As China’s power expands, the South China Sea has become a frontier of military friction with US and allied forces. The two powers have avoided a head-on collision so far, but this could just be a lull before the military storm.

China’s enforcement of its historic nine-dash line claim casts doubt over assurances that it will not seek dominance over Southeast Asian states, threatening the progress it has made in the region – and playing right into the hands of the US.

The road to agreement on this needed safeguard to prevent a clash will be long and tortuous, but worthwhile. An incidents-at-sea agreement similar to the US-Soviet pact reached during the Cold War should be pursued.

China hopes to forge a new model of ocean governance that integrates existing and evolving norms, but that will be easier said than done, given the numerous sticking points.

The primary players in the South China Sea dispute say they support Asean centrality, but their actions tell a different story. The US and its partners have asserted themselves in part because they felt Asean was ineffective in dealing with regional security issues.

The USS Connecticut incident is the latest in a number of accidents involving nuclear-powered submarines. An incident that releases radiation could destroy fisheries that provide food stocks on which much of the region relies.

Most Southeast Asian countries have traditionally preferred not to have to choose between the US and China. But with US-driven security partnerships potentially endangering peace, particularly in the South China Sea, Asean should speak up and ask both sides to restrain themselves.

Freedom of navigation operations are not necessary to bolster the US’ legal position. Diplomacy is the usual response of other nations, and it is far more consistent with the UN Charter.

US strategy to enlist Southeast Asia in containing China by supporting their South China Sea claims against China is based on false premises and wishful thinking. To truly build trust, the US needs to put Southeast Asia’s interests on a par with its own.

There are three areas where unilateral action could trigger war – Taiwan, the East China Sea and South China Sea. The danger in the South China Sea is that the red lines are ambiguous, leaving the US and China stuck in a circle of geopolitical and military gamesmanship.

The report concludes too much based on remote sensing, without confirming its findings with on-site observation. The suggestion that damage to the coral threatens the food security of coastal states is based on unproven assumptions about the Spratlys as a genetic ‘savings bank’.

A recent commentary on a website specialising the national security issues argued in favour of using drones in freedom of navigation operations. However, drones are an inviting target for capture or destruction because they may not have sovereign immunity, increasing the risk of warfare.

Asean defence ministers’ focus on China’s behaviour suggests that if China does not recalibrate its approach, it might lose diplomatic ground. With recent conciliatory moves towards Indonesia, Beijing has shown it can repair its diplomatic damage.

The US unilaterally established a precedent for air defence identification zones. But being first does not justify dictating the rules for all nations, especially in the absence of an international agreement.

China is catching up but still can’t match the US’ network of spy planes, surface vessels, submarines, satellites, and drones. In the process, both are testing the bounds of existing international law and increasing the likelihood of confrontation.

The situation calls for cool heads to prevail among all countries, and especially from decision-makers and supposedly objective analysts. Hyperbole only plays into the hands of those who want confrontation and conflict.

A Sino-Philippine row over a remote Spratlys reef has drawn in the US and its allies, greatly raising the geopolitical stakes in a worrying game of chicken.

The Alaska meeting makes it clear the US will continue to try to blunt China’s rise and cement US hegemony in Asia. In the South China Sea, its continuing strategy of demanding China abide by its interpretation of UNCLOS while refusing to ratify it can only fail.

France appears generally supportive of US strategy in the region, which invites China’s economic, political and possibly military wrath. Despite French denials, the actions of its military may well be interpreted as hostile by Beijing, and French businesses invested in China should be worried.

Putting the military cart before the diplomatic horse only begets tit-for-tat responses from China that increase militarisation and frighten Southeast Asian countries

Japan should acknowledge there is a legitimate sovereignty dispute, and that the features cannot be used to justify exclusive economic zone or continental shelf claims. In exchange, China could tacitly accept Japan’s temporary administration of the features.

The Biden administration has a chance to forge stability in the South China Sea and undo the damage of Trump’s ‘America first’ policy. But, so far, there has been no indication of a softening of the US approach to China.

For China, the disputed waters are a historically vulnerable underbelly that must be turned into a natural shield for national security. Beijing feels cornered, and the presence of allies’ navies in US-led operations will only exacerbate the feeling.

A new great power contest would be a disaster for Southeast Asian states which struggle to maintain autonomy and prefer to selectively follow the wishes of bigger powers.

US military chiefs have played down any risk of radical action with China and many think the reshuffle is to fulfil Trump’s vow to bring troops in Afghanistan home. China is also unlikely to rise to provocations.

Asian nations prize their independence and do not want to take sides in a great power competition not of their making. They, too, take issue with some aspects of US behaviour, and sense that Washington may not have their interests and needs at heart.

The US seems to be pushing China to stand down from its claims and occupations or defend them militarily. This ‘put up or shut up’ strategy is risky – unless confrontation really is the aim.

Using a false civilian cover for spy planes may not be illegal but is dangerous and risks a major international incident. On this and undersea drones, the US owes the world more than studied silence.

As US-China tensions mount, Southeast Asian countries will need some fancy footwork to preserve Asean’s unity and centrality in deciding regional issues.

Amid heightened US-China tensions, the best scenario involves negotiations and power sharing. In the worst case, a clash leaves the region a cold-war zone, drives away energy firms, and possibly splits Asean. Unless the US is ready for war, it must learn to accommodate China