Will South Korea or Japan develop a nuclear deterrent of their own?

War on Iran has changed many things, not least of which is the tenor of nuclear debate in two of America’s closest Asian allies: countries that have long defined themselves by the weapons they do not possess. For decades, the question of whether South Korea and Japan might one day build their own nuclear arsenal was treated as fringe speculation – the preserve of hawks and provocateurs. No longer. The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has sounded the alarm. Veteran Korea watchers speak of a “rationalisation” of nuclear weapons discourse. And a majority of South Koreans tell pollsters they want the bomb. The debate, long simmering, has come to a roiling boil. Yet analysts who watch the region closely urge caution before declaring the non-proliferation order in East Asia on the verge of collapse. The obstacles to change – be they economic, diplomatic or structural – are still formidable, even if the psychological ones are eroding fast. ‘Friendly proliferation’? In an interview published on Monday, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi outlined his “worst fear”: a new global nuclear arms race. He told The Telegraph the “current atmosphere of fragmentation, conflict, polarisation” was driving more countries – including Washington’s allies – to reconsider whether the concept of a US nuclear umbrella still held water. “Friendly proliferation” is what Grossi called it. “There are all these things which fill me with concern,” he said. “Because I believe that a world with 20 nuclear weapon states or more would be extremely dangerous.” Beyond South Korea and Japan, other countries reportedly weighing their options include Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Sweden – a list that underlines just how far the contagion of nuclear anxiety has spread. Yet experts like Sydney Seiler, Korea chair at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, frame the current moment more carefully. “There remain many reasons why, ultimately, Seoul and Tokyo would not take this route,” he told This Week in Asia. “The sufficiency of US extended deterrence, the diplomatic and political ramifications of going nuclear and of course the economic costs.” Still, he said Japan and South Korea’s nuclear aspirations were a cause for concern, “more so than at any time” previously, against the backdrop of North Korea’s advancing capabilities and a regional security landscape that grows more fraught by the month. But aspiration and action are not one and the same – and he draws a sharp distinction between public sentiment, “rationalisation” and the machinery of government. “Public opinion is more easily swayed, but those directly involved in the policy process are less forward-leaning,” Seiler said. What has changed is the quality of the debate. This is no longer the simplistic logic of “if North Korea has nuclear weapons then both South Korea and Japan should follow suit”, he argues. Serious questions are now being asked about the capabilities required, the deployment doctrines, and the diplomatic and military trade-offs of a credible deterrent. Still, “we are not at a point of confidence crisis”, Seiler said. Sentiment vs strategy The engine driving much of this is Pyongyang. North Korea’s nuclear programme, long dismissed – at least partly – as a way to extract concessions and attention from Washington, is now being taken much more seriously. “North Korea’s sustained development of capabilities and direct threats against South Korea [have] become more flagrant,” Seiler said. South Korea’s Foreign Minister Cho Hyun addressed the swirling speculation directly in an essay published by the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network earlier this month. He cast non-proliferation not as a constraint imposed from outside but as a considered strategic choice. Going nuclear, Cho wrote, “would mean becoming another North Korea”. Cho laid out a set of nuclear policy initiatives Seoul was pursuing “within the bounds” of the international Non-Proliferation Treaty that entered into force more than 50 years ago: modernising its nuclear fuel cycle, managing spent fuel and introducing conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. Washington and Seoul agreed late last year that South Korea would be allowed to enrich uranium up to 20 per cent for civilian purposes: well below weapons-grade levels, but a big step up for a country previously prohibited from domestic enrichment under a 1974 bilateral agreement stemming from its abandoned weapons programme earlier that decade. Nuclear weapons alone cannot guarantee a nation’s security, nor can they ensure the well-being of its people South Korea’s Foreign Minister Cho Hyun Cho was emphatic that none of this signalled Seoul’s ambitions for a nuclear arsenal of its own. “Nuclear weapons alone cannot guarantee a nation’s security, nor can they ensure the well-being of its people,” he wrote. “North Korea itself stands as the clearest proof of this fact.” On the contrary, he warned that seeking nuclear armament would erode the credibility of extended deterrence, weaken South Korea’s alliance with the US and trigger a chain reaction of proliferation across the region. Which is all well and good. But public opinion is another matter entirely. A survey by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies last year found that more than 70 per cent of South Koreans supported the country developing an “indigenous nuclear weapons capability”. It was a striking number – until the pollsters added another variable. When respondents were told that developing nuclear weapons was likely to trigger international sanctions, support collapsed to around 30 per cent. ‘Unthinkable’ speculation Jun Bong-geun, president of the Korea Nuclear Policy Society, called it “unthinkable” that South Korea and Japan would abandon their alliance with the US and risk “becoming international pariah states” to develop nuclear weapons of their own. “Indeed, there are growing voices in both South Korea and Japan to develop their indigenous nuclear weapons amid deteriorating security situations,” he said, but such a move would likely devastate their trade-dependent economies. “And it’s hard to imagine a situation where the United States removes its nuclear umbrella from two important allies and its forces stationed there pack up and leave,” he added. Unlike South Korea, Japan already possesses the legal right and technical capacity to enrich uranium and holds what strategists call “nuclear latency” – the ability to build a weapon at speed if the political decision was ever made. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, for her part, has conspicuously declined to rule out this as an option. China has signalled that Seoul’s efforts to develop civilian uranium enrichment capabilities could carry unspecified consequences, potentially including economic pressure and increased military activity near South Korean waters. It has also expressed deep concern and issued a stern warning to Tokyo against changing its non-nuclear policy. Seiler predicted that Beijing would seek to frame Japan’s remilitarisation as the region’s true destabilising force, further arguing that Washington’s sustained rejection of this narrative – combined with credible extended deterrence signalling – would be key to ensuring Tokyo’s nuclear ambitions remained rhetorical rather than operational. “Strong, demonstrated extended deterrence will help sustain confidence that the security needs of allies can be met by reliance on the United States, not securing indigenous capabilities,” he said, adding that there was a degree of “sensationalistic hyperbole” in portraying the region’s non-proliferation regime as collapsing. Jun, meanwhile, raised a point that tends to get lost in all the hand-wringing over what South Korea and Japan might do next: “The two countries in the world that are fast increasing nuclear weapons are in the region. They are, of course, North Korea and China.” Yang Uk, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, was similarly candid, if in less forthright terms. “Vertical nuclear proliferation is more disconcerting than unrealised horizontal proliferation,” he said, drawing a distinction between existing nuclear powers building bigger and better weapons, and new countries acquiring them for the first time.

Will South Korea or Japan develop a nuclear deterrent of their own?

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Seven in 10 South Koreans tell pollsters they want the bomb. Japan’s PM refuses to rule it out. Is ‘friendly proliferation’ next?

‘Friendly proliferation’?

Seven in 10 South Koreans tell pollsters they want the bomb. Japan’s PM refuses to rule it out. Is ‘friendly proliferation’ next?