A stunning court verdict that sentenced former military dictator Pervez Musharraf to death after finding him guilty of treason has set the stage for the latest destabilising power struggle in Pakistan . The legal rationale for the verdict was never in question. As charged, Musharraf had in November 2007 suspended the constitution to prevent the judiciary from blocking a law which embodied a political deal with exiled opposition leaders. In doing so, Musharraf became liable to treason charges under an article of the constitution. But nobody in Pakistan ever expected the charge to culminate in a guilty verdict. The three other generals who previously staged coups – Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq – were never even charged. Along with Musharraf, they directly ruled Pakistan for about half of its 72-year existence, establishing the military as the unquestionably dominant force in the national power structure. Despite Pakistan’s transition to democracy in 2008, the military’s power has steadily grown since Musharraf stepped down. It has become more and more public in its assertiveness, browbeating successive elected governments into submission. Former Pakistan president Musharraf sentenced to death for treason Since Prime Minister Imran Khan came to power in controversial circumstances in August 2018, the military’s grip has tightened further. Freedom of speech has been sharply curtailed, drawing comparisons with the oppression prevalent during General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule from 1977 until his assassination in 1988. The army’s corps commanders conference (effectively, the military’s cabinet) minced no words in its public retort to the court’s treason verdict against Musharraf. In a statement, it said an army chief of staff who had fought in three wars and served as president could never be labelled a traitor. The generals warned that the verdict had given rise to “extreme sadness and anger” within the military, and demanded a judicial review. Musharraf, in a video statement late on Wednesday, dismissed the ruling as the result of a “personal vendetta”. Straining to speak from a hospital bed, he said he remained undecided on his next move. He is reportedly in Dubai. A subsequent social media campaign by pro-military activists accused Supreme Court Chief Justice Asif Khosa of targeting the army. They had good reason for questioning his motives. For 10 of the 11 months he spent as Chief Justice, Khosa had been remarkably subdued, especially in comparison to his populist predecessor Saqib Nisar. As soon as Khosa entered his final month in office, however, he blindsided both the Khan administration and the military. He established a judicial precedent by outlawing, on procedural grounds, the government’s decision to grant army chief of staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa a three-year extension. The Supreme Court referred the case to Parliament, asking it to legislate a fixed procedure. Although Khosa retires on Friday, the Supreme Court is primed to deliver several other landmark verdicts in the months to come. Musharraf enjoys life of luxury in detention One pertains to a presidential reference seeking the dismissal of a Supreme Court justice, Qazi Faez Isa, on tax evasion charges. He was targeted after issuing a verdict in February that criticised the military for involvement in politics. He also scolded the military’s premier security service, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, for its role in ending an Islamist siege of Islamabad in late 2017 that brought the remnants of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s government to its knees. Isa is widely expected to be exonerated by his colleagues. The judiciary is also in the process of getting to grips with a petition that alleges Khan failed to declare US$3 million in foreign funding, illegally channelled into the personal accounts of members of his Movement for Justice party, as he mounted a five-month sit-in in Islamabad in 2014. The charge threatens Khan with disqualification from his office and imprisonment. Viewed collectively, the judiciary’s recent actions have challenged the military’s impunity like never before, and raised an enormous question mark about the circumstances in which Sharif was deposed and replaced by Khan. Meanwhile, army chief of staff Bajwa’s fate must be determined by Parliament. No party would publicly oppose the extension of his tenure, but Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and ex-president Asif Ali Zardari’s Pakistan Peoples Party will certainly use the opportunity as leverage. Anger aside, Bajwa and the generals will want to find a face-saving solution to the crisis. They know that public sentiment has turned against Khan because of his inept governance and the accompanying onset of economic recession. There is also great dissatisfaction on these counts within the military. This has been amplified by the Khan administration’s mishandling of Bajwa’s extension, and its subsequent failure to avert the treason verdict against Musharraf. This does not augur well for Khan’s future, or for the political stability of Pakistan during 2020. Pakistan’s foreign partners may be perturbed by the prospect of yet more uncertainty, but none would be sad to see Khan go. His government has aggravated close ally China, in particular, by embroiling Belt and Road Initiative projects in corruption charges against Sharif and his erstwhile ministers. Did pressure from Saudi Arabia see Khan skip summit in Malaysia? Khan’s government has also decelerated the implementation of major projects under the US$60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) , reportedly earning an ultimatum from Beijing. Political infighting in Islamabad will unnerve the civil service, slowing down its execution of projects. This will also impact CPEC, although responsibility for implementing the programme has been directly assumed by the military and the Prime Minister’s office, in an attempt to reassure Beijing. China also has good reason to be affronted by the marked swing in Pakistan’s geopolitical priorities during the Khan administration, although foreign policy is the exclusive domain of the military. Whereas Sharif and Zardari both courted Beijing as a counterweight to Washington, Khan has curried favour with the Trump administration. Pakistan’s foreign policy is as confusing as its divisive internal politics. With the inter-institutional power struggle building in Islamabad, that is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future. Additional reporting by Agence France-Presse