Since then, India and Pakistan have gone to war three times – in 1965, 1971, and 1999 – and had several more scares: in 1986-87, 1990, 2001-2, 2008, and most recently, after 2019’s Pulwama terrorist attack in Kashmir that prompted Indian air strikes on Balakot in retaliation. However, the two sides have also signed peace treaties and agreements: in Tashkent, after the 1965 war; and in Simla, after the 1971 war. When tensions ran high after their respective nuclear tests in 1998, the two signed the Lahore Declaration, which included understandings on nuclear controls, in February 1999.

Even in war they have tacitly cooperated. Neither side has ever resorted to strategic bombing of population centres and both treat prisoners-of-war correctly. Violence during hostilities has been limited, and casualties have been low. In 1988, they signed an accord to exchange a list of nuclear facilities annually and have pledged not to attack each other’s reactors.

Sceptics may argue that the many India-Pakistan agreements are all just “smoke and mirrors”, signifying little. If so, virtually all agreements between rivals lack much credibility. In fact, the repeated efforts at cooperation show a substantial desire for peace in South Asia at every level of society.

Peace by pieces

How can India and Pakistan construct a stable long-term peace? History has shown the “big bang” approach has failed: Kashmir and cross-border terrorism remain core disputes that are still off the negotiating table in the wake of India’s 2019 decision to abolish Kashmir’s special constitutional status and the Pulwama terrorist attack later that same year.

Instead, a “peace by pieces” approach could change the atmosphere surrounding India-Pakistan relations by solving the disputes that are easy to solve before moving on to the bigger ones – making use of pre-existing agreements on persistent territorial conflicts at Sir Creek and Siachen, and on trade and investment.

The long-standing dispute over Sir Creek, at the mouth of the Indus River, is easy enough to resolve using principles of international law that would divide the territory equitably. Both sides have reached agreements over the dispute several times, only for them to be abandoned. India walked away from the original pact but could return to it now and sign at no great cost.

At the other end of their more than 3,300km shared border sits the disputed Siachen Glacier, which rises to over 5,500m in altitude and is one of the largest non-polar glaciers in the world. Hundreds of troops have died or been injured defending the inhospitable terrain over the years, despite India and Pakistan coming to an agreement over its future in the 1990s. India claims controlling the glacier is vital as it overlooks the Karakoram Highway, but this is unconvincing. Given its treacherousness, Siachen provides no strategic benefit. A solution is in plain sight: Indian and Pakistani troops should pull back to lower ground, with satellites, ground sensors, and patrols being used to prevent fresh incursions.

Finally, Pakistan must be the first mover on trade. Islamabad has never granted India most favoured nation status, largely on security and political grounds, and as a result bilateral trade between the two is tiny – with each usually accounting for no more than 2 per cent of the other’s total exports. A bilateral trade deal with India would benefit Pakistani consumers and businesses, increase tax revenues, and earn Islamabad goodwill. Pakistan has been farsighted in allowing Indian investment. A trade deal could get India to revise its investment regime to benefit Pakistani businesses.

Are India and Pakistan really heading towards peace?

Agreements on Sir Creek, Siachen, and trade and investment are already on the table and could be signed by India and Pakistan with little further discussion or bargaining. This would create public goodwill in both societies to prepare the ground for more ambitious agreements, such as on Kashmir’s final status and the issue of cross-border terrorism – both of which need to be squarely addressed to ensure a stable, long-term peace. When it comes to resolving core disputes, Delhi and Islamabad have a history of not holding all issues hostage. That’s a history they can build upon.

Kanti Bajpai is the Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS). This article was first published by the Asian Peace Programme, an initiative to promote peace in Asia, housed in the NUS Asia Research Institute