This forms the background to Morrison’s invitation for an event that, on the face of it, is not designed to rally Western democracies dealing with the economic fallout from the coronavirus pandemic.

Rather, a “G7+” gathering would be aimed at providing an embattled president with a photo opportunity in the middle of what promises to be one of the most bitter presidential election contests in American history.

In other words, Morrison would be a prop in a wider political game.

Is the silent treatment part of China’s new art of war with Australia?

There are many reasons to criticise China, but a Camp David pile-on is the last thing Morrison needs to associate himself with given the tenuous state of Sino-Australian relations.

Beijing’s propaganda that Canberra is at Washington’s beck and call may then become further entrenched, and when the dust has finally settled Trump could be on the cusp of losing the election in any case – the latest polls show a slump in popularity amid widespread disgust at his response to nationwide civil rights demonstrations.

What would a G7+ look like?

It should also go without saying that a Russian presence at Camp David would be highly provocative domestically in America on the eve of an election, given sensitivities over alleged Russian interference in the 2016 poll.

All other things being equal, there would be legitimate arguments for convening an expanded G7 during a global economic meltdown in the wake of a pandemic.

Such a gathering might also consider shifts in the balance of global power occasioned by China’s rise. This is a pressing issue.

However, things are far from equal. Risks outweigh potential rewards.

Given the anti-China bombast emanating from Washington, it would be hard to envisage the gathering at Camp David arriving at a constructive approach removed from Trump’s crude politicking.

Typical of the sort of rhetoric Trump has indulged in recently is an outburst on May 29 in which he said China had “ripped off” the US, “raiding our factories” and “gutting” American industry.

Crude attempts by America to promote a G7+ front against China would be particularly awkward for participants like South Korea and Japan.

South Korea is geographically vulnerable to Chinese pressure, given the unstable security environment in which it finds itself on the Korean peninsula. South Korea’s companies are significant investors in China. Trade between the two countries is strongly in Seoul’s favour.

Risks for Australia

Like South Korea and Japan, Australia risks unnecessarily offending China to its own detriment.

Morrison has already been given a lesson in Chinese realpolitik after his decision to spearhead the push for an independent inquiry into the origins and spread of Covid-19 produced ferocious resistance from Beijing, making Australia look vulnerable.

By blundering into a thicket of international diplomacy, he has drawn reprisals from China in the form of restrictions on imports of Australian commodities accompanied by inflammatory rhetoric directed at Canberra.

Participation in a Camp David pile-on – if that were to happen – would further inflame this rhetoric and might well lead to additional economic reprisals.

02:52

Australia’s revolving door: seven prime ministers since 2007 – soon to be eight?

Australia’s revolving door: seven prime ministers since 2007 – soon to be eight?

An interesting historical footnote to all this is that Australia has, in the past, sought membership of the global grouping of like-minded Western democracies that would become the G7.

Malcolm Fraser, who was prime minister from 1975-83, was frustrated in his efforts, as it turned out, by American opposition – on grounds that opening the doors would encourage lobbying by others to be included. In 1979, Japan advanced Australia’s case.

To be clear, Trump’s proposal is not for Australia to join the G7. Along with Japan, South Korea and India, it is being invited to participate.

It is also uncertain whether the Camp David event will go ahead at all, given uncertainties that prevail in the world on many different fronts. Will Trump be in a position to convene such a gathering if America remains in turmoil?

Finally, there’s the issue of where an expanded G7 leaves bodies like the G20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

Under the current circumstances, in which the world is facing economic and other challenges not witnessed in a generation, it would make sense to convene a G20 – as was done in 2008 to combat the global financial crisis – whose membership includes both China and Russia.

In the end, when it comes to the G7+, what’s in it for Australia? Diplomatic risks.

Tony Walker is an adjunct professor at La Trobe University’s School of Communications in Melbourne, Australia

Read the original article at The Conversation