Asian Angle | What a US-China ‘grand bargain’ would mean for Southeast Asia
Washington’s Venezuela raid has resurrected old fears about ‘spheres of influence’, sounding alarm bells for Southeast Asian autonomy
More troubling still, it dusts off the old geopolitical idea of “spheres of influence”. This notion harks back to a time when major powers “staked out” zones of control, constraining the autonomy of weaker states. Indeed, the latest US National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly commits Washington to “reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine” – a foreign policy position from 1823 associated with US military dominance that frames the western hemisphere as a privileged security space – through what it terms a “Trump Corollary”.
Such an uncontested declaration of a sphere of influence is rare in modern history. When it does occur, other powers must decide whether to cede ground. Historically, many of these arrangements were codified through negotiation. In 1869, for instance, Russia assured Britain that Afghanistan lay outside its sphere of influence, an understanding later formalised in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which effectively divided Persia into British and Russian zones.
Washington’s action in Venezuela has therefore resurrected Southeast Asia’s fears about spheres of influence closer to home. But it is unlikely that the US could unilaterally establish such a sphere anywhere in Asia without China challenging the move. In any case, the latest NSS was more equivocal about Asia than it was the Americas, stating only that the US sought to “successfully compete” against China in the Indo-Pacific.