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Ivanka Trump, right, with other world leaders at the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan. Photo: EPA
Opinion
Asian Angle
by Ananth Krishnan
Asian Angle
by Ananth Krishnan

Cringeworthy, yes, but Ivanka Trump had something to say about US-India ties

  • As cringeworthy as it was to watch Donald Trump’s daughter at the G20, her glowing comments about India carried a message worth noting
  • Amid fears for bilateral ties and tension over Delhi’s links with China, Iran and Russia, the US is saying: ‘Don’t worry, we can work through this’
Many of the post-G20 headlines were hogged by one widely circulated – and admittedly cringe-inducing – video of Ivanka Trump inserting herself awkwardly into a conversation between the leaders of Britain, France and Canada, prompting one apparently dismissive look from the head of the International Monetary Fund.
It was, however, another less noticed – if equally cringeworthy – Ivanka Trump video from Osaka that drew the attention of followers of US-India relations, where she emerged in the unlikely role of State Department spokesperson. Providing a readout of her father’s meetings with India’s Narendra Modi and Japan’s Shinzo Abe, she described India glowingly as “a critical trading partner, a critical security partner and a critical ally”.
Ivanka Trump watches as her father Donald shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the G20 summit. Photo: PA wire

Leaving aside the incongruity of Trump’s daughter emerging as an unlikely spokesperson for US-India relations – and engaging with an Indian prime minister who rose to power on a platform slamming dynastic politics – her video, as odd as it was in delivery and in conception, did carry a message worth noting. And regardless of the intense criticism at home for nepotism over Ivanka’s expanded role in the administration, including apparently as an unofficial second Secretary of State, the Modi government certainly isn’t going to be complaining about having another Trump bat for India, notwithstanding its aversion to political dynasties.

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Indeed, her upbeat reading was a sharp contrast to a relationship recently in the headlines for the wrong reasons over a number of spats, most notably on trade. A relationship, according to some observers, in worrying free-fall. Only days after Modi was basking in his stunning May election victory for a second term, the Trump administration revoked India’s trade benefits under its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) status, essentially taxing US$5.5 billion worth of Indian imports. Delhi responded with retaliatory tariffs of its own, and was left once again concerned about how Trump really viewed what has been an increasingly crucial strategic relationship for India.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka. Photo: EPA
Moreover, the India-US trade spat, particularly after the GSP withdrawal, has even drawn some comparisons with the more bruising and broader China-US trade war, including in the Chinese media, which has suggested that China and India draw closer, at least in the commercial domain, to jointly deal with the unpredictability unleashed by Trump’s Washington.

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That such comparisons are both premature and misplaced was the very clear message both from the Trump-Modi meeting at the G20 in Osaka, and the recent visit of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Delhi before the summit. If the message from Trump to Modi – “We have never been so close” – was laced with his typical bombast, Pompeo’s Delhi visit provided a more measured and realistic appraisal of the state of relations. Certainly, there are dark clouds over disputes, particularly over trade, that need to be resolved, which if left festering could derail the broader relationship, one which has undoubtedly been growing closer. The silver lining is both sides appear to understand this, and agree on the need to resolve these issues quickly.

As much as Trump may push India to the limit on trade – as he has done with most American trading partners – there is a consensus in Washington on the need to engage India closely as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region, a marked opposite to the very different consensus emerging there on dealing with China.

Underlining this, on July 2 the US Senate passed a legislative provision, contained in the National defence Authorisation Act for 2020, that essentially places India on a par with US Nato allies for taking forward closer defence cooperation, including in maritime security and counterterrorism.

Jeff Smith, who closely follows US-India ties as a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation in Washington, told me that Pompeo had in India “hit all the right notes and made all the right noises”.

“To his credit, he didn’t skirt around the tangible differences that have emerged on trade and US sanctions towards Russia and Iran but conveyed confidence those disputes would be resolved,” he said.

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On Russia, the sticking point is India’s plans to buy five S-400 missile systems from 2020, which faces the prospect of US sanctions under the Trump administration’s Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, while on Iran, the fresh sanctions imposed by Trump threatened India’s oil imports – of which 10 per cent come from Iran – with pressure on India to reduce its purchases.

Smith said that at a time “of elevated tensions in the relationship it was important for the new Modi government to have someone of his stature personally convey the message: ‘Don’t worry, we’re going to work through these hiccups’.”

What the Trump administration hasn’t appeared to grasp is the unique position India occupies as a crucial US partner, but one which has the strategic manouevering space that many American allies do not.

Trump’s emphasis on short-term trade problems over longer-term areas of strategic convergence is the primary reason for the recent disruption.

US National Security Adviser John Bolton and Ivanka Trump (R) attend a bilateral meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Osaka. Photo: AFP

“This series of differences – coming as they do together – threatens to overshadow the very real progress in US-India relations in the first couple of years of the Trump administration,” observed Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution in Washington, in a recent article.

“They have already reinforced traditional concerns that the two countries have about each other. In the US, in some quarters, this includes asking whether the relationship with India is worth it; in India, whether the US is reliable.”

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These concerns in India have begun to manifest in other areas beyond trade, such as 5G, where the US has made clear that areas of intelligence cooperation would be impacted if India was to include Chinese vendors, such as Huawei, in its trials later this year. The Indian government is yet to take a call on doing so, with some agencies in favour of allowing Chinese vendors with safeguards, but others opposed to doing so on account of security concerns. Likewise with India’s regulations on data localisation, which US companies have opposed.

Smith says the two sides’ priority should be to get to work on a trade and investment deal and “find a way to forestall a trade battle that could threaten strategic convergence and make the Trump administration’s prior decisions to impose tariffs on Indian steel and aluminium exports and revoke India’s benefits under the GSP look tame by comparison.”

Whether or not this convergence can be realised will ultimately depend on whether both sides will, as they pledged to do both in Osaka in Delhi, find common ground and see the bigger picture. The problem is that with the current occupant in the White House, that remains far from a certainty.

Ananth Krishnan is a former China correspondent for India Today and is currently a visiting fellow at Brookings India

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