US-China relations: Asean needs to pay attention to great power rivalry in the Pacific

After the Quad, Aukus and other US moves, Beijing wrong-footed Washington and its allies by aiming for the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s soft underbelly
The US responded in kind, but the contest is not over – and its significance for the security of East and Southeast Asia cannot be overstated

Daljit Singh

Published: 9:00am, 31 Jul 2022

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Pacific island nations like Kiribati, Palau, Solomon Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia have been making headlines recently in a way they rarely have before.

In the past, mass media reports on the Pacific largely focused on rising sea levels or touristic exotica, but the region has since emerged as an arena of fierce geopolitical competition between China and the United States and its allies.

China has been cultivating relations with South Pacific nation-states for years, both through aid and investment. No less than nine of the 17 members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) are part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative – a tenth, Kiribati, said earlier this month it was withdrawing from the PIF with immediate effect.

Anthony Albanese and Jacinda Ardern, the respective prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand, pictured on July 7. Photo: EPA-EFE

The US and its allies Australia and New Zealand – both PIF members themselves – have traditionally been the dominant influence in the Pacific, but China’s unprecedented attempt to establish a security foothold in the region has set off alarm bells in Washington and Canberra.

In April, Beijing confirmed it had signed an agreement for security cooperation with the Solomon Islands, prompting Washington to dispatch its Asian security tsar Kurt Campbell, coordinator of the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, to Honiara days later to meet Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare.

Although no details of the discussions were released, it’s likely Campbell warned Sogavare that any Chinese military presence in the Solomons would be totally unacceptable to the US, and no doubt emphasised that Washington would henceforth pay close attention to the island state. Already in February, the State Department had announced its plans to re-establish a US embassy in the capital Honiara.

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Sogavare has given his assurances that there will be no Chinese military facility on the islands, but concerns remain in Australia and the US about Beijing’s role in the Solomons’ internal security and the possible incremental growth of a Chinese military presence.

China upped the ante in late May, when its Foreign Minister Wang Yi tried – albeit unsuccessfully – to forge a multilateral security agreement with 10 Pacific nations that have switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing from Taipei. Such an endeavour, had it succeeded, would have driven a wedge in the PIF.

In a virtual address to the PIF leaders’ meeting in Fiji on July 12, US Vice-President Kamala Harris announced a slew of new American commitments to the region, including setting up new embassies in Kiribati and Tonga; nearly tripling US contributions to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, to the tune of US$600 million over the next decade; appointing for the first time a US envoy to the PIF; and the return of US Peace Corps volunteers, initially to Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu.

Washington is also set to release its first-ever National Strategy on the Pacific Islands in a bid to prioritise US foreign policy towards the region with a whole-of-government approach. This would probably mean more demonstrable efforts to deal with rising sea levels caused by climate change – a top concern for Pacific nations – followed by economic development and fisheries protection.

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China’s proposed security deal with Pacific islands falls short as Wang Yi tours region

Further, Washington said it will involve its allies and partners in a new coordination mechanism called Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) – initially comprising the US, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Britain – to support the Pacific islands and bolster Pacific regionalism.

So what accounts for China’s recent bold steps in the Pacific? Beijing plays a long game and would have gone ahead with its plans in any case. But their present timing may have been influenced by a sense that the US had thwarted China with its recent moves on the Indo-Pacific chessboard such as the institutionalisation of the Quad, the formation of Aukus, the involvement of European countries in the Asian security nexus, the rearming of Japan, and Washington’s stronger ties with Taiwan. What better countermove than to outflank the US by aiming at the soft underbelly of its Indo-Pacific Strategy?

Pacific nations sit astride some of the major sea-lanes linking the US to East Asia and Australia, and would be of strategic importance in the event of war with China. In such an eventuality, Chinese military bases in the Solomons or Kiribati would adversely affect the security environment for Australia and potentially the US, which explains why Washington and Canberra reacted so forcefully to China’s recent moves.

There are also historical and emotional factors at play. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea between the US and imperial Japanese forces, and the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomon Islands that halted Japan’s advance in the South Pacific. It is also the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Midway – a crucial Allied victory and major turning point in the Pacific campaign. These locations, alongside others like Tarawa in present-day Kiribati and Saipan in the Marianas, may evoke American memories of the many US servicemen who died in the region’s blood-soaked World War II battles.

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Beijing’s recent Pacific moves will further poison US-China relations. Students of strategy and the use of power will understand the significance of this contest for the security of East and Southeast Asia, much of which depends on maintaining a balance of power. This in turn hinges on a robust US military presence that is forward deployed in the Western Pacific.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations needs to watch closely how the tussle between these two great powers plays out at the PIF. It should also monitor how Pacific nations react collectively and individually to intensifying great power competition. Can they maintain their unity and successfully exercise their agency? Only time will tell.

Daljit Singh is a Visiting Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Regional Strategic & Political Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This article was originally published as ‘The US-China Strategic Competition in the Pacific: Something Asean Needs to Watch’ on ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s commentary site, fulcrum.sg.