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The resumption of the Quad signals that the grouping is likely to play a significant role in setting the geopolitical agenda in the Biden era. Photo: AP

Explainer | What is the Quad, and how will it impact US-China relations under the Biden administration?

  • The belief that the informal security grouping of the US, India, Australia and Japan is targeting China could be its weakness, analysts say
  • Asian countries are seen as wary of the Quad as they seek to balance ties between Washington and Beijing, but could France be an addition to future dialogues?
The United States, India, Australia and Japan have held their first meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad”, since President Joe Biden’s inauguration – showing the new US administration’s support for a grouping China has criticised as a “clique” that could start a new Cold War, despite expectations Washington would ease some pressure on Beijing to improve US-China relations.

The virtual talks were hosted by new US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who spoke with his three counterparts about cooperation on issues including the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change, the restoration of democracy in Myanmar, and “advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region”.

The resumption of the dialogue, which is widely seen as driven by shared concerns over China’s growing power and influence, signals that the grouping is likely to play a significant role in setting the geopolitical agenda in the Biden era, amid speculation that new members could join.

Will closer India-Australia ties boost ‘Quad’ group that has China in its sights?

HOW DID THE QUAD COME ABOUT?

Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe first proposed the Quad in 2007, envisaging a grouping that would help uphold “freedom and prosperity” in the Asia-Pacific. While not mentioning China by name, his proposals were widely understood as aimed at countering Beijing’s growing influence in the region. Abe solidified that perception in 2012 when he outlined his vision of a “democratic security diamond” to challenge China’s “coercive behaviour” in the East and South China Seas.

The Quad held a single round of dialogue and joint military drills in 2007, before entering a decade-long hiatus when Australia withdrew from the grouping the following year to boost ties with Beijing.

In late 2017, as the Trump administration ramped up confrontation with Beijing, the four countries kicked off the second incarnation of the Quad during a gathering in Manila focused on “issues of common interest in the Indo-Pacific region”.

Foreign ministers S. Jaishankar of India, Japan’s Toshimitsu Motegi and Australia’s Marise Payne with then-US secretary of state Mike Pompeo before the Quad ministerial meeting in October. Photo: Reuters

Since then, the Quad has held several more rounds of dialogue, and last year organised the first joint naval exercises since the forum’s initial incarnation.

Despite attracting the ire of Beijing, which has dismissed it as transitory “sea foam”, the Quad has generally refrained from directly mentioning China.

Following the latest dialogue, only Japanese foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi mentioned China, through a statement expressing “serious concern with regard to China’s coastguard law” and saying the four ministers agreed to “strongly oppose unilateral and forceful attempts to change the status quo in the context of the East and South China Sea”.

Lalit Kapur, a retired commodore in the Indian Navy and senior fellow with the Delhi Policy Group, said he did not see the Quad as “being about China, even though it is in the interests of the Communist Party to project it as such”.

“I see it as about the rule of law, honouring agreements, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and peaceful resolution of disputes,” he said. “China has set out to unilaterally revise these norms that have maintained peace and guided relationships between nations at least since World War II. If it upholds these norms – as it professes to do – the Quad is not needed.”

WHAT SPARKED THE REVIVAL OF THE QUAD?

China’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy has set off growing alarm across the region, galvanising calls for cooperation to uphold the “rules-based international order” and push back against perceived coercion and aggression in areas such as the South China Sea.

Each member of the Quad has become increasingly wary of Beijing in recent years amid disputes over territory, trade, human rights issues, and alleged espionage. Some of the many points of tension include fatal clashes along the Sino-Indian border; allegations of Chinese meddling in Australian politics; and the status of the disputed Diaoyu Islands, known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan.

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The South China Sea dispute explained

The South China Sea dispute explained

Distrust of China has also become a largely bipartisan affair. Although the 2016 election of Donald Trump as president marked the start of Washington’s ramped-up confrontation with Beijing, Biden has signalled that his administration will continue to take a hard line on China, and has appointed numerous officials known for their hawkish views.

National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan last month said the White House viewed the Quad as a “fundamental, a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific region”.

Derek Grossman, a senior defence analyst at the Rand Corporation in Washington, said: “The Biden administration is fully embracing the Quad because it is useful to work together with like-minded partners on global challenges of mutual concern, like pandemic relief and climate change.

“But in addition, the Biden team seeks to leverage the Quad to uphold American values, such as international rules and norms of behaviour, and supporting democracy and human rights, against the authoritarian Chinese model which is antithetical to these ideals.”

Why the Quad doesn’t spell the future of Asia’s relationship with China

Clive Williams, a former Australian defence intelligence official based at the Australian National University in Canberra, said the Quad’s evolution was clearly “intended to send a message to China that [the People’s Liberation Army] military activities in the South China Sea and towards Taiwan are unacceptable to the Quad – as are ongoing human rights abuses in China’s outlying areas, including Hong Kong”.

Williams said that for smaller countries such as Australia, the grouping was also aimed at keeping the US engaged in the region.

Ian Hall, an international relations professor at the Griffith Asia Institute in Brisbane, said the Quad’s continuation under Biden reflected “deeper bipartisan concern in Washington about China’s assertiveness and acquisitiveness”. But, he said, it also showed its usefulness as a forum for regular dialogue between key states in the region that face similar challenges, “whether they relate to China or to other issues, like Myanmar, which was on the agenda for the last meeting”.

A candlelight vigil to protest against the military coup in Myanmar which was on the agenda at the most recent Quad meeting. Photo: Reuters

WHAT ARE THE QUAD’S LIMITATIONS?

Despite originating more than a decade ago, the Quad remains an informal and loosely defined grouping. There is no official alliance linking its members, and its exact functions and aims remain largely undefined. Last year, then US deputy secretary of state Stephen Biegun acknowledged that the grouping was a “somewhat undefined entity”, expressing his hope that it could “become more regularised and at some point formalised as well as we really begin to understand what the parameters of this cooperation are”.

Hall from the Griffith Institute described the grouping as “ad hoc and not institutionalised”.

“So, at any point, any partner could decide to walk away,” he said. “But equally, that makes it flexible – others could be invited and the agenda is not fixed.”

As US plays off India and China, it risks losing a nuclear-armed ally: Pakistan

There are also significant differences among its members in terms of priorities and geopolitical orientation. While Australia and Japan are both US allies, India has traditionally been non-aligned.

“What India sees as important lies in the Indian Ocean,” the Delhi Policy Group’s Kapur said. “What Japan sees as important lies around Taiwan and north of it. What the US sees as important lies east of China, into the Pacific. Much still remains to be discussed and clarified before a larger role for India can be considered.”

Another weakness could be the widespread perception that the grouping is aimed at China.

“Beijing consistently called out the Quad for being some sort of military alliance designed to limit China’s rise, and this has given Beijing the ability to persuade Southeast Asian countries – who are caught between the US and China as their competition ramps up – to favour China or at least maintain their non-alignment and resist becoming part of the Quad,” said Grossman from the Rand Corporation. “If they do, then China may punish them.”

COULD THE QUAD GET NEW MEMBERS?

Officials and analysts have on various occasions suggested membership of the Quad could be expanded. In October, Marc Knapper, acting deputy assistant secretary of state for Korea and Japan, said although the grouping was not currently “advertising for new members”, it could expand “at some point in the future”.

The same month, Japan’s foreign minister Motegi suggested “like-minded countries” could participate in Tokyo’s vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, singling out France as a European country with “territory in other regions such as East Africa and the Indian Ocean”.
Many Asian countries with a stake in regional stability, however, are seen as reluctant to get too closely involved with the Quad. Although the group’s latest dialogue stressed the importance of cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), the 10-nation bloc is widely believed to be hesitant to be seen taking sides between Washington and Beijing.

Last year, Moon Chung-in, an adviser to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, said South Korea, a close US ally, would face an “existential dilemma” if it were formally invited to join the Quad due its need to balance its ties with the powers.

While it is not known to have extended any formal invitations for membership, the Quad has on several occasions asked other countries to discuss their responses to the pandemic, prompting commentary about the potential of “Quad Plus” dialogue.

“There has obviously been talk of other states joining Quad meetings,” said Hall of the Griffith Asia Institute. “And we saw Quad Plus meetings last year to discuss Covid-19 involving New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam. I doubt, however, those countries would join an expanded Quad soon. A more likely prospect would be France, given its interests across the Indian Ocean and South Pacific, and its strong ties to India.”

James Goldrick, a retired two-star rear admiral in the Royal Australian Navy, said informal partnerships with the Quad on issues of common concern could be the way forward for Asian countries wary of entangling alliances.

“Asean may well steer clear of any formal relationship, but I think that the approach of informal partnerships and efforts to act together to find solutions to shared problems may well work on a region-wide base and be attractive to individual Southeast Asian nations,” he said. “So the Quad could become the core of a whole range of networks, not all of which will be centred on the US – and not all of which may be primarily about China.”

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