assurances from Chinese leaders, including then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and premier Zhao Ziyang , that Beijing would honour the agreement on Hong Kong's handover.

Yet the cordial atmosphere of the talks belied a rift between Britain and China over Hong Kong's affairs in the run-up to 1997 that was to emerge shortly after Thatcher and Zhao inked the historic agreement, according to recently declassified British government files.

The different stance between the two countries on matters such as democratic reform and representation in Hong Kong were swept aside during the signing. But inevitably, it sowed the seeds for a growing feud in the transitional period.

None of it, though, was evident during the Thatcher-Deng talks. Deng said the conclusion of the matter was of "historic importance". His remark was in stark contrast to his blunt reply to Thatcher during their first meeting in September 1982, when she warned about "grave consequences" if Beijing insisted on taking back Hong Kong. Deng had replied icily then that Beijing "would face the disaster head on and make the decision".

Clearly, both sides had moved considerably since that more fractious meeting of 1982.

According to the declassified records of the meeting between Zhao and Thatcher on December 19, 1984, Zhao said China always lived up to its international commitments, even during its years of domestic turmoil.

Even on the sensitive issue of Hong Kong's constitutional development in the run-up to the handover in 1997, Zhao said diplomatically that he was not prepared to make any comment on constitutional development during the transitional period.

He made the remarks after Thatcher told him the British Government was "anxious to give the people the experience which they needed to run their own administration after 1997 to a greater extent than they did now".

"Zhao said in principle, they [the Chinese government] wanted to see more and more Hong Kong people working in government departments in Hong Kong and playing an even greater role than hitherto," the declassified papers reported.

"But any measure to this end should not adversely affect the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong or the smooth transfer of government in 1997."

Former Hong Kong governor David Wilson, who was a member of the British team that negotiated with Beijing on the joint declaration, told the South China Morning Post that Zhao's response showed to some extent he did not view the development of representative government in Hong Kong before 1997 with a closed mind.

READ MORE: Britain adjusted tactics to sway Chinese leaders ahead of Joint Declaration visit in 1984

While the top leaders of the two countries sought to strike a conciliatory note, there were already verbal sparks at times during a meeting between British foreign secretary Geoffrey Howe and his Chinese counterpart Wu Xueqian on December 19.

Howe said that while drafting the Basic Law was a matter for the Chinese government, the law would be scrutinised with the same intensity as the Joint Declaration had been.

"The secretary of state [Howe] said we would be happy to offer all the help when we could, such as through joint consultations, on practical matters," the records show. Wu replied that Beijing would solicit opinions in Hong Kong on a "wide basis" when the Basic Law was drafted.

If that message of polite rejection did not get through, Zhou Nan, vice-minister of foreign affairs and head of the Chinese delegation during the talks on Hong Kong's future, made plain China's true sentiments. As the discussion came to an end, Zhou intervened to emphasise that when Wu had spoken of soliciting opinions, he meant only the views of Hongkongers.

The drafting of the city's Basic Law or mini-constitution began in 1985. This was when the signs of discord began to surface openly, in the form of disagreements over the nature of representation in the Legislative Council.

It was then, too, that the Hong Kong government saw British-introduced indirect elections to Legco for the first time. The plan was laid out in a White Paper on Hong Kong a year earlier.

Under the plan, the colonial government decided 12 legislators would be returned by nine functional constituencies, while another 12 would be elected by an electoral college composed of district councillors and members of the now-defunct Urban Council and Regional Council.

Beijing showed its displeasure. It insisted that the development of representative government must be in line with the Basic Law, which was eventually passed in 1990.

The British had also tried to engineer a so-called "through-train" arrangement, under which lawmakers returned in the 1995 election would automatically become members of the first legislature of the special administrative region.

The idea had to be abandoned when talks between Britain and China broke down in 1993.

But well before that, according to the declassified papers, British officials knew of trouble ahead. They assessed in 1984 that Beijing appeared to suspect the British government was aiming to leave a "pro-British" administration in place in 1997.

Howe told Wu there was pressure in the British Parliament and in Hong Kong for Hongkongers to be represented on the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, which discussed arrangements for the handover.

But Wu said the group had to be confined to representatives of the British and Chinese governments, adding that the Hong Kong government could not be represented.

Wu went on to say that Chinese nationals could not be members of the British side. After further discussion, he said that if there was a need to consult Chinese nationals because of their local knowledge they could be members of an expert sub-group.

The British government did succeed in persuading Beijing to register the joint declaration at the United Nations.

Howe told Wu that it was an accepted practice among states to register international agreements at the UN. Wu said that the Chinese had not registered their agreements in the past, but that he was prepared to consider the idea.

The agreement was eventually registered at the UN by the Chinese and British governments in June 1985. A source familiar with the matter said Deng gave the green light to the UN registration.