C ould this be the year that Southeast Asia , led by an emboldened Vietnam , finally pushes back as one against Beijing’s moves in the contested South China Sea ? That is the question increasingly being asked by political analysts and observers, who detect a level of defiance in China ’s smaller communist neighbour as it assumes key diplomatic posts, including chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc and a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Asean members up the ante on South China Sea amid code of conduct talks Such platforms could be instrumental in helping to implement a rules-based order in the contested waterway and speculation is growing that Hanoi could use its new-found influence to promote regional security interests, unite fellow claimants against the world’s second-largest economy and take the lead in defending its maritime sovereignty – though not necessarily in that order. Hanoi “can potentially make the People’s Republic of China diplomatically uncomfortable by rallying regional opinion against particular actions Beijing takes”, said Andrew Chubb, a British Academy postdoctoral fellow at Lancaster University who specialises in China’s maritime foreign policy. It could also “push for the inclusion of tougher language in Asean communiqués [and] promote discussion of Chinese illegal behaviour in the waters off Malaysia , Vietnam and Indonesia ”, said Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Chunks of the South China Sea – a strategic trade route home to significant natural resources – are claimed by various jurisdictions, including the Philippines , Brunei and Taiwan . Beijing asserts ownership over most of the seaway, even after a tribunal in The Hague rejected those claims in a 2016 ruling . It is accused of building artificial islands and employing “coercion and the threat of force” to block the oil and gas operations of other claimants, even as it pursues its own energy exploration, a CSIS report stated last year. South China Sea: Vietnam urges Beijing to ‘show restraint’ in 2020 Most nations are reluctant to antagonise Beijing because of its economic power – Manila, which launched The Hague court case, has since backtracked from its defensive position in pursuit of Chinese capital. Hanoi, however, appears committed to confronting Beijing. Vietnamese and Chinese ships faced a months-long stand-off last year after a Chinese vessel entered Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. In a defence white paper released in November, Hanoi indicated it would strengthen ties with the United States if Chinese aggression persisted. Last year also saw Vietnam upgrade facilities and build up land on islands it occupies in the Spratlys, a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea. Also in November, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Hoai Trung said his country was considering invoking the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea against China. But that is likely to be a move of last resort, strategists have said, given Beijing’s probable economic retaliation in such a scenario. Others appear emboldened by Hanoi’s actions. Malaysia, a country that has traditionally been quiet on the South China Sea, filed a submission in December seeking to establish the limits of its continental shelf in the disputed waters. Indonesia, meanwhile, rebuked Beijing last month after a Chinese vessel trespassed into Jakarta’s exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands, later deploying fighter jets to patrol the area as President Joko Widodo warned that there would be “no negotiation when it comes to our sovereignty”. If Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta can cooperate against Chinese encroachment, that could pressure Chinese President Xi Jinping ’s administration, experts say. “China doesn’t enjoy being criticised collectively by Asean. It punctures the image Beijing tries to project of a peaceful rising power …. and because Asean operates on consensus, it threatens to isolate [China] in its own region,” Chubb said. “China would be likely mindful of a more united intra-Asean position,” said Collin Koh Swee Lean, a research fellow specialising in maritime security at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. This year, the bloc will start negotiations on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea and it is anticipated that Hanoi will introduce some tough language in the document. “ Cambodia , arguably China’s closest Asean partner, has year after year dogged progress on a Code of Conduct, but this year Vietnam could leverage its special historical relationship with Cambodia and its Asean chairmanship to produce a firmly worded pact,” said Brian Eyler, director of the Southeast Asia programme at The Stimson Centre, a US think tank. Still, a Code of Conduct may not deter Beijing since it is not legally binding. “If it contains dispute-settlement mechanisms and concrete provisions that restrain coercive behaviour, it could have a moderating impact,” said Glaser, before adding that she was not optimistic about the prospect. Chinese warplanes take South China Sea exercises to new level Asean cooperation, even for a single document, is no easy feat as member states frequently fail to agree on regional issues. Cambodia, a Chinese ally, blocked any mention of the 2016 Hague court ruling against Beijing in the official Asean statement that year – an example of China’s “divide and rule” technique that hinders potential Asean unity. “Despite professions of Asean centrality, [South China Sea] claimants do not coordinate,” said Zachary Abuza, a professor of Southeast Asian politics and security at the National War College in Washington. “No state really jumped on board the Philippines’ arbitral case, or cite it, despite the fact that it was the most definitive ruling on the Law of the Sea.” Abuza said he was sceptical of Malaysia adopting a tougher stance, noting its inability “to prevent the Chinese coastguard from all but anchoring itself at Luconia Shoal”, an area of the South China Sea administered by Kuala Lumpur. As for Indonesia, “publicly they made a statement, but I don’t see them doing anything that would be provocative”, Abuza warned. Some believe support from Washington could help Hanoi in uniting Asean. “Hanoi’s voice can only be as strong as its backstop support from Western partners,” Eyler stated. “Graduating its relationship with the US to the level of a strategic partnership will do much to bolster Vietnam’s voice and productive role in the region.” Many analysts believe that maritime tensions between Asean and China present a strategic opportunity for Washington as it looks to reduce Chinese dominance in the Asia-Pacific. “This is a really powerful opportunity for the US to strongly signal that it is going to support countries in their assertion of sovereign rights and international legal norms in Asia,” said Michael Mazzar, senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, a US think tank. “My hunch is that it will do so, to a degree, but how much and in what way, I am not sure anyone knows at this point.” ■ Purchase the China AI Report 2020 brought to you by SCMP Research and enjoy a 20% discount (original price US$400). 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