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Demonstrators in Yangon on Monday hold pictures showing some of the hundreds killed during Myanmar’s ongoing anti-coup protests. Photo: EPA
Opinion
Philipp Annawitt
Philipp Annawitt

China can return stability to Myanmar and fix its image problem if it takes sides in the crisis

  • Despite the rumours, Beijing has not yet lent decisive support to Myanmar’s junta, and has called for domestic political reconciliation to end the post-coup crisis
  • But Myanmar will not be peaceful until it is a federal democracy, a political system that can be best achieved by working with the country’s democratic interim government
China has an image problem in Myanmar. Rumours have swirled about whether Beijing’s top diplomat had any inkling, when he visited Yangon in January and met military chief Min Aung Hlaing, of the impending coup that would topple the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government just weeks later. 
Then came talk of nightly flights supposedly ferrying tech experts and equipment from Kunming to help the junta build a “Great Firewall”, like China’s, to shut down internet traffic and disrupt the budding civil disobedience movement that sprang up to oppose the military regime. Further rumours followed of Chinese troops supporting Myanmar security forces in putting down peaceful demonstrations. Chinese factories in Yangon soon went up in flames – though it remains unclear who set the fires. China’s muted reaction to the coup, and its continued shielding of the junta from sanctions at the United Nations Security Council has surely fired this hostility. 
It seems, however, that Beijing has not yet made up its mind on Myanmar’s coup. It has not lent decisive support to the junta, and has called for domestic political reconciliation. But now is the time for China to take sides, because a democratic Myanmar is a more reliable partner than the generals.

TURBULENT RELATIONSHIP

A deep-seated fear of being lorded over by China is part of Myanmar’s national identity. Through the early 1970s, Mao’s China backed the Communist Party of Burma with funding, arms, and even volunteers as it sought to overthrow the military dictatorship of General Ne Win. Out of the ruins of that conflict, ethnic militias such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) formed in the early 1990s in northern Shan State, both of which maintain close ties with China to this day. 

Relations between Myanmar’s generals and Beijing then improved under the reformist regime of Deng Xiaoping and his successors, who sought constructive engagement. The generals, however, grew wary of China’s economic rise and the threat its increasing dominance might pose to them.

Seeking ways of balancing Beijing’s influence, the generals looked to the United States. In 2009, Myanmar’s military led by General Min Aung Hlaing attacked the MNDAA – long accused of profiting from the drugs cultivated in the area it controls, part of Southeast Asia’s infamous Golden Triangle – “in order to demonstrate to Washington ‘what a useful ally’ Burma could be … calculating that the Americans still cared about reducing drug production in the region,” historian Thant Myint-U wrote in his 2011 book Where China Meets India. Beijing was caught by surprise and not amused at the thousands of refugees that subsequently streamed into Yunnan province. 
Over the next few years, the reformist government of president and former general Thein Sein continued the turn away from China, culminating in the shelving of plans in 2011 for the Myitsone Dam, a hydropower mega project designed to satiate Yunnan’s rising demand for electricity. 
China preserved its influence over Myanmar’s politics by cultivating the ethnic armed groups on its border, chiefly the UWSA – Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic militia with more than 30,000 well-armed fighters. The UWSA rules the Wa State, a now-autonomous zone that is more integrated into China than Myanmar: Wa State’s administrative language is Mandarin, its leaders are ethnic Chinese, and it is linked to the Chinese electricity grid. Even the clocks in Wa State keep Yunnan time – 90 minutes ahead of those in Yangon. 

Chinese foreign minister warns against foreign interference in Myanmar

During this period of strained China-Myanmar relations, the UWSA shied away from the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement that Thein Sein concluded with other ethnic armed organisations in 2015 to end most of the country’s long-running conflicts. Though at Beijing’s behest, it did play a more positive role in the NLD’s government’s “21st Century Panglong Conference” peace initiative. 
From the time Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD formed a civilian government in 2016 until it was brought down on February 1, China’s turbulent relationship with its southern neighbour was stable. Beijing, with its interest in fostering economic cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative, found in the NLD government a willing partner that wanted to boost trade and connectivity – especially after 2017’s Rohingya crisis caused relations between Suu Kyi’s government and its Western partners to cool markedly.
Mainland China and Hong Kong have since become the largest source of foreign investment into Myanmar and the migration of ethnic Chinese into the Southeast Asian country has increased. 

THE STABILITY BEIJING CRAVES 

Beijing understands its policy of non-interference as meaning it will not impose its values on a foreign partner – it will work with liberal democracies and authoritarian governments alike. 

Right now it is in China’s interest to work with Myanmar’s democratic interim government, led by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which is composed mostly of NLD MPs and operates from safe areas in the country’s southeast. The junta has made a mess of governing – its threats of nationalising assets, for instance, have accelerated investor flight – and is increasingly isolated. It has no legitimacy in the country, with protesters continuing to resist the coup, and even if it wins in the short-run, a junta-led Myanmar will not bring the stability Beijing craves.

The CRPH is currently forming a broad national unity government which will be inclusive of ethnic minorities – its federal democracy charter released on April 1 envisions a Myanmar with autonomy for its ethnic minorities. Based on this formula, China’s ethnic minority allies in the northeast might finally find a home in a stable, federal Myanmar. 

Could ethnic armed groups turn the tide against Myanmar’s junta with help from Beijing?

On April 1, China reportedly massed troops on its southern border. It should use them to deter Myanmar’s military from further atrocities and to assist refugees fleeing the clashes between security forces and anti-coup protesters in both Kachin and Shan states. Most importantly, Beijing should turn down requests for loans coming from the bankrupt junta. Myanmar will not be peaceful until it is a federal democracy, and the unity currently on show against the coup offers the best opportunity to establish this new political system.

Beijing has the influence to bring about this victory, on its own or through its ethnic minority allies in Myanmar. Doing so will preserve regional stability, and will also help solve China’s long-standing image problem in the country. 

Philipp Annawitt served as an adviser to Myanmar’s parliament and government from 2015 to 2021.

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