South China Sea: could Philippines and Vietnam bond over assertive Beijing?
- Both nations believe maritime claims to the region must be based on a 1982 international convention, but China’s claims do not adhere to that
- While Vietnam and China are close ideologically, the increasingly volatile sea dispute could bring Manila and Hanoi closer together, say analysts
But before any enhancements to maritime security cooperation between the two Southeast Asian nations can occur, they urgently need to find common ground on handling their overlapping claims in the resource-rich waterway, experts say.
Why is a rusty old Philippine warship involved in the South China Sea dispute?
Manila ran the World War II-era ship aground there in the late 1990s, to help assert Philippine sovereignty.
The line – literally made up of nine long dashes – first appeared on Chinese maps in 1953, based on a map with an 11-dash line issued by the Nationalists in 1947.
02:13
Philippines accuses Chinese coastguard of firing water cannons at its vessels in disputed waters
China has long asserted that its territorial claims over disputed shoals and other features in the sea – based on so-called historic rights – allow it to draw straight baselines to create a vast coastal jurisdiction.
The Southeast Asian claimants, despite their internal differences, hold a common position that maritime claims must be based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), which was signed by over 150 nations. The claims made by China – itself a signatory – do not adhere to the convention.
Since entering office, Marcos has taken a stronger stance on Beijing, and rekindling ties with Vietnam appears to be part of a larger strategy of not solely relying on the West to deal with China, but working alongside neighbouring states as well.
What’s behind Philippine Senate’s bipartisan support for firmer China policy?
After a number of meetings between Marcos and Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, the two nations held the 10th meeting of their high-level Joint Permanent Working Group on Maritime and Ocean Concerns in Vietnam in May, to deepen bilateral cooperation.
“[Marcos’] government policy towards the South China Sea is no longer about how China will react to things that the Philippines will be doing,” said Aries Arugay, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.
“Under the past administration, it appeared as if the Philippines was walking on eggshells, not doing anything that would somehow cause irritation on the part of China,” he said. “But we can see that ship has already sailed under this new administration.”
Although Vietnam sees the current Manila administration as more trustworthy than Duterte’s, strategically it is likely to remain a lot more cautious and subdued in its approach to China, according to Huynh Tam Sang, a lecturer at the Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities.
“Despite the Philippines and Vietnam’s strengthened ties to jointly weather maritime issues in the South China Sea, Vietnam has tight ideological connections with China and the two neighbours are entrenched in a comprehensive strategic partnership.
“A ‘balanced’ stance when it comes to great-power politics may stymie Vietnam’s concrete efforts to effectively engage with the Philippines,” added Huynh, noting that Vietnam may be more inclined to work with Manila if activities and policies were not directly targeted towards China.
A divided Asean is always a good thing for China, as it makes it difficult for the member states to coalesce against Beijing on these issues
On the Philippine side of the equation, some legislators may argue that Vietnam is untrustworthy because it is under communist rule like China, but they are in the minority, according to Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore.
“Generally, the conduct of interstate relations within Asean itself has very much been predicated on pragmatism more than anything else,” he added.
Arugay said that while similar goals in the South China Sea were likely to trump ideological differences, the bigger issue lay in whether the Philippines and Vietnam could come to terms with their own respective claims.
In May, Vietnam criticised a Chinese research ship, as well as a coastguard vessel from the Philippines, for separate actions that Hanoi said violated the country’s sovereign rights.
“The fact of the matter is that some of their claims are still overlapping,” Arugay said. “This further cooperation can actually thaw some of the issues between the two that may have prevented them from deeper cooperation in the past.”
Did the Philippines ever agree to move its grounded South China Sea warship?
Huynh concurred, saying that narrowing the scope of differences between the two countries was critical if they were of a mind to collaborate.
“Cooperation in fields ranging from joint patrols to military industry partnerships to coastguard coordination might benefit both sides,” he said.
A de facto alliance between Vietnam and the Philippines might also go a long way in challenging Beijing’s growing footprint in the South China Sea.
“Asean needs to have better unity when it comes to negotiating with China on conduct, and for that what needs to be done is to resolve intra-Asean disputes within the South China Sea first,” RSIS’ Koh said.
“A divided Asean is always a good thing for China, as it makes it difficult for the member states to coalesce against Beijing on these issues.”
