As North Korean leader Kim Jong-un vowed to build up a nuclear arsenal and railed against Washington at a rare party congress this week, Park Won-gon, a professor of international relations at Seoul’s Handong Global University was struck most by what was missing. Bihaekhwa (“denuclearisation”) – a foreign policy priority for global powers in relations with North Korea – was not mentioned once, casting a dark cloud over prospects for progress, even if talks between the United States and North Korea resume under incoming president Joe Biden . “If and when negotiations resume with the US, the North is likely to demand Cold War style arms control talks to reduce mutual threats from nuclear weapons and accept the North as a nuclear-armed state,” Park speculated, adding that this was unlikely to be acceptable for Washington. Kim’s unwillingness to back down from his nuclear programme comes even as the country struggles economically under sanctions, natural disasters and the Covid-19 pandemic that led to the closure of its borders with ally China, on which the North relies for most of its trade and international aid. This has raised questions about what provocations Kim might mount as the new US president takes office and what strategy Biden’s team will adopt to manage North Korea. At the eight-day congress in Pyongyang, the first since 2016 and only the second since 1980, Kim also vowed to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with ranges of 15,000km that could reach the US mainland, a nuclear-powered submarine, now reportedly in the testing stage, and various tactical nuclear warheads “to be applied differently depending on the target subjects”. He also described the US as the hermit state’s “biggest enemy”, and added for good measure, “no matter who is in power”. While Kim apologised for mistakes in economic management and promised the population of 25 million greater prosperity, he also took on the title of general secretary of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party, a title reserved so far for his late father and grandfather, a move widely seen as a bid to tighten his grip on power. His sister Kim Yo-jong , who at one point was seen as a successor given her prominent role in relations with the US and South Korea , was seemingly demoted within the party, becoming vice-department director of the its Central Committee. But analysts said a subsequent statement in which she criticised South Korea showed she still had clout and as a direct family member of Kim, retained a higher status in the party than other officials. Analysts parsing the outcome of the meetings, which took place just a week before Biden’s inauguration, said the message to the US was that North Korea would continue with “nuclear deterrence” unless Washington offered concessions, raising questions about how the US would respond. Under the administration of former leader Barack Obama, when Biden was vice-president, the US adopted a policy of “strategic patience” that called for tight sanctions against the North and a refusal to negotiate with Pyongyang. Kim Jong-un met the outgoing US President Donald Trump three times, including in Singapore in 2018, but talks collapsed due to differences over what the North should give up in terms of denuclearisation in return for sanctions relief. BACK BURNER On Tuesday, the outgoing Trump administration declassified its Indo-Pacific strategy, which emphasises accelerating India’s rise as a counterweight to Beijing and the ability to defend Taiwan against an attack. Released just a week before Biden’s inauguration and as Trump was impeached for the second time in the US House of Representatives, the document seemed aimed at ensuring continued bipartisan support for countering China’s dominance in Asia. It also contained a framework for relations with North Korea, saying the objective was to “convince the Kim regime that the only path to its survival is to relinquish its nuclear weapons” and to “maximise pressure on Pyongyang using economic, diplomatic, military, law enforcement, intelligence, and information tools to cripple North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programmes, choke off currency flows, weaken the regime, and set the conditions for negotiations aimed at reversing its nuclear and missile programmes, ultimately achieving the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the peninsula.” Is North Korea hiding coronavirus quarantine camps on China border? To do this, it called for helping South Korea and Japan to acquire advanced, conventional military capabilities and for drawing the two countries – who are fighting over disputed islets and Japan’s colonial past – closer to one another. Woo Jung-yeop, research fellow at the Sejong Institute, said the Trump administration had failed to achieve what had been laid out and he did not believe the Biden administration would feel the need to use the strategy as a blueprint. Other analysts said North Korea would remain a key diplomatic challenge for Biden but other issues would take precedence, including the US relationship with China and Washington’s backing for Taiwan. “There is a natural assumption that Biden will have a concrete strategy when it comes to North Korea,” said Harry J. Kazianis, Senior Director for Korean Studies at the Center for the National Interest. “However, taking into account the recent chaos in the Capitol building, the coronavirus challenges and the need for an economic recovery Washington is simply maxed out in what it can or will do internally as well as globally,” he said. America in 2021 was a “very inward looking nation – and for good reason these days”, he added. “That means Team Biden likely will have very little to say and less it can do on North Korea as a matter of simple prioritisation. “Their goal, I suspect, is to hope the status quo holds until the late summer when they are in a better position to try and make meaningful progress with North Korea.” North Korea gears up for party congress to discuss US policy, Biden Vice-President of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies Choi Kang also said the Biden administration would be too busy coping with challenges from China and Iran and resetting ties with the European Union and Nato countries that had been undermined under Trump to turn its attention to North Korea. Kyle Ferrier, director of academic affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America, said North Korea did not appear to be among the foreign policy priorities for Biden, though this could change quickly if there was a provocation. “Despite Pyongyang’s past proclivity to test the mettle of an incoming president, the potential costs for North Korea to do so now are seemingly too high as the domestic economy is struggling under the impact of both sanctions and Covid-19,” said Ferrier. “Still, the best course of action for the Biden team would be to reach out to North Korea early on with potential offers in hand to try to jump-start negotiations. These talks may not be front and centre like Trump’s were, but that would ultimately be for the best.” CHINA FACTOR What North Korea does next will also depend on signals from China , with analysts pointing to how Kim had been able to take advantage of the bitter rift between Beijing and Washington. “Kim rightly understands that the longer US-China tensions keep getting worse, the more China will look the other way in terms of his nuclear programme and the aggressive rhetoric he uses,” said Kazianis. “Kim also knows that short of starting a war or some sort of short-term kinetic conflict, China won’t let his regime collapse as it does not want millions of impoverished North Koreans in Manchuria.” But North Korea would also be careful not to roll out ICBM launches or nuclear tests that might anger its key ally. In a message congratulating Kim on his new title this week, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the two countries should “jointly safeguard regional peace, stability, development and prosperity”. Kazianis said Kim had “the ultimate get-out-of-jail geopolitical card thanks to the alliance with China” and he would use this as much as he could for decades to come if he could not make a deal with America. “Kim, at least for now, does not mind being used as leverage by China against the US. And, in fact, for the short-term, he gets very real strategic benefits,” he added. Choi said the growing US-China tensions raised the North’s geopolitical value for both China and the US, and that Pyongyang might use this to gain concessions from China. Choi said the North was “unlikely to anger the new Biden administration and ruin any chance for diplomatic outreaches” by resuming long-range missile tests or nuclear explosions that had stopped since the 2018 summits with Trump. “It would likely limit itself to less provocative acts such as its first test launch of a submarine launched ballistic missile [SLBM]” when South Korea and the US carry out their annual springtime joint military exercises in March, he said. Lingerie, secret tunnels, and chickens: a North Korean defector’s tale BANKING ON ‘SINGAPORE SPIRIT’ Meanwhile in South Korea, the government of liberal President Moon Jae-in is reportedly pressing the incoming US administration to endorse a joint statement signed at the Singapore summit by Kim and Trump. “A message has been delivered to the incoming Biden administration suggesting resuming talks with North Korea by returning to the Singapore spirit,” an unnamed ranking government official was quoted as saying by the JoongAng Ilbo . At the summit, the two leaders signed an agreement that pledged joint commitments to denuclearise North Korea, establish normal relations, work toward a peace settlement, and the recovery of the remains of US soldiers on North Korean soil. Kim Joon-hyung, head of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, praised Trump for making North Korean denuclearisation a priority in US foreign policy, saying his outreach to Kim was “ideal”. Since the Singapore summit, Kim had not conducted any long-range missile or nuclear tests, he pointed out. Biden should “honour” the joint statement, he said in comments to the Korea Times . Joseph DeTrani, a former US special envoy to the ill-fated six-party denuclearisation talks, recommended the Biden administration embrace and build on the Singapore Declaration that many believe would be the first step to opening the door to negotiations. “The declaration succinctly articulates the need to transform bilateral relations, end the Korean war and pursue the complete denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, in addition to repatriation of the troops killed during the Korean war. Those are the core objectives to what we pursued in 26 years of negotiations with North Korea,” he said. Technically, the two Koreas remain at war because fighting ended with an armistice rather than a peace treaty. Other experts have advised that the Singapore agreement could serve as a first step to resuming diplomacy as the Biden camp has signalled room for talks with the North, stressing coordinated efforts with allies. “The Biden team also knows that not everything went wrong during the Trump presidency. They admit that President Trump contributed to opening the door even slightly and there [were some] achievements made during his meetings with Kim,” Joseph Yun, former American special representative to North Korea, told The Hankyoreh newspaper. Australia needs South Korea, but Kim Jong-un and China are in the way Yun said the Biden administration should come up with a new, more realistic diplomatic road map based on lessons learned during the Trump era. Kurt Campbell, the top US diplomat for east Asia under Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton – who will be a senior official for Asia policy under Biden – said the incoming administration would have to make an early decision on its approach to North Korea and not repeat the Obama-era delay that led to “provocative” steps by Pyongyang that prevented engagement. Campbell praised Trump’s unprecedented summits with Kim, even though no progress had been made persuading Kim to give up nuclear weapons and missiles. “Some boldness is appropriate in American foreign policy, particularly in Asia,” said Campbell. BALL IN SEOUL’S COURT? While Moon said he aimed to facilitate talks between the US and North Korea, it is unclear what role Seoul can play. Kim Yo-jong on Tuesday issued a statement referring to the “idiot” South, denouncing South Korea’s military for closely tracking a military parade late on Thursday in Pyongyang, where the North displayed what appeared to be a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). (Notably, the parade, overseen by Kim, stopped short of rolling out the North’s ICBMs in an apparent bid to avoid provoking the incoming Biden administration). “The southerners are a truly weird group that’s hard to understand,” said Kim Yo-jong. Analysts said this was an indication that she remained a powerful figure in inter-Korean affairs, regardless of her title. Moon, whose term ends in 2022, has made outreach to the North a key goal of his administration. But in its attempts to reach out to the North, the South has struggled to find any wiggle room within the boundaries of international sanctions. It has made a slew of proposals for economic assistance including a recent offer to help the North fend off the coronavirus. However, the North has flatly turned down the offers, which it has labelled “trifling”, and has called on the South to stop its annual military drills with the US, even as it develops new weapons of its own. The outlook is a far cry from the optimism felt in some quarters after Kim came to power in 2011. Pyongyang appeared to have embarked on a modest liberalisation of the economy that raised hopes the capitalist South’s outreach might fall on fertile ground. Restrictions on private trade were eased, a middle class began to emerge and there were even signs of a small, but rich elite forming. The picture now looks very different. In his closing address to the party congress, Kim said the party needed to reassert its grip on the planned economy, “restoring and strengthening the system and order by which the economy runs under the unified guidance and management of the state”. If that was Kim’s way of signalling a return to Pyongyang’s old ways, the South’s outreach efforts are about to get far more complicated. Biden, meanwhile, whatever his other preoccupations, may find that North Korea has worked its way back to the top of the president’s in-tray.