Pacific security axis grows as New Zealand eyes Australia-Fiji defence pact

New Zealand’s interest in joining a newly signed defence pact between Australia and Fiji may mark the start of a broader hard security alliance covering the South Pacific, but analysts warn smaller states’ concerns are likely to go unaddressed. The Ocean of Peace Alliance, signed by Australia and Fiji on July 6, binds Canberra and Suva to come to each other’s defence if attacked. Days later, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon welcomed the pact and signalled Wellington’s interest in joining, saying his country and Australia shared a close bond with a military alliance that “continues to go from strength to strength”. “We also have a strong and enduring relationship with Fiji,” he said on Thursday, describing a partnership with Suva built on years of shared work towards “a safer region for all”. “So engaging with them on this alliance is logical,” Luxon added. For Fiji, the alliance marks its first-ever formal mutual defence treaty. For Australia, it is the fourth, following pacts with the United States, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Winston Peters, who had called China’s ballistic missile test on July 6 “deeply concerning”, framed the move as the fulfilment of a long-held regional ambition. “Elevating our long-standing relationship with Australia and Fiji – and other Pacific nations – to the next level through an alliance would mean we become even closer partners,” he said. David Capie, a professor of international relations at Victoria University of Wellington, said New Zealand’s entry in the pact could be the start of a wider alliance connecting Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific nations with standing militaries: Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea. “New Zealand will be keen to be an early member and to try and shape the alliance as it evolves and grows,” he said, adding that all the main political parties backed the move, so it was “unlikely to run into any domestic political headwinds”. Defence vs development Alexander Tan, executive director at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs in Christchurch, identified one issue with the alliance: it is mainly focused on hard security, while most Pacific states are more concerned with economic and human security. “The question is: will Australia and New Zealand contribute enough to fend off China’s development aid or investments in the region?” he asked. As Beijing has poured aid, investment and infrastructure into the Pacific in recent years, Canberra and Wellington – wary of China’s strategic ambitions in their backyard – have taken steps to counter its influence. Apart from signing mutual defence and security treaties with Fiji and Papua New Guinea, Australia has also committed major financial packages, including a A$1 billion (US$695 million) economic treaty with Fiji, to secure its position as the region’s “preferred security partner”. New Zealand, for its part, has pursued the same goal more gradually, through its “Pacific Reset” policy launched in 2018, expanding diplomatic posts, funding and defence cooperation across Pacific nations. Solstice Middleby, a PhD candidate in Pacific regionalism at the University of Adelaide and a former Australian diplomat, said Wellington’s announcement should not be seen solely through the lens of China’s recent missile test. “It reflects a much longer trend of closer Australia-New Zealand security cooperation in the Pacific and increasing efforts to build a more integrated regional security architecture,” she said. “New Zealand already works very closely with both Australia and Fiji across policing, defence and humanitarian response, so exploring participation is a logical next step.” Wellington’s participation in the pact would fit a broader trend towards more formalised regional security arrangements. However, whether this would ultimately benefit Pacific states “is much less clear”, Middleby added. Supporters argued deeper cooperation strengthened deterrence, disaster response and stability, she said, while “others question whether an increasingly treaty-based and militarised security architecture could instead heighten strategic competition in the Pacific”. Such defence agreements are increasingly paired with development packages. Australia’s Nakamal Agreement with Vanuatu last month, for example, tied support for critical infrastructure to security guarantees and consultation on major projects. Middleby questioned whether this approach was making Pacific societies “more secure or simply more strategically significant”, noting these deals had yet to deliver clear long-term development outcomes or otherwise proven their effectiveness. “Security must be understood more broadly than defence,” she said, pointing to climate change as the threat Pacific leaders consistently ranked highest, alongside health, education and economic resilience. Moses Sakai, resident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum, said New Zealand’s interest in joining the alliance also stemmed from its long-standing commitment to regional and global non-proliferation, including its support since 1986 for a nuclear-free Pacific under the Treaty of Rarotonga. “New Zealand has supported and promoted, through its foreign policy in the Pacific, global peace and stability,” Sakai said.

Pacific security axis grows as New Zealand eyes Australia-Fiji defence pact

.css-1c6uqr6{color:inherit;font-weight:inherit;font-size:inherit;font-family:inherit;line-height:inherit;overflow-wrap:break-word;}Wellington’s bid to join the pact flags a hard-security pivot, but analysts ask if such treaties serve Pacific societies’ best interests

Wellington’s bid to join the pact flags a hard-security pivot, but analysts ask if such treaties serve Pacific societies’ best interests