Communist Party’s moment of crisis turned Xi Jinping from the ‘weakest’ to its ‘most powerful’ leader in history

China’s long-standing norms, including retirement age and balance of power at the top, are set aside as Xi Jinping seeks to restore party discipline
After taking office, Xi promised to crack down on corruption, which was rampant under former leader Hu Jintao

Chow Chung-yan

Published: 10:00am, 28 Oct 2022

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The recently concluded 20th Party Congress was exceptional because it shattered many long-standing conventions. These unwritten rules and customs were established over time after the Cultural Revolution to reduce party infighting, build consensus and avoid excessive concentration of power.

At the end of the Cultural Revolution, party elders like Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun found themselves inheriting a party and country torn by bitter political strife and chaos resulting from the excesses of Mao Zedong in his later years.

Deng and his colleagues realised that if they could not reunite a divided party and refocus their minds on economic development, the very survival of the People’s Republic of China and the Communist Party would be in doubt.

A set of unwritten rules and customs gradually formed around the turn of the century. These include the customary age rule to decide promotions to the Politburo Standing Committee – the highest decision-making body.

Any candidate over the age of 68 would be disqualified for promotion to this controlling group.

At the same time, short of an untimely death, even candidates with the most dubious performance records, once entrenched in the top bloc and still below the customary retirement age, could not be removed.

The party secretary was the first among equals at the Politburo Standing Committee, whose members were often representatives of different factions rather than the choice of the party chief.

All key decisions were the results of behind-the-door negotiations and horse-trading, while externally, the party would painstakingly maintain an image of unity.

These unwritten customs form the basis of the so-called collective leadership principle. Ironically, Deng, its grand architect, was not bound by these rules. Throughout his career, Deng held no top state or government position, yet he made and dismissed party chiefs from the dining table of his retirement home.

Xi’s anti-graft drive has become more political, and the fight’s far from over

The principle of collective leadership is designed to revitalise the party and to prevent any faction from total domination. While it has proved useful in that regard and brought superficial unity, its shortcomings also gradually became apparent, particularly during the decade-long reign of Hu Jintao.

Hu’s tenure was marked by extreme caution, inertia and a breakdown of party discipline. An honest man with integrity, Hu was hamstrung from the start. He was never able to assemble a supporting team of his choosing.

The Politburo Standing Committee, expanded to nine members to accommodate conflicting factional demands, was half-jokingly referred to as “nine dragons ruling the rainfall” – referencing an idiom that means all have a share but none powerful enough to effect a downpour.

With no strong leadership at the top, responsibility was spread across the team. As a result, party discipline had broken down, breeding rampant corruption, abuse of power and even insubordination.

The situation came to such an acute stage that towards the end of Hu’s decade, the veteran Chinese politician Wang Qishan, known for his sharpness and directness, was openly urging his colleagues to read Alexis de Tocqueville’s The Old Regime and the Revolution – a book about the cause of the French Revolution.

This background is necessary to understand the rise of Xi Jinping.

07:22

Explainer: How did Xi Jinping rise to power in China?

When Xi came to power, he arrived with a keen sense of crisis and a strong belief that, short of drastic actions, the Communist Party was heading to its demise despite its outward show of unity and strength.

His sense of crisis was shared by like-minded leaders like Wang. And if anyone still needed convincing, a Byzantine plot by security tsar Zhou Yongkang, populist leader Bo Xilai, party rainmaker Ling Jihua and military chief Xu Caihou was exposed almost by luck. When Hu and his predecessor Jiang Zemin were presented with details of the case, they were said to have been stunned speechless.

This moment of awakening set the stage for Xi, at the time written off by most Western observers as the “weakest Chinese leader in history” based on the fact that he had no strong factional background, to embark on a path to reverse the collective leadership.

This CCP’s road to Damascus eventually takes us to where we are today – and turning “the weakest leader” to the most powerful one in history.

Chow Chung-yan is the South China Morning Post’s executive editor