Asian AngleWhen the US comes for Cuba, what can Vietnam do?

The Trump administration’s indictment of former Cuban president Raul Castro and sanctions on his successor, Miguel Diaz-Canel, suggest Washington now views regime change in Havana as a viable policy objective. This adds to Cuba’s mounting woes. The fall of Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro in January severed the subsidised oil lifeline that had long kept the island nation afloat, plunging Cuba into its worst socio-economic crisis since the 1990s. For most countries, this is a distant problem. For Vietnam, it is a test of friendship, resolve and foreign policy judgment. Hanoi and Havana have been close allies for six decades, bound by a shared struggle against imperialism, ideological affinity and genuine camaraderie. Cuba’s predicament presents Vietnam with a dilemma: how to stand by a long-standing comrade without jeopardising the vital partnership it has painstakingly built with Washington. For most of those six decades, supporting Cuba came at little cost. Havana’s troubles were chronic rather than existential, US pressure was intermittent and symbolic gestures – a UN vote here, a shipment of rice there – were enough to sustain the friendship. Maduro’s fall and Washington’s ensuing squeeze have changed that calculus. The pressure being applied is escalating and targeted, of the kind associated with regime change. The question Hanoi has long avoided – how much it is willing to sacrifice for Cuba when real costs are involved – can no longer be deferred. The Vietnam–Cuba relationship rests not only on shared ideology but on lived history. In September 1973, Fidel Castro visited the war-ravaged frontline in Quang Trị province and famously declared: “For Vietnam, Cuba is willing to shed its blood.” It was not an empty gesture. Cuba helped rebuild the Southeast Asian nation, constructing, among other things, a major hotel in Hanoi and a hospital in Quang Binh. Hanoi has repaid that debt in kind. Vietnam is now the largest Asian investor in Cuba, with seven active projects and committed capital exceeding US$160 million. Rice remains the spine of the friendship: tens of thousands of tonnes have been sent as aid over the past decade alone, including 11,500 tonnes following President To Lam’s visit in 2024. At the United Nations, Vietnam has voted every year to condemn the US embargo, as it did again last October. The affection is not merely official. A Vietnam Red Cross Society appeal last year, marking 65 years of bilateral ties, raised about US$23 million for Cuba in 65 days – nine times its target, drawn from 2 million small donations. That record is precisely what now makes Hanoi uncomfortable. Few expect American boots on Cuban soil tomorrow, but a path running from embargo to the indictment of a former head of state to sanctions on a sitting president leaves little room for optimism about what comes next for Havana, or for those who stand with it. The case for caution is clear enough. Vietnam upgraded its ties with the United States to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2023 and is currently engaged in sensitive trade negotiations aimed at easing tariffs that threaten its export-driven economy. Picking a public fight with Donald Trump’s administration over Cuba would be risky; Hanoi has no desire to become collateral damage. Yet quietly distancing itself from Cuba would carry different costs. Solidarity with a small circle of ideological partners – foremost among them Havana – has long been a hallmark of Vietnamese foreign policy and a signal of reliability to foreign partners. Allowing that relationship to be undermined by external pressure without protest would weaken that signal considerably. The domestic political cost could be greater still. Public sympathy for Cuba runs deep, particularly among older Vietnamese. The relationship remains a touchstone for party conservatives, who see solidarity with Havana as evidence that Doi Moi never severed Vietnam from its ideological roots. Vietnam’s instinct will be to preserve the rhetoric of solidarity while avoiding costly commitments in Cuba’s defence, but that balancing act is becoming harder to sustain. Last October’s UN resolution against the US embargo passed 165-7 with 12 abstentions, a sharp fall from 187-2 the previous year. The diplomatic shelter Vietnam has long enjoyed is shrinking and Washington is working to shrink it further. A more constructive role is available. As one of the few countries that enjoys goodwill in both Havana and Washington, Vietnam could serve as an intermediary should the two sides move towards dialogue. Such a role would cost little while supporting a stable, non-violent outcome. The longer game matters more. The most valuable thing Vietnam can offer Cuba is not rice but an example. Both countries were left stranded by the collapse of the Soviet Union, yet their paths dramatically diverged. Vietnam transformed a bankrupt command economy into one of the developing world’s great success stories. Cuba clung to the old model. The political lesson is equally instructive. Vietnam once fought wars against both the US and China, leaving both relationships in ruins. Through open-minded diplomacy and meaningful economic reforms, it converted two adversaries into indispensable partners. Cuba absorbed the rhetoric of the Vietnamese example without absorbing the substance, deepening its isolation rather than dismantling it. Hanoi has begun, cautiously, to make this case. Vietnamese leaders offer the lessons of reform to their Cuban counterparts in nearly every exchange, while Vietnamese firms continue investing in Cuba despite significant risks and modest returns. This is where Vietnam’s influence is best deployed: encouraging reform and opening before crisis forces a far more disruptive transition. In the worst-case scenario of Cuban regime collapse, Vietnam would lose one of its most enduring diplomatic friendships. Hanoi will do what it can to prevent that outcome, through aid, investment, diplomatic support and the power of example. Ultimately, however, the decisive choices lie in Havana. Vietnam has demonstrated that a socialist state can reform, open up and prosper without sacrificing political stability. The model exists. Cuba must decide whether to follow it. Nguyen Khac Giang is a Visiting Fellow at the Vietnam Studies Programme of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was previously Research Fellow at the Vietnam Centre for Economic and Strategic Studies. Le Hong Hiep is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Vietnam Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This article was first published on the institute’s commentary website fulcrum.sg.

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Vietnam has stood by Cuba for 60 years. Now Washington is raising the price of that friendship – and Hanoi must decide what it’s worth

Vietnam has stood by Cuba for 60 years. Now Washington is raising the price of that friendship – and Hanoi must decide what it’s worth