How the US can maintain influence over Asean, whether Trump or Biden wins

US-China tensions have left Southeast Asian countries in a difficult position, and Washington should offer options instead of forcing them to take sides
The US could adopt a cooperative approach in pushing against Beijing on issues like the South China Sea, Belt and Road infrastructure and Huawei

William Choong

Published: 12:06pm, 27 Oct 2020

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During his first term, US President Donald Trump triggered concerns among Asian countries that Washington would not shoulder the responsibility of maintaining regional and global stability, and could even stage a strategic retrenchment from the Asia-Pacific.

Whether Trump or Democratic challenger Joe Biden wins next week’s presidential election, Washington’s approach to the region – in particular Southeast Asia – must change.

The US should avoid presenting binary choices as part of its ongoing rivalry with China, adopt a looser cooperative approach in pushing back against Beijing – particularly in the South China Sea – and help build regional connectivity networks and infrastructure.

From early on in the Trump administration, there has been a consistent effort to challenge the perceived threat posed by China, leading to a focus on the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”. The US has conducted dozens of freedom of navigation operations through the South China Sea over the past three years and in July carried out a series of high-profile maritime exercises involving two aircraft carriers operating in tandem.

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The US Defence Department in August said Beijing had “likely considered” Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore and Thailand for military logistics facilities as it seeks to build a “world-class” military capable of equalling or surpassing that of the US by mid-century.

Yet this confrontational approach towards China has not gained much traction in Southeast Asia, given the regional preference to avoid “making choices” between the two world powers.

Anxieties have been heightened regarding Trump’s transactional approach towards allies and divergences with senior officials in statements about alliances and Washington’s regional presence. America’s use of the stick rather than the carrot to shape China’s choices appears excessively confrontational to many Asia nations. A more serious concern is the dissonance between Trump’s “America First” rhetoric and his country’s calls for stronger alliances and partnerships.

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has previously said it was “unclear” whether the US would continue to carry the burden of maintaining international peace and stability, or whether it would pursue a narrower approach designed to preserve its interests.

Already, such fears have led to networking attempts between like-minded countries such as Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Vietnam.

US interests may be better served by not forcing a choice upon Southeast Asian countries but rather offering choices (and reasons) added to US initiatives

Confrontation between China and the US has left Southeast Asian countries in a difficult position. China has in effect demanded that its size and prominence be recognised through “subservience” to its interests. Although many countries have welcomed the Trump administration’s resistance to this assertiveness, they have preferred to voice their support privately lest they attract Beijing’s retaliation, particularly if the US is less capable and less committed to providing its allies with the same security guarantees as in the past.

Immediate concerns might subside if Trump leaves office but doubts about the reliability of US power and presence in the region may persist given Washington’s “diplomatic attention span” and its military capabilities.

Regardless of next week’s result, US interests may be better served by not forcing a choice upon Southeast Asian countries but rather offering choices (and reasons) added to US initiatives.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo speaking during an online meeting with Asean foreign ministers on September 10. Photo: AP

The US approach of using democracy and ideology to confront China has proven ill-advised. For one, Chinese citizens’ satisfaction with the Communist Party increased between 2003 and 2016. Second, Southeast Asian countries are traditionally leery of the issue of democracy, particularly in light of the “illiberal turn” taken in some Asean states.

Southeast Asians with longer memories remember the US-backed security order was a “bloody business” involving wars, support for communist purges and tolerance of anti-communist autocrats. The US would be wise to capitalise on Southeast Asian countries’ predilection for Washington by accepting the region’s relatively “agnostic approach” to the great powers. Despite their ongoing differences in trade, technology and human rights, China and the US should still be able to find areas of cooperation. Such a move would be a net positive for the region.

The US should seek to accommodate Chinese aspirations within the existing system of rules and norms, while China collaborates with the US and other countries to revise arrangements for the international order. China and the US can find a way to coordinate on issues, such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and China helping to build infrastructure in the US.

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US Secretary of Defence Mark Esper has advocated a looser, more cooperative approach. Speaking at a seminar in July 2020, Esper called for a network of regional countries to consult diplomatically and “pursue things” to defend the rules-based order.

This is similar to the “principled security network” proposed by his Obama-era predecessor Ash Carter in 2016, which advocates using the complex web of America’s bilateral and multilateral relationships to advance shared values and burden-sharing.

A natural analogue of Esper’s network concept is the emerging Indo-Pacific strategy, which has been endorsed by Australia, India, Japan and the US. The concept seeks to promote the principles of adherence to the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, and no recourse to the use of force. It has already gained some purchase with Asean. But the grouping has been careful not to use any formulation that targets China, directly or indirectly.

The USS John S. McCain takes part in a trilateral exercise in the South China Sea. Photo: Handout

A natural and logical application of Esper’s network concept is in the disputed South China Sea. In line with Washington’s appeal for the upholding of the rules-based order in the region, Asean member states have raised the aegis of international law to reject China’s nine-dash line claim. While they have not cast their rejection of China’s claims as being congruent with Esper’s network formulation, their actions nevertheless uphold the rules-based order.

Granted, the use of lawfare will do little to change the contours of the South China Sea dispute, but the concerted show of effort could give China some ground for caution if it considers steps which could constitute crossing a “red line”, for example, turning Scarborough Shoal into an artificial island or establishing an Air Defence Identification Zone in the South China Sea.

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Further afield, external powers have sought to uphold the rules-based order, particularly in the South China Sea. As of early October, India was reported to have considered inviting Australia to the Malabar series of maritime exercises (which currently involve the US, Indian and Japanese navies).

Canberra has also rejected China’s claims to the South China Sea. Japan’s recent efforts have centred on Indo-Pacific naval deployments involving its Izumo-class carriers, and exercises with like-minded navies. From April to June 2019, the JS Izumo took part in exercises and interactions with Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam.

The highlight of the JS Izumo’s 2019 deployment involved a four-nation naval exercise, with six ships from Japan, India, the Philippines and the United States, in the South China Sea. The exercise has been interpreted as an overt signal to China.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has been criticised by the US as predatory “debt trap” economics, is addressing a real need in the region in terms of infrastructure. Together with Japan and Australia, the US can use the financing of infrastructure as a bid to uphold the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Between 2008 and 2016, China overtook Japan as the region’s biggest bilateral financier of infrastructure projects, with US$42 billion versus US$37 billion; Australia and the US invest far less in infrastructure, namely US$1.8 billion and US$1.1 billion respectively.

To compete with China’s scale of financing, the trilateral partners can conceivably raise their allocations to official development assistance, from 0.2 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), to the OECD average of 0.3 per cent of GNI.

Other options that the US can lay before Southeast Asian countries is a renegotiation of the TPP (or its successor the 11-nation Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), which Trump withdrew the US from in 2017. Biden has agreed to renegotiate the pact if he is elected.

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And even as the US seeks to “decouple” the US economy from the Chinese economy, particularly in areas of technology and networks, it should still continue to offer options to Southeast Asian countries – such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines – which are adopting Huawei technologies for their 5G networks. Thus far, the US has not presented any alternative to Huawei, which has given these countries an efficient and cost-effective option. The American offer to finance the replacement of Huawei infrastructure in developing countries such as the Philippines and Thailand is a good start.

Biden’s approach to China will not differ much from Trump’s, given the bipartisan approach in Washington towards challenging Beijing. While Biden may confront China on issues such as trade, technology, cybertheft and human rights, the relationship under Biden will not be a rush into a new Cold War. What Biden may bring to the table is the ability to leverage on the power and “behaviour of American allies and partners” to prosecute American goals and interests. Some see this as reason enough for China to prefer a Trump victory in the November 3 election.

Whether it is Biden or Trump who wins, Washington should be able to maintain traction in Southeast Asia by laying options on the table for regional countries.

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