Taiwan’s relations with China are more important, however. The island’s fortunes are closely linked to the mainland. Taiwanese businesses started investing in mainland China in the 1990s, drawn by a common language, low labour costs and a vast market.

Some 70 per cent of Taiwan’s outbound direct investment goes to the mainland, and up to two million Taiwanese businessmen and their families live there. China (including Hong Kong) is Taiwan’s most important export market, accounting for more than 40 per cent of Taiwanese exports.

The Tsai administration seeks to reduce dependence on China by redirecting trade and investment to the 18 countries, but the policy faces several hurdles.  

First, the policy is hampered by internal division. Taiwan’s two main political parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), hold competing views on policy and especially on relations with Beijing.

The former favours friendly engagement with China and the latter, independence. The intense rivalry between the two parties could result in mutual attrition and, for Taiwan, a waste of talent, resources and opportunities.

In the first place, Taiwan has no diplomatic ties with the 18 countries of the plan. Because of pressure from China, those governments are also reluctant to be involved in Taiwan’s initiative. During his recent visit to Kuala Lumpur, Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu failed to secure meetings with Malaysian officials.

Despite a sizeable budget (NT$3.2 billion or US$104.5 million in 2018), the policy offers few workable options, and a spate of conferences have generated little popular enthusiasm (the policy’s Facebook page has around a thousand fans).

The Taiwanese media's overwhelming focus on domestic news leaves the public poorly informed about the outward-looking policy, even though there are significant numbers of Southeast Asian contract workers in Taiwan.

Third, the policy lacks focus. It casts too wide a net – these are 18 countries with vast differences in size, population, religion, language and economic development. Taiwan would be wise to tailor the policy to each market’s needs.

To do this, there needs to be insightful analysis. However, think tanks supporting the policy lack regional expertise – their researchers typically pay perfunctory visits to the 18 countries – and Taiwanese universities, traditionally oriented towards the West and Japan, fare no better.

Of more than 150 universities, only one offers a degree in Southeast Asian studies, and even elite schools show little understanding of their southern neighbours.

Finally, the New Southbound Policy is predicated on an uncertain political calculus. The DPP is on a quest to shift Taiwan’s economy away from China, but Taiwanese concerned about the business climate have chosen a different path – voting for the Beijing-friendly KMT last November.

Wary of getting sucked into a risky war in the Taiwan Strait, the United States is opposed to Taiwan independence.

Although Taiwanese enjoy a broad range of civil liberties and are understandably not keen on unification, the economic and geopolitical landscape has shifted in China's favour; as an export-driven economy, Taiwan needs the mainland far more than vice versa.

Electronics is Taiwan's star industry but the domestic market is too small and Taiwan needs the Chinese market and production bases to build successful brands. The New Southbound Policy aims to redirect Taiwanese investment to Southeast Asia, which simply cannot match Chinese manufacturing prowess.

China boasts a comprehensive supply chain able to turn blueprints into prototypes often in a matter of days, and 90 per cent of the world's electronics are made at least in part in Shenzhen. Despite rising wages, it is still more efficient to manufacture on the mainland.

US President Donald Trump's retreat from the post-war global order means that Taiwan’s interests are ever more aligned with China's, even as Japan, the US’ chief Asian ally, takes steps to strengthen business ties with Beijing.

The New Southbound Policy cannot effectively address Taiwan's long-term economic challenges; for the sake of prosperity, Taipei may need to return to the consensus, secure the status quo, and seek mutually beneficial cooperation with Beijing.

Michael Tai is a Taiwan Fellow and visiting scholar at the National Taiwan University's Graduate Institute of National Development