New year in the South China Sea brings little hope for change
Mark Valencia expects more political wrangling and run-ins over maritime disputes in the South China Sea this year as China and the US continue to jostle for regional influence
Last year was not a good year for international relations on the South China Sea. In fact, one could argue that the conflicting interests became the primary security issue in Southeast Asia. This year is unlikely to be better and could be worse.
Flux is integral to international relations and that describes the political situation in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. China - which aspires to be the dominant regional power - is trying to build positive relations with neighbours and fellow claimants to disputed territories, and also with the US, which currently dominates the region.
The tone and tenor of the China-US relationship affects the political climate. But it is not clear that either is willing or able to make the compromises that a peaceful coexistence requires - let alone a relationship in which cooperation outpaces competition. In China's view, the US wants to continue the status quo, maintaining, and enhancing, its cold war "hub and spoke" alliance system and presence. With the US "pivot", the South China Sea is becoming a cockpit of China-US rivalry for dominance in the region.
In particular, despite their November memorandum of understanding regarding "rules of behaviour" for unplanned military air and ship encounters, more incidents are likely.
The problem is that these encounters are not unplanned, but purposeful probes and intercepts designed to send a message. China will continue to challenge US naval intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance vessels and aircraft, as well as drones operating on, under and over China's "near seas".
The US believes China is developing a strategy to control the near seas and prevent access in the event of a conflict - say, between Beijing and Taipei. The US response is the air-sea battle concept, intended to cripple China's command, control, communications, intelligence and surveillance systems. So, attempts to negotiate preventative measures are unlikely to make much progress.
There is also likely to be little progress in negotiating a robust code of conduct between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and China. China believes other claimants to disputed territories are violating the non-binding declaration on conduct by not negotiating the issues directly with Beijing and instead "internationalising" them. Until they do so, China is unlikely to yield.