Philippine defence secretary Delfin Lorenzana provided a textbook response at the time, saying: “We anticipate more mutually productive and beneficial cooperation with you to create greater understanding and friendship between our two nations.”

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However, Lorenzana’s true feelings emerged at a news forum two days later. “So they are saying … they want peace in the South China Sea, blah blah blah,” he said. “But it does not match what they are doing on the ground.”

Duterte’s 2016 “pivot to China” included setting aside a historic arbitral victory over Beijing’s claim to much of the South China Sea through its “nine-dash line”, which the president said was in return for obtaining preferential loans for infrastructure projects.

The Philippine military, according to Manila-based security analyst Chester Cabalza, was unprepared for this sudden shift. “The problem is, the military has long viewed China as an enemy, historically,” he said. “To get warm towards China, it will have to come into some kind of accommodation. It will have to agree to China occupying reefs in the South China Sea, when the mandate of the military is to protect national sovereignty in all its areas.”

Cabalza said during his year-long study of military diplomacy in 2011 at the PLA National Defence University in Beijing that PLA officers he met “were adamant about the ownership of the South China Sea”. With the two nations’ armies maintaining their opposing views, military cooperation remained “limited” and “very delicate” due to the “level of distrust and mistrust between institutions”, he noted.

The Philippines, a treaty ally with the United States, signed a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation with China in 2004 that promised to “strengthen and expand ties” between the countries through the likes of exchanging military delegations and holding defence and security talks on an annual basis, according to Philippine media.

However, this “didn’t result in much progress”, noted Greg Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at Washington-based think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “Despite the noise, there has been almost no concrete military-to-military cooperation between China and the Philippines. A bit with the Philippine Coast Guard, but AFP has been quietly but strongly pushing back on any efforts to move it closer to China.”

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According to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, the coastguard cooperation was meant to address maritime emergency incidents as well as humanitarian and environmental concerns in the South China Sea.

Beijing’s latest overture came last week, when ambassador Zhao reiterated Beijing’s willingness to lend Manila 1 billion pesos (US$19.2 million) to buy military equipment, “no strings attached”.

Defence secretary Lorenzana confirmed China’s offer, but made no mention of the fact that in 2016 Beijing offered Manila a soft loan of US$500 million to buy Chinese-made equipment.

To sweeten the pot on Duterte’s first state visit, China that year committed to “donate” a US$14 million package of guns and other equipment to the Philippines. Lorenzana was then given a list of arms and equipment to choose from, but so far he has mostly been window shopping.

Jose Custodio – defence analyst at the Institute for Policy, Strategy and Development Studies, a Manila-based think tank – said the AFP had lessened its dependence on the US and become more multilateral, buying military equipment from Israel and France and obtaining support from Japan and Australia.

As for buying from China, a general who was closely involved in the 2017 Battle of Marawi, a five-month-long clash between security forces and Islamic State-affiliated militants in the southern Philippine city, was open to the idea. “China gave us weapons during the Marawi siege and these were effective weapons, sniper rifles that were used to neutralise Maute-Isis members,” he said. “Our snipers said the Chinese models were on par with the US models.”

He would not confirm, however, whether it was Chinese sniper rifles that were used to kill Abu Sayyaf militant leader Isnilon Hapilon during the Marawi conflict, which was what Duterte told Premier Li Keqiang in October 2017.

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Analyst Custodio said because Philippine military officers had long been immersed in fighting internal insurgencies, they found it difficult to grasp geopolitical and strategic issues. For example, he pointed to the widely held perception in the AFP that the US would not come to the Philippines’ defence in the South China Sea because it would not “fight over rocks”, and explained it was the sea itself that would be a reason for any conflict in the region.

“The US will fight a war over the sea because it is a strategic waterway,” he said, adding that this was demonstrated by Washington’s freedom of navigation operations in the area. “They are putting themselves in harm’s way.”

While Custodio described current relations between Manila and Beijing’s military institutions as “superficial”, he saw scope for progress. “China is getting small victories,” he said. “China will work to widen its footprint [within the AFP] and there will be multiple footprints in the long run [especially if Duterte is succeeded by others keen to continue his China pivot].

“There is resistance of course,” Custodio added. “However, there is confusion from within. There are some opportunistic officers and, slowly, they weaken the pushback.”

Max Montero, an Australia-based defence blogger and systems consultant for a foreign military organisation, shared the same assessment.

“Generally, the AFP is still pro-US, although there are already some quarters – especially officers who are pro-Duterte – who are open to cooperation with China. But it is not as simple as many even in the AFP believe, considering the territorial dispute [in the South China Sea] has become a major roadblock for real peace and cooperation between China and the Philippines.”

A colonel who spoke on condition of anonymity explained the prevailing sentiment within the ranks. “The South China Sea issue is a concern especially [among] mid- to upper-level officers,” he said.

“We are quiet for now since we believe the president has a strategy with China, but when our territory is compromised or any member of the AFP and its assets compromised, that will not be acceptable and could be a flashpoint within the organisation if no action will be taken.”

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He referred to a May incident in which a Chinese coastguard ship blocked the resupply of soldiers stationed on the Philippine navy vessel BRP Sierra Madre on Ayungin Shoal (also called Second Thomas Shoal), warning that this could be one such point of contention.

A senior government source familiar with the situation conceded that “defence cooperation with China is still limited at present due to anti-terrorism and humanitarian assistance as well as disaster relief, but the two sides are discussing ways to expand their areas of cooperation”.

“There are about 10 AFP personnel who are studying at Chinese military academies for a one-year programme,” said the source. “They take courses that are open to military personnel from other countries with good ties with China. These courses include Chinese military doctrine and strategy, as well as technical military courses. There is one Chinese military officer studying at the [National Defence College of the Philippines].”

He also noted that both navies had exchanged port calls and a Philippine navy ship had taken part in the PLA navy’s April anniversary celebration and in last October’s joint maritime exercise off the Chinese coast between Beijing and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean).

“Defence cooperation is small-scale at present, but it provides the Philippines another option for a source of weapons in case the US or other Western countries seek to ban weapon sales to [Manila],” the source said, stressing that Duterte’s China pivot was not a military alliance with Beijing against the US. “[Manila seeks to be] friends to all and enemy to none, to build ties with China and the US.”

As security analyst Cabalza put it: “Right now [the Philippines] is using the hedging strategy, rowing in two rivers.”

Part of that strategy is for the AFP to continue regular training exercises with US and other forces whose countries are aligned with Washington. For instance, Australia-based consultant Montero noted that last week’s airborne exercises, held jointly with American infantry, were intended partly to introduce to Filipino soldiers the new T-11 parachute used by the US army.

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The Philippines and the US signed a Mutual Defence Treaty in 1951, which requires the nations to come to the aid of the other should either be attacked in the Pacific, and it has been used for further agreements that allow Washington to conduct joint military training exercises with the Philippines and maintain troops there on a rotating basis.

For Poling from the CSIS, a military accord between Manila and Beijing is “all but impossible [and] the political outcry in Manila would be enormous”. “Washington is certainly concerned about the types of military cooperation Manila might pursue with Beijing in the future,” he said. “For instance, certain communications channels or acquisitions could compromise the security of US-Philippine military communications or undermine the AFP’s efficiency with incompatible platforms and doctrines.”

Custodio from the Institute for Policy, Strategy and Development Studies had one more warning. If an accord is signed with Beijing, he said, the AFP “will lose all arms assistance from the US [at a time] when it is on a war footing because of the communist rebels and Muslim militants”.

BROTHERS IN ARMS?

During Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s 2016 state visit to China, Beijing promised Manila a US$14 million military aid package designed to introduce Filipino soldiers to Chinese military equipment.

Max Montero, an Australia-based systems consultant for a foreign military organisation who was once a junior officer in the Philippine navy, said the package consisted of:

• 3,000 units of CQ-A5 5.56mm rifles with five million rounds of ammunition;
• 60 units of Type 85 7.62x39mm sniper rifles plus 800,000 rounds of ammo;
• 30 units of CS/LR4 7.62x39mm sniper rifles;
• 60 units of Type 69 Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) launchers;
• 2,000 units of high explosive anti-tank RPG rounds used against tanks and fortified walls;
• 3,000 units of high explosive incendiary RPG rounds used for troops in open field;
• 20,000 units of 7.62x39mm rounds;
• 60 units of CS/ON6 sniper rifle optics;
• 30 units of CS/ON8A sniper rifle optics;
• 4 Type 966Y coastal boats.

As the arms started coming in, Philippine defence secretary Delfin Lorenzana announced that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) might buy US$500 million worth of defence assets from China’s arms trading company Poly Technologies.

To date, however, no arms have been bought from Poly. What has been delivered so far is 1.57 billion pesos worth of civil engineering heavy equipment by China’s Sany Heavy Industries, Montero said.

Some of the Chinese weapons proved useful in battling Islamic militants who had laid siege to Marawi City. But the bulk of the donated arms – 3,000 units of CQ-A5 5.56mm rifles – were turned over to the Philippine National Police.

Armed Forces spokesman Noel Detoyato denied that the soldiers did not want to use them. “We have more than enough,” he said. “We still have working M16s and the initial batch [of long ordered] 54,000 brand new R4 [assault rifles] have started arriving.”

Montero, who runs the MaxDefense blog – a go-to site on the AFP modernisation programme – still sees the military buying Chinese weapons. “The Type 69 RPG donated by China won’t have a problem in terms of interoperability since their ammunition is similar or compatible to those used by the RPG launchers the AFP acquired or is acquiring from other sources like Bulgaria and Russia. It has become a standard item, and it does not require network or electronic connectivity to a system,” he said.

“What is certain, though, is that the AFP is avoiding buying major weapon systems from China or even Russia. RPGs can be considered as minor [purchases]. This is the reason you won’t see Chinese or Russian models in the shortlisted products on every AFP modernisation project.”

One reason, he said, is the “very heavy reliance” of the AFP on the US military. “Logistics-wise, the AFP was designed to allow easy access to the American logistics train. Munitions used by the US military can also be used by the AFP, while also being reliant on US support once hostilities start and the AFP starts expending its munitions and even fuel stocks. This was evident during the Marawi Siege wherein the US sends in their own stocks to fill AFP requirements,” Montero said.

“Same is true on doctrine, procedures, and equipment standards. The AFP’s way of fighting is based on a simplified version of how the US military fights. But it easily matches US doctrines, with the AFP designed to even integrate with US forces if needed.”

Buying equipment from China could result in a “chop suey armed forces that may even have internal problems with integration and interoperability issues between existing and future assets”, he said.

For instance, “mixing Nato and Russian/Chinese rifles in the field would create logistical issues. I have already received reports of troops misusing incorrect ammunition [using Nato-standard 7.62mm instead of Russian-standard 7.62mm round], resulting to destroying some of the Russian rifles”, Montero said. ■