The sudden demise of Kim Jong-il has drastically increased the probabilities of a regime collapse in Pyongyang and the reunification of the two Koreas. Should either scenario become a reality, China will face the most difficult geopolitical challenge since the disintegration of the Soviet Union two decades ago.
It is thus understandable that Chinese leaders are now trying to do everything possible to prop up the Kim dynasty. Maintaining the status quo will avert a strategic nightmare for China because a collapse of North Korea will not only unleash a flood of refugees into its northeast, but also, more critically, trigger a process that will eventually lead to the reunification of a divided Korean Peninsula and the loss of a buffer state for China.
Yet keeping the Kim dynasty alive will not be easy. Kim Jong-il's son and designated successor, Kim Jong-un, is in his late twenties and has scant political experience. He has no power base of his own. His survival depends solely on the uncertain loyalty of North Korea's military and security forces. Based on historical record, no modern authoritarian ruler has ever managed to pass power to his grandchildren. While succession from the first-generation dictator to his sons is fairly common, no succession from the second to the third generation has ever taken place in non-monarchical autocracies.
In all cases, the second-generation rulers, typically more corrupt and less competent than their fathers, were overthrown before they had a chance to hand power over to their sons. This suggests that second-generation rulers themselves face unfavourable odds of survival. Their authority tends to be weaker, and they face a challenge to their power from ambitious elements within the regime and disaffected members of society. In all likelihood, Kim Jong-il's 17-year reign was an exception, not the rule. This suggests that his son's rule could be very short-lived.
So China must hedge its bets on North Korea. At the moment, Beijing may have no choice but to ensure stability in North Korea. In practical terms, this policy means an increase in economic aid and political support for the new Kim regime. However, given the high probability of a regime collapse in the near future, China must have a strategic alternative: reaching out to South Korea and the United States, the two countries that will wield decisive influence over the course and terms of reunification.
Until now, Beijing has been reluctant to engage in any dialogue with either the US or South Korea regarding the reunification of the two Koreas. The ostensible explanation is that China does not want to enrage North Korea. But the more likely reason is that Chinese leaders may find the prospects of reunification too horrible to contemplate, let alone discuss it with a geopolitical rival such as the US.