Trump beware: Pakistan’s luck playing China card is turning
When the bin Laden raid sent US-Pakistan ties into a tailspin, Beijing rebuffed the advances of Islamabad. But six years on, as relations head south once again, China’s calculus has changed
At the lowest ebb of the last annus horribilis for US-Pakistan ties in 2011, soon after the special forces raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan brandished the China card: if relations with Washington were going into a tailspin, Islamabad would turn to Beijing instead. They were rebuffed. China discreetly made it clear to both the United States and Pakistan that the “all-weather friendship” was already as deep as they wanted it to be and that Islamabad needed to focus on fixing its relations with Washington.
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In principle, then, there is still a basis for continued US-China cooperation on Afghanistan, and Beijing’s first instinct will almost certainly be to see if there is scope to square the circle between US and Pakistani interests rather than risking a slide into mutual antipathy. An agreed path towards peace talks with the Taliban will probably continue to be China’s main focus, even if the near-term prospects of negotiations remain poor. But if the needle proves impossible to thread, it is clear that Beijing’s interests in Pakistan have shifted markedly in recent years, and Beijing cannot be expected to react the same way that it did in the Abbottabad aftermath.
In addition to the fact that China’s once negligible economic interests in Pakistan have grown to the tune of tens of billions of dollars in investment, there is a political premium to making CPEC a success.
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Demonstrating that China can stick by its closest military and intelligence partner during trying times is a credibility issue that now extends well beyond any bilateral interests.
As a result, if Pakistan comes under real pressure, China will probably be willing to extend forms of economic support and political protection it would previously have balked at. A version of this already played out in 2015, when Pakistan was being pushed by the Saudis and the UAE to play a significant role in the military campaign in Yemen. Chinese economic reassurances helped Pakistan to resist the entreaties and financial threats. China has also given stronger political cover to Pakistan in international forums.
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In many ways, though, the question is less what new steps Beijing might take and more whether China’s existing backing leaves Pakistan in a position where it thinks it can hold out without changing its approach to Afghanistan. Pakistan has no interest in casting its lot in entirely with China, and Beijing doesn’t want that either. China has its questions about Pakistan’s use of militant proxies in the region too. But the two sides have become more deeply enmeshed. And while CPEC might help to shift Pakistan’s security calculus in a benign direction over the longer term, in the short term, it is likely to give Pakistan additional breathing space if it decides to face the US down. ■
Andrew Small is the author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics