US-China tensions: is war the endgame in the South China Sea?
A close encounter between a Chinese destroyer and the USS Decatur may have been an attempt by Beijing to keep tensions from crossing into an outright armed confrontation for which neither side is ready
This latest Chinese action in the South China Sea could have been meant as a tit-for-tat move by Beijing to express displeasure, yet it may also be an attempt to keep tensions from going past boiling point and crossing into outright armed confrontation. Neither power is ready for such an eventuality. The political and economic repercussions are too colossal as even a thought to entertain.
What’s behind Beijing’s South China Sea moves?
For one, the South China Sea remains an international medium through which the global community at large enjoys freedom of passage by sea or air. Thus far, there has been no attempt by any party to impede civilian passage. That would amount to an act of aggression on international economic well-being, since an estimated one-third of the world’s shipping passes through the sea.
This is, however, not the same for military passage. Beijing has challenged foreign military aircraft flying close to its garrisoned South China Sea features – much as, in this latest case, its destroyer’s manoeuvres challenged those of the USS Decatur.
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Hence, both China and the US will most plausibly not roll back on their respective activities. The latter will continue to conduct “show of flag” presence operations, including warship manoeuvres and military overflights such as a recent one by B-52 strategic bombers. Beijing will continue to militarise the sea, including staging frequent air, naval and amphibious exercises. It will continue to couch all such moves as “self-defensive” responses to US military activities and for that matter, those of other external powers such as Australia, France, India, Japan, and Britain, which have also recently ramped up their South China Sea military presence.
There is no stopping Chinese warships and fighter jets from more muscular forms of sovereignty assertion
The “show of flag” and “show of force” moves and counter-moves by China and the US (and its allies and partners included at times) will continue, but be assiduously maintained under the threshold of outright use of force.
At the mildest, PLA Navy ships and planes will continue to shadow foreign military assets traversing the area. The verbal challenges issued by Chinese garrisons in the Spratlys will continue, backed up by a growing plethora of military capabilities such as missile batteries and, possibly, rotational deployment of fighter jets and other warplanes. It may be difficult to imagine an exclusion or air defence identification zone over the South China Sea that may trigger regional repercussions, including the alienation of at least some Asean member states. But there is no stopping Chinese warships and fighter jets from more muscular forms of sovereignty assertion, such as in the case of the USS Decatur.
Amid the enduring deficit of strategic trust, it is still possible to promote navigational safety and crisis stability through the use of confidence-building mechanisms, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea promulgated by 21 navies during the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 2014. It will be fitting, given the present evolving circumstances including unceasing submarine proliferation and a possible return of aerial close-proximity encounters, to not only solidly implement the code but extend this mechanism to the undersea and aerial dimensions.
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The South China Sea endgame does not necessarily have to devolve into conflict, but rather, fester on as an avenue of tit-for-tat military moves and countermoves maintained under that threshold. It is delusional to expect strategic distrust to dissipate overnight. But an unfortunate mishap arising from inadvertent or accidental clashes between rival forces can indeed emerge quickly and without prior warning. Confidence-building mechanisms, not just at the strategic but operational levels, and professionalism of the servicepeople on the ground, would be the bulwark against such dire eventualities. ■
Collin Koh is research fellow at the Maritime Security Programme, at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University based in Singapore
